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The Irrepressible Myth of
Jacobson v. Massachusetts
JOSH BLACKMAN †
ABSTRACT
During the COVID-19 outbreak, Jacobson v.
Massachusetts became the fountainhead for pandemic
jurisprudence. Courts relied on this 1905 precedent to resolve
disputes about religious freedom, abortion, gun rights, voting
rights, the right to travel, and many other contexts. But
Justice John Marshall Harlan’s decision was very narrow. It
upheld the state’s power to impose a nominal fine on an
unvaccinated person. No more, no less. Yet, judges now follow
a variant of Jacobson that is far removed from the Lochnerera decision. And the Supreme Court is largely to blame for
these errors. Over the course of a century, four prominent
Justices established the irrepressible myth of Jacobson v.
Massachusetts.
This myth has four levels. The first level was layered in
Buck v. Bell (1927). Justice Holmes recast Jacobson’s limited
holding to support forcible intrusions onto bodily autonomy.
The law did not involve forcible vaccination, but Holmes still
used the case to uphold a compulsory sterilization regime. The
second level was layered in 1963. In Sherbert v. Verner,
†Professor, South Texas College of Law Houston.
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Justice Brennan transformed Jacobson, a substantive due
process case, into a free exercise case. And he suggested that
the usual First Amendment jurisprudence would not apply
during public health crises. The third level was layered in
1973. In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun incorporated
Jacobson into the Court’s modern substantive due process
framework. Roe also inadvertently extended Jacobson yet
further: during a health crisis, the state has additional
powers to restrict abortions. The fourth layer is of recent
vintage. In South Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, Chief Justice Roberts’s “superprecedent” suggested
that Jacobson-level deference was warranted for all
pandemic-related constitutional challenges. This final layer
of the myth, however, would be buried six months later in
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo. The per
curiam decision followed traditional First Amendment
doctrine and did not rely on Jacobson. But Jacobson stands
ready to open up an escape hatch from the Constitution
during the next crisis. The Supreme Court should restore
Jacobson to its original meaning, and permanently seal that
escape hatch.
This Article, written in the midst of the pandemic, will
revisit, repudiate, and replace the irrepressible myth of
Jacobson v. Massachusetts.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2019, Jacobson v. Massachusetts was an obscure
precedent. 1 Yet in 2020, Jacobson became the fountainhead
for pandemic jurisprudence. Courts relied on Jacobson to
resolve disputes about religious freedom, abortion, gun
rights, voting rights, the right to travel, and many other
contexts. And in 2021, governments began to impose vaccine
mandates. Now, as the COVID-19 pandemic enters its next
phase, this 1905 precedent retains a central place in our
constitutional discourse. But what exactly did Jacobson say?
Justice John Marshall Harlan’s decision upheld the state’s
power to impose a nominal fine on a person who refused to
be vaccinated. No more, no less. Yet, judges now follow a
variant of Jacobson that is far removed from the Lochner-era
decision. And the Supreme Court is largely to blame for these
departures from precedent.
Over the course of a century, four prominent Justices
established the irrepressible myth of Jacobson v.
Massachusetts. 2 This myth has four levels. The first level
was layered in 1927. In Buck v. Bell, Justice Holmes upheld
Virginia’s eugenics law, which mandated involuntary
sterilization for so-called “imbeciles.” 3 And he used Jacobson
as the leading authority. Or more precisely, Holmes recast
Jacobson’s limited holding: “the principle that sustains
compulsory vaccination” from Jacobson “is broad enough to
cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.” 4 In a single sentence,
Holmes expanded the scope of Jacobson beyond its narrow
1. See 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
2. I give all due credit to John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Irrepressible
Myth of Marbury, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2706 (2003); Adam N. Steinman, The
Irrepressible Myth of Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment Burdens
Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 81 (2006); Howard M.
Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53 (2011); Josh
Blackman, The Irrepressible Myth of Cooper v. Aaron, 107 GEO. L.J. 1135 (2019).
3. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
4. Id.
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confines to support forcible intrusions onto bodily autonomy.
The second level was layered in 1963. In Sherbert v.
Verner, Justice Brennan found that neutral laws that burden
religion would be reviewed with something like strict
scrutiny. 5 But Brennan recognized that the Court had
upheld “governmental regulation of certain overt acts
prompted by religious beliefs or principles” that “invariably
posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or
order.” 6 Justice Brennan cited Jacobson as an example of
this dynamic. 7 Jacobson had nothing to do with “religious
beliefs.” The case didn’t even raise a Free Exercise claim. But
with a single citation, Brennan transformed a substantive
due process case into a Free Exercise Clause case—even
though Jacobson predated incorporation doctrine by decades.
And, perhaps unwittingly, Brennan suggested that the usual
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence would not apply during
public health crises.
The third level was layered in 1973. In Roe v. Wade,
Justice Blackmun recognized a substantive due process right
to terminate a pregnancy. 8 But, “[t]he Court . . . refused to
recognize an unlimited right” “to do with one’s body as one
pleases.” 9 To support this limitation, Justice Blackmun cited
two cases: Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Buck v. Bell. 10
With these citations, the Court affirmed Justice Holmes’s
misreading of Jacobson. And Justice Blackmun incorporated
Jacobson into the Court’s modern substantive due process
framework—even though Jacobson predated modern
constitutional law by decades. Roe also extended Jacobson
yet further: during a health crisis, the state has additional
powers to restrict abortions.
5. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
6. Id. at 403.
7. Id.
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. Id. at 154.
10. Id.
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The fourth layer is of recent vintage. In South Bay
United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, the Supreme Court
refused to enjoin California’s COVID-19 restrictions on
houses of worship. 11 This shadow docket case lacked a
majority opinion. But Chief Justice Roberts wrote an
influential concurring opinion. 12 He favorably cited Jacobson
and wrote that “[o]ur Constitution principally entrusts ‘the
safety and the health of the people’ to the politically
accountable officials of the States ‘to guard and protect.’” 13 In
short order, this concurrence became a “superprecedent.”
Over the following six months, 140 cases cited the solo
opinion, more than 90 of which also cited Jacobson. 14 It isn’t
clear that the Chief Justice intended to adopt Jacobson’s
constitutional analysis as a general rule to review pandemic
measures. Yet Roberts established the fourth layer of
Jacobson’s myth: Jacobson-level deference was warranted
for all pandemic-related constitutional challenges. The lower
courts followed the Chief’s signal. This final layer of the
myth, however, would be buried six months later in Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo. The per curiam
decision followed traditional First Amendment doctrine and
did not rely on Jacobson. 15 But Jacobson stands ready to
open up an escape hatch from the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.
This Article, written in the midst of the pandemic, will
revisit, repudiate, and replace the irrepressible myth of
Jacobson v. Massachusetts.
Part I provides a brief history of constitutional law
during the Lochner era. During that time, there were no tiers

11. See 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 141
S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.).
12. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief).
13. Id. at 1613.
14. I performed this search, and others, using the Westlaw Keycite feature.
15. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 65–69 (2020)
(per curiam).

138

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

of scrutiny, the Supreme Court did not distinguish between
fundamental and nonfundamental rights, and the Bill of
Rights had not yet been incorporated. So-called rational
basis review was actually somewhat rigorous. Moreover, the
Court treated economic property rights in the same fashion
as it treated personal liberty. When reviewing decisions from
this epoch, it is important to view them in the timeframe in
which they were decided. It is anachronistic to view these
cases through the lens of modernity. And it is problematic to
graft these early cases onto the modern framework of
constitutional law. Yet, courts and scholars routinely make
these errors with Jacobson.
Part II recounts the history of Jacobson. In 1902,
Massachusetts and Cambridge law provided that
unvaccinated people would be subject to a five-dollar fine.
Henning Jacobson, a Lutheran Evangelical Minister, refused
to be vaccinated. In his youth, Jacobson had an adverse
reaction to a smallpox inoculation. The city charged him with
violating the law. Jacobson raised several defenses based on
the federal and state constitutions, but he did not argue the
prosecution violated the Free Exercise Clause. Nor could he.
The First Amendment would not be incorporated for decades.
The trial court rejected Jacobson’s defenses. He was
convicted after a jury trial and ordered to pay a five-dollar
fine. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction. Justice John Marshal Harlan wrote the
majority opinion. So long as there was a reasonable fit
between the measure adopted and the government’s interest
to promote public health, the law was valid. Two months
after Jacobson was decided, the Court handed down its
infamous decision in Lochner v. New York. Both of these
cases were cut from the same constitutional cloth and should
be viewed as byproducts of Progressive Era jurisprudence. To
understand Jacobson, we must understand Lochner. And to
understand Lochner, we must understand Jacobson.
Part III introduces the first layer of Jacobson’s myth.
The 1905 decision only upheld the state’s power to impose a
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nominal fine on an unvaccinated person. The Massachusetts
law did not involve forcible vaccination. But in Buck v. Bell,
Justice Holmes completely retconned Jacobson. Now
Jacobson was understood to support Virginia’s sterilization
law. Holmes analogized government-compelled sterilization
to government-compelled vaccination. Buck radically
expanded the scope of Harlan’s modest decision. In time,
Holmes’s misreading would become the paradigmatic
understanding of Jacobson.
Part IV turns to the second layer of Jacobson’s myth.
Justice Harlan’s decision did not implicate the Free Exercise
Clause. Yet, during the 1940s several Justices found
Jacobson to be a useful precedent to limit the scope of
religious exemptions. And in Sherbert v. Verner, Justice
Brennan expressly incorporated Jacobson into First
Amendment doctrine. In normal times, certain Free Exercise
claims would be reviewed with strict scrutiny. But during a
health crisis of unknown severity or duration, Brennan
crafted an escape hatch from strict scrutiny that led back to
profound judicial restraint. And the second layer of
Jacobson’s myth was established: usual Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence would not apply during health crises.
And this myth would cause confusion for decades to come—
especially during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Part V peels back the third layer of Jacobson’s myth. Roe
v. Wade explained that a woman can be forced to carry a
pregnancy to term in light of precedents upholding
compulsory vaccination (Jacobson) and compulsory
sterilization (Buck). Roe incorporated Jacobson, as well as
Buck, into the Supreme Court’s modern substantive due
process jurisprudence—thus laying the third level of
Jacobson’s myth. And in the process, Roe extended Jacobson
yet further: during a health crisis, the state has additional
powers to restrict abortions. This expanded authority would
be utilized during the pandemic.
Part VI revisits South Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom. In this 5–4 case, the Court declined to enjoin
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California’s restrictions on houses of worship. Chief Justice
Roberts wrote a brief concurrence that counseled deference
during the pandemic. The Chief Justice included one citation
to
Jacobson.
The
concurrence
soon
became
a
“superprecedent” for the lower courts. And Roberts
established the fourth layer of Jacobson’s myth:
Jacobson-level deference was warranted for all pandemicrelated constitutional challenges. Six months later, in
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, the Court
interred this superprecedent. Here, the new Roberts Court
followed modern First Amendment caselaw and did not even
cite Jacobson.
Jacobson was pruned, but was not overruled. This
precedent still stands “like a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need.” 16 In 2020, COVID-19 pulled that
trigger. At any moment, Jacobson can open another escape
hatch from the Constitution during a future crisis. The
Supreme Court should restore Jacobson to its original
meaning and permanently seal that escape hatch. Future
disputes should be resolved based on settled law, and not on
an irrepressible myth.

16. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944) (“Even the
personal liberty of the citizen may be temporarily restrained as a measure of
public safety.” (first citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); and
then citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905))).

2022]
I.

IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF JACOBSON

141

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM THE
LOCHNER ERA TO THE PRESENT

Jacobson v. Massachusetts was decided in February
1905, 17 two months before the Supreme Court handed down
Lochner v. New York. 18 This period was known politically as
the Progressive Era, and legally as the Lochner Era.
Constitutional law was very different at the turn of the
twentieth century. When reviewing decisions from this
epoch, it is important to view them in the timeframe in which
they were decided. It is anachronistic to view these cases
through the lens of modernity. And it is problematic to graft
these early cases onto the modern framework of
constitutional law. Yet, courts and scholars routinely make
these errors.
Part I will provide a brief history of constitutional law
from the Lochner era to the present. First, we will revisit the
Fourteenth Amendment, as it was understood in 1905. At the
time, there were no tiers of scrutiny, the Supreme Court did
not distinguish between fundamental and nonfundamental
rights, and the Bill of Rights had not yet been incorporated.
So-called rational basis review was actually somewhat
rigorous. Moreover, the Court treated economic property
rights in the same fashion as personal liberty. Second, we
will turn to the Supreme Court’s nascent First Amendment
caselaw. Modern Free Speech and Free Exercise
jurisprudence would not begin until the 1940s. Jacobson,
decided in 1905, did not in any way implicate the First
Amendment. Third, we will trace the evolution of modern
constitutional law. Footnote Four of United States v.
Carolene Products dichotomized fundamental and
nonfundamental rights. And this decision largely repudiated
the Lochner-era level of judicial skepticism of laws that
burdened unenumerated rights. That presumption of liberty

17. 197 U.S. at 11 (decided February 20, 1905).
18. 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905) (decided April 17, 1905).
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was replaced with the presumption of constitutionality. All
of these developments, however, post-dated Jacobson by
decades.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment, as Understood in 1905
In 1905, the Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment
caselaw was primordial. The Privileges or Immunities
Clause was an empty vessel. 19 States were not bound by the
Bill of Rights. 20 And separate was equal. 21 This
jurisprudence was far removed from modern doctrine. The
Supreme Court had not yet carved the tiers of scrutiny. 22
There was no divide between rational basis scrutiny and
strict scrutiny. 23 Nor was there a sharp dichotomy between
fundamental and nonfundamental rights. 24 Yet, cases from
the Progressive Era invoked concepts and terms that seem
familiar to present-day students of constitutional law, but
had very different meanings. Consider three prominent
examples.
First, courts in the early twentieth century employed the
19. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873).
20. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552–53 (1876) (holding that
the state governments were not bound by the First and Second Amendments).
21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
22. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Jacobson pre-dated the modern tiers of scrutiny.”);
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1284
(2007) (“Before 1960, what we would now call strict judicial scrutiny . . . did not
exist.”).
23. Cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“It should be
noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a
single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the
most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the
existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.” (emphasis added)).
24. Cf. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 811 (2010) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“The one theme that links the Court’s substantive due process
precedents together is their lack of a guiding principle to distinguish
‘fundamental’ rights that warrant protection from nonfundamental rights that
do not.”).
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concept of a rational basis test in a very different fashion
than courts do in the modern era. Adkins v. Children’s
Hospital of the District of Columbia, for instance, “steadily
adhered to the rule that every possible presumption is in
favor of the validity of an act of Congress until overcome
beyond rational doubt.” 25 This level of deference seems quite
high. Yet Adkins than halted the federal minimum wage law.
Second, courts in the early twentieth century referred to
“fundamental rights” in a very different fashion than courts
do today. Buchanan v. Warley held that the Fourteenth
Amendment “fix[ed] certain fundamental rights which all are
bound to respect.” 26 But those fundamental rights need not
be enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, prior to the
modern incorporation doctrine, fundamental rights were
generally unenumerated. Bailey v. Alabama recognized that
certain laws “violate[] those fundamental rights and
immutable principles of justice which are embraced within
the conception of due process of law.” 27 And Meyer v.
Nebraska found that “the individual has certain
fundamental rights which must be respected,” including
“those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” 28 These
prominent Progressive-Era cases declared unconstitutional
regulations that violated unenumerated rights—what courts
now refer to as substantive due process. That term, however,
did not exist in the Progressive Era.
Moreover, during this period, the Supreme Court did not
distinguish between due process rights to “property” and due
process rights to “personal liberty.” 29 Lochner v. New York

25. 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923) (emphasis added).
26. 245 U.S. 60, 75 (1917) (emphasis added).
27. 219 U.S. 219, 239 (1911) (emphasis added).
28. 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) (emphasis added).
29. RANDY E. BARNETT & JOSH BLACKMAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 100 SUPREME COURT CASES EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW 155
(2021).
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involved the former right, 30 and Buck v. Bell involved the
latter right. 31 In many cases, these rights would merge. For
example, Pierce v. Society of Sisters involved a corporation’s
economic right to run a private school. 32 Yet, this propertybased right was intertwined with a parent’s personal liberty
to raise their children. 33 The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court recognized this relationship in Jacobson v.
Commonwealth: “The rights of individuals must yield, if
necessary, when the welfare of the whole community is at
stake. This is true of the right to personal liberty as well as
the right to property.” 34 The unenumerated right at issue in
Jacobson had deep roots. There is a longstanding, commonlaw right to be free from arbitrary governmental restraint. 35
Indeed, the Supreme Court “inferred” from Jacobson the
“principle that a competent person has a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment.” 36
Third, courts in the early twentieth century approached
pretext in a very different fashion than courts do today. In
modern cases, courts often set aside facially neutral laws
that are motivated by unconstitutional animus based on
race, religion, sexual orientation, or some other

30. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
31. 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
32. 268 U.S. 510, 530–33 (1925).
33. BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 29, at 158.
34. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 720 (Mass. 1903), aff’d sub nom.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (emphasis added).
35. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990) (“The logical
corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally
possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse [medical] treatment.”); id. at
305 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The right to be free from medical attention
without consent, to determine what shall be done with one’s own body, is deeply
rooted in this Nation’s traditions, as the majority acknowledges. This right has
long been ‘firmly entrenched in American tort law’ and is securely grounded in
the earliest common law.” (citations omitted)).
36. Id. at 278 (majority opinion).
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characteristic. 37 But in the Progressive Era, courts
performed a different type of pretextual analysis. They were
largely unconcerned with legislatures burdening disfavored
groups. Remember, separate was still equal. Rather, courts
carefully scrutinized so-called “class legislation.” 38 Such laws
were not public spirited, but were designed to benefit a
specific class, without regard to any innate characteristic.
For example, the majority opinion in Lochner insinuated that
the New York Bakeshop Act was enacted for such “other
motives”—helping unions, and harming non-unionized
bakeshops and their employees. 39 Likewise Jacobson
considered, and rejected similar arguments that the
Massachusetts law was class legislation. 40
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, a prominent case from two decades

37. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1724 (2018) (“When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission considered this
case, it did not do so with the religious neutrality that the Constitution
requires.”); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770 (2013) (“The history of
DOMA’s enactment and its own text demonstrate that interference with the
equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a dignity conferred by the States in the
exercise of their sovereign power, was more than an incidental effect of the
federal statute.”).
38. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (“What is called class
legislation would belong to this category, and would be obnoxious to the
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.
27, 32 (1884) (“Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring
others, is prohibited . . . .”); cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 370 (1927)
(“The Syndicalism Act is not class legislation; it affects all alike, no matter what
their business associations or callings, who come within its terms and do the
things prohibited.”).
39. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“It is impossible for us to
shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed
under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the
public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.” (emphasis
added)).
40. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905) (“[I]f a statute
purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals,
or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects,” then “it
is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the
Constitution.”); see supra Section II.C.4 (discussing pretextual analysis in
Jacobson).
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earlier, also illustrates this principle. 41 This case declared
unconstitutional a San Francisco ordinance that required
business owners who operated laundries in wooden buildings
to obtain a permit. At the time, approximately two-thirds of
those laundries were owned by people of Chinese descent. 42
Today, judges and scholars commonly categorize Yick Wo as
an Equal Protection Clause case. 43 But this characterization
is incomplete. The Waite Court expressly relied on both the
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. The
syllabus of the case identifies the two independent bases for
the Court’s ruling. The first paragraph evaluated the
substance of the ordinance in light of the Due Process
Clause. 44 And the second paragraph evaluated how the
ordinance is enforced in light of the Equal Protection
Clause. 45 According to the syllabus, both the substance and
enforcement of the San Francisco ordinance were
unconstitutional. This law violated the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a companion case to Yick Wo, the federal circuit court
observed that the government’s licensing scheme was not a
means “to regulate the business for the public safety.” 46
Rather, the actual purpose of the ordinance was “to drive out
of business all the numerous small laundries, especially
those owned by Chinese, and [to] give a monopoly of the
41. 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
42. Id. at 359.
43. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 292 (1978).
44. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 356 (“A municipal ordinance to regulate the carrying
on of public laundries within the limits of the municipality violates the provisions
of the Constitution of the United States, if it confers upon the municipal
authorities arbitrary power . . . .” (emphasis added)).
45. Id. (“An administration of a municipal ordinance for the carrying on of a
lawful business within the corporate limits violates the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, if it makes arbitrary and unjust
discriminations, founded on differences of race, between persons otherwise in
similar circumstances.” (emphasis added)).
46. In re Wo Lee, 26 F. 471, 475 (C.C.D. Cal.), rev’d sub nom. Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).

2022]

IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF JACOBSON

147

business to the large institutions established and carried on
by means of large associated Caucasian capital.” 47 This
policy, the court found, likely violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Why? Because it deprived the business owners
of their “property”—that is, their business and livelihood—
“without due process of law.” 48 This analysis did not turn on
the race of the proprietors.
The Supreme Court found that the San Francisco
laundry ordinance was unconstitutional not because it
targeted Chinese people, but because it arbitrarily denied a
single class of people a property right. 49 The Court suggested
that the law was “class legislation” because it did not
“prescribe a rule and conditions, for the regulation of the use
of property for laundry purposes, to which all similarly
situated may conform.” 50 This law did not “affect[] alike all
persons similarly situated.” 51 Rather, San Francisco drew
“an arbitrary line, on one side of which are those who are
permitted to pursue their industry by the mere will and
consent of the supervisors, and on the other those from whom
that consent is withheld, at their mere will and pleasure.” 52
The fact that only Chinese people were targeted was
evidence of the law’s arbitrariness. But such racial animus
was not dispositive.
When reviewing constitutional law decisions from the
Progressive Era, it is important to view them in the
timeframe in which they were decided. This lesson is
47. Id. at 474.
48. Id.
49. David E. Bernstein, Revisiting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV.
1393, 1402 (“But unlike typical Lochner-era cases, in which the Court invalidated
laws as facially invalid as violations of property rights or liberty of contract, or as
class legislation, the Yick Wo Court avoided ruling on the petitioners’ facial
challenge and instead invalidated the laundry ordinances at issue because they
were applied in a discriminatory manner.”).
50. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 368.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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especially apt for Jacobson v. Massachusetts.
B. The First Amendment, as Understood in 1905
In 1905, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence was nascent. At that time, the First
Amendment had not been “incorporated” against the states
by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court had
decided a handful of Free Exercise Clause cases, with respect
to the federal government. For example, Reynolds v. United
States rejected a Free Exercise challenge to a federal
polygamy prosecution. 53 In 1919, the Court decided a trio of
free speech cases: Schenck v. United States, Debs v. United
States, and Abrams v. United States. 54 These cases upheld
prosecutions for seditious speech that was critical of the
federal government. These three speech cases are flatly
inconsistent with modern First Amendment jurisprudence. 55
It is unclear if Reynolds would survive Obergefell v. Hodges. 56
The Supreme Court first suggested that the states were
bound by the Free Speech Clause in Gitlow v. New York
(1925). 57 And the Court found that a state law violated the
Free Speech Clause for the first time in Stromberg v.

53. 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878); see also Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 347–
48 (1890).
54. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
55. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (“The contrary
teaching of Whitney v. California, . . . cannot be supported, and that decision is
therefore overruled.”).
56. 576 U.S. 644, 704 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If not having the
opportunity to marry ‘serves to disrespect and subordinate’ gay and lesbian
couples, why wouldn’t the same ‘imposition of this disability,’ serve to disrespect
and subordinate people who find fulfillment in polyamorous relationships?”); id.
at 705 (“When asked about a plural marital union at oral argument, petitioners
asserted that a State ‘doesn’t have such an institution.’ But that is exactly the
point: the States at issue here do not have an institution of same-sex marriage,
either.” (citation omitted)).
57. 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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California (1931). 58 The Free Exercise Clause was formally
incorporated a decade later in Cantwell v. Connecticut
(1940). 59 All of these developments postdated Jacobson by
decades.
C. The Evolution to Modern Constitutional Law
Modern constitutional doctrine would begin, in earnest,
three decades after Jacobson. The Supreme Court’s
Progressive-Era approach to the Fourteenth Amendment
largely subsided during the New Deal. 60 The Supreme
Court’s present-day approach to the Due Process Clause
springs from Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene
Products Co. 61 Justice Stone wrote the majority opinion. The
first paragraph of Footnote Four stated that the presumption
of constitutionality should not be used by courts to review
legislation that “appears on its face” to violate “a specific
prohibition of the Constitution.” 62 Specifically, that
presumption of constitutionality is not warranted when a
law runs afoul of rights protected by “the first ten
Amendments.” 63 For example, the Court should not use the
presumption of constitutionality to review a law that violates
the freedom of speech. Instead, the Court should invert the
presumption of constitutionality to what may be called a
presumption of liberty. 64 With this approach, the
government has the burden to justify why it is violating that
enumerated right. The Court would later refer to this model
as “strict scrutiny.” There was an unstated implication in the
first paragraph of Footnote Four: nonfundamental rights
58. 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
59. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
60. BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 29, at 163.
61. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2003).
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that did not violate “a specific prohibition of the
Constitution” would be reviewed with the presumption of
constitutionality. 65 That is, most laws that burdened
unenumerated rights would be reviewed with a deferential
standard of review. 66
Under modern doctrine, enumerated rights in the Bill of
Rights are considered fundamental rights. And most laws
that burden fundamental rights are reviewed with strict
scrutiny. 67 I say most because the Supreme Court has
stopped short of reviewing laws that burden the Second
Amendment with strict scrutiny. 68 And the Court reviews
certain free speech claims with a standard akin to
intermediate scrutiny. 69
In contrast, most unenumerated rights are considered
nonfundamental rights. I say most, because the Supreme
Court has found that certain unenumerated rights may still
be considered fundamental. 70 However, the Supreme Court
65. See id.
66. The Ninth Amendment provides, “The enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Footnote Four arguably “disparages” rights
that are “not enumerated in the Constitution” because they are not enumerated.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
67. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (“We know of no
other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected
to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach. The very enumeration of the right
takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—
the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth
insisting upon.”); cf. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63,
70 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Rational basis review is the test this Court
normally applies to Fourteenth Amendment challenges, so long as they do not
involve suspect classifications based on race or some other ground, or a claim of
fundamental right.”).
68. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (noting that the rational basis test “could not
be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific,
enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, the guarantee against double
jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the right to keep and bear arms”).
69. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77, 382 (1968).
70. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 675 (2015) (“These
considerations lead to the conclusion that the right to marry is a fundamental
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does not purport to follow this doctrine with any regularity.
In some cases, the Court does not even classify the
substantive due process right at issue. 71 Generally, laws that
burden nonfundamental rights are reviewed with rational
basis review. Still, the scrutiny for certain nonfundamental
rights may resemble strict scrutiny. 72
Footnote Four served as a repudiation of the prevailing
jurisprudence from the so-called Lochner era. 73 During the
early twentieth century, the courts would strictly scrutinize
laws that burdened enumerated rights that were implied
from the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment. But at this time, the phrase “substantive due
process” had not yet been coined. And the Court hadn’t
referred to strict scrutiny or rational basis scrutiny. These
concepts would only come about decades later.
Jacobson was decided during a time when the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
understood to prohibit “arbitrary” or “irrational” forms of
legislation. But that standard of review did not resemble the
modern rational basis test—even where the Supreme Court
referred to a “rational” basis. 74 This type of scrutiny had
teeth. In Lochner, the government had the burden to defend
the reasonableness of its law. In Jacobson, the challenger
right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may
not be deprived of that right and that liberty.” (emphasis added)); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’
fundamental to our very existence and survival.” (emphasis added)).
71. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Though there is discussion of ‘fundamental proposition[s],’ and ‘fundamental
decisions,’ nowhere does the Court’s opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is
a ‘fundamental right’ under the Due Process Clause.” (alteration in original)
(citations omitted)).
72. Id.
73. See Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial
Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1566 (2004) (observing that Carolene Products
“is best understood as an effort by the Court to tame the doctrine of substantive
due process by confining it within narrow boundaries”).
74. See supra Section II.A.
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had the burden to challenge the reasonableness of the law.
But under either standard, it was still feasible for the
challengers to prevail. Contrary to common belief, this
standard would endure through the New Deal. 75 Rather, the
Court would only adopt a nearly-irrebuttable presumption of
constitutionality decades later in Williamson v. Lee
Optical. 76 In that seminal case, the “Supreme Court would
adopt something like Justice Holmes’s more deferential
[Lochner] approach.” 77
II. REVISITING JACOBSON AND LOCHNER IN 1905
Around the turn of the twentieth century, states began
to require people to be vaccinated against smallpox. And
courts upheld these measures as constitutional exercises of
the police power. In 1902, Massachusetts enacted such a law.
Later that year, the city of Cambridge prosecuted Henning
Jacobson for refusing to get vaccinated. Jacobson, a
Lutheran Evangelical Minister, argued that the law violated
the state and federal constitution. However, Jacobson did not
raise any religious freedom arguments. At the time, the Free
Exercise Clause had not yet been incorporated. After a trial,
Jacobson was convicted, and ordered to pay the maximum
permissible fine: five dollars. The Massachusetts law did not
allow the Commonwealth to forcibly vaccinate Jacobson. An
unvaccinated person who paid the fine was free to spread
smallpox, and still be fully compliant with the law. The
Boston Globe reported about one such person who attended
the 1902 meeting of the Massachusetts Anti-Compulsory
Vaccination Society: “Mortimer W. Lawrence of Roxbury,
who recently paid his fine for refusing vaccination and defied
75. BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 29, at 169 (“Throughout the New Deal,
the presumption of constitutionality in O’Gorman, Nebbia, and West Coast Hotel
was rebuttable. It was still feasible for plaintiffs to challenge the constitutionality
of a law that restricted economic liberty. They could present evidence showing
that the restriction was arbitrary.”).
76. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
77. BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 29, at 147.
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the board of health to prosecute further.” 78
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld
Jacobson’s conviction. It found that individual liberty could
be restricted to promote the common welfare. On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court agreed. Justice John Marshal
Harlan wrote the majority opinion. So long as there was a
reasonable fit between the measure adopted, and the
government’s interest was to promote public health, the law
was valid. Still, Jacobson identified several limitations on its
holding that are often disregarded in modern discourse.
Finally, this Part will juxtapose Jacobson with the
infamous case of Lochner v. New York. The two cases, which
were decided two months apart, are cut from the same
constitutional cloth. Both of these cases should be viewed as
byproducts of the early twentieth century jurisprudence. To
understand Jacobson, we must understand Lochner. And to
understand Lochner, we must understand Jacobson.
A. Mandatory Vaccination Laws at the Turn of the
Twentieth Century
By the end of the nineteenth century, “most, if not all, of
the States” made “vaccination [against smallpox] a
prerequisite to attendance” for students at schools. 79 The
state courts upheld those laws “on the general ground that
attendance upon schools is a privilege afforded by the State,
rather than a technical right of the citizen.” 80 Therefore, “the
State may impose reasonable conditions upon those availing
themselves of such privilege.” 81 However, some states went
even “further and enacted statutes requiring in certain
exigencies, vaccination on the part of all persons in the

78. Stands by Albert M. Pear, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 2, 1902, at 4
[https://perma.cc/Z3TA-7R5A].
79. Comment, Compulsory Vaccination, 12 YALE L.J. 504, 504 (1903).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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community.” 82 Two early state supreme court decisions
approved these measures.
In Morris v. City of Columbus, the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld a general vaccine mandate that was not
tethered to school attendance. 83 The Court reasoned that if
the legislature “can say that the penalty for refusing to be
vaccinated must be a denial of the pupil’s right or privilege
to attend school, why can it not say to another general class,
‘The penalty for your refusal to submit to vaccination shall
be a fine or imprisonment’?” 84 The mandate did not “deprive
[people] of any right without due process of law, or . . . deny
to them the equal protection of the law.” 85 This reasoning
seems backwards. The power to impose a mandate for
students is more limited than the power to impose a mandate
for the entire populace. The lesser power does not embrace
the greater power.
North Carolina enacted a similar law. Defendants would
“be fined $10 for every day they refuse[d] [to be vaccinated]
after being called upon by the doctor appointed, or
imprisoned for 30 days.” 86 The North Carolina Supreme
Court upheld this regime. 87 The Court explained that if the
state has the greater power to “draft or conscript its citizens
to defend its borders from invasion,” the state also has the
lesser power to “protect itself from the deadly pestilence that
walketh by noonday by such measures as medical science has
found most efficacious for that purpose.” 88 This syllogism—
in contrast with the Georgia Supreme Court’s backwards
reasoning—flows in the correct direction. The greater power
of conscription includes the lesser power of vaccination. But
82. Id. at 505.
83. 30 S.E. 850, 853–54 (Ga. 1898).
84. Id. at 854.
85. Id.
86. State v. Hay, 35 S.E. 459, 460 (N.C. 1900).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 461.
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there was some disagreement on the North Carolina
Supreme Court about the broad scope of this authority. A
concurrence worried that “there must be some limit” to the
state’s police power, but found the challenged measure was
reasonable. 89
Theoretically, an unvaccinated North Carolinian could
be incarcerated for life, serving a never-ending series of
thirty-day sentences. Double jeopardy would not attach
because violating each new order would trigger a new
offense. Moreover, the daily penalties could force a person
into never-ending debt. Before the Supreme Court, Henning
Jacobson explained that English law permitted a person to
be “repeatedly fined for recalcitrancy.” 90 He added that with
“repeated prosecutions . . . brought against the same
individual, the accumulation of fines and taxes may become
an insupportable burden and result in the imprisonment of
the offender.” 91 Jacobson concluded that “[a]ny law providing
a fine, together with the costs of prosecution upon appeal, as
in this case, is practically compulsory upon a large class of
citizens who are without means of payment.” 92 Still, despite
all of these draconian measures, the states did not purport to
have the power to forcibly vaccinate people. By 1905, “[n]ot
one of the states undert[ook] forcible vaccinations of its
inhabitants, while the states of Utah and West Virginia
expressly provide[d] that no such compulsion [would] be
used.” 93

89. Id. at 462 (Douglas, J., concurring).
90. Transcript of Record at 17, *43, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (No. 70-175) [https://perma.cc/EUK9-TX4V] (For the Jacobson transcripts,
all asterisk page numbers—“*__”—refer to the page number in the PDF.).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 17–18, *43–44.
93. Id. at 7, *33.
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B. Commonwealth v. Henning Jacobson
In 1902, Cambridge, Massachusetts required its
residents to be vaccinated against smallpox. Those who
refused would be subject to a five-dollar fine. Henning
Jacobson, a Swedish Evangelical Lutheran, refused to be
vaccinated. He had adverse reactions from a prior
inoculation. Jacobson was charged with violating the
Cambridge ordinance. The minister argued that the law
violated the United States and Massachusetts constitutions,
but he did not raise any arguments based on the freedom of
religion. The trial court rejected all of Jacobson’s
constitutional defenses. Jacobson was convicted. On appeal,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld his
conviction. The Court found that the state can restrict
individual liberty to promote the general welfare. But the
Court stressed that this case did not involve forcibly
vaccinating people. Rather, the unvaccinated would only
have to pay a modest penalty. Section II.B will tell the story
of Commonwealth v. Henning Jacobson.
1. Massachusetts Legislates and Cambridge Regulates
In 1902, the Massachusetts Legislature followed the
practices from Georgia and North Carolina. It gave local
governments the authority to penalize people who were not
vaccinated against smallpox. At the time, cowpox was used
to vaccinate against smallpox. The Massachusetts statute
provided:
The board of health of a city or town, if, in its opinion, it is necessary
for the public health or safety shall require and enforce the
vaccination and re-vaccination of all the inhabitants thereof and
shall provide them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever,
being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship,
refuses or neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit
five dollars. 94

94. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 137 (1901) [https://perma.cc/8CLS-QXWM]; see
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12 (1905). I have reproduced all of the
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The Legislature exempted from this requirement
“[c]hildren who present a certificate, signed by a registered
physician that they are unfit subjects for vaccination.” 95
Unlike the North Carolina law, the Massachusetts statute
did not permit daily fines or incarceration. 96 Moreover, this
statute did not authorize the government to prosecute the
same person over and over again for the same offense.
However, the failure to pay the five-dollar penalty could
result in jailtime. But an unvaccinated person who paid the
fine was free to spread smallpox, and still be fully compliant
with the law. This bill had received support from doctors, 97
and opposition from critics of compulsory vaccination. 98 One
of the anti-vaccionationists who testified before hearings
nearly died of smallpox, but later recovered. 99
On February 27, 1902, the Cambridge Board of Health
“order[ed] that all the inhabitants of the city who had not
been successfully vaccinated since March 1, 1897, [must] be
vaccinated or revaccinated.” 100 (The cowpox-based vaccine
only provided immunity for limited periods of time.) The
Board made several findings. First, “smallpox has been
prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge, and still
continues to increase.” 101 Second, to promote “the speedy
provisions of Chapter 75 at https://perma.cc/8CLS-QXWM.
95. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 139 (1901).
96. Cf. supra Section II.A (discussing North Carolina statute that would
permit repeated prosecutions for disregarding subsequent orders).
97. Many Physicians Demand Legal Interference, BOS. EVENING TRANSCRIPT,
Jan. 31, 1902, at 6 [https://perma.cc/94XA-TCHK].
98. All Opposed Vaccination, BOS. EVENING TRANSCRIPT, Jan. 29, 1902, at 10
[https://perma.cc/FR8H-JWLE]; Loud Protest Against the Compulsory
Vaccination Law, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 29, 1902, at 4 [https://perma.cc/7BXR-YEZ9].
99. Pfeiffer Dying of Smallpox: Noted Anti-Vaccinationist Who Risked
Exposure is Dying, BOS. POST, Feb. 9, 1902, at 1 [https://perma.cc/T8CM-SDDH];
Dr Pfeiffer’s Illness: His Condition Reported Good This Morning, BOS. GLOBE,
Feb. 12, 1902, at 3 [https://perma.cc/PZV4-92LW].
100. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 719–20 (Mass. 1903), aff’d sub nom.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
101. Id. at 720.
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extermination of the disease, that all persons not protected
by vaccination should be vaccinated.” 102 Third, “the public
health and safety require the vaccination or revaccination of
all the inhabitants of Cambridge.” 103
However, several Cambridge residents refused to get
vaccinated. Perhaps the most famous refusenik was Henning
Jacobson, a Swedish Evangelical Lutheran minister. 104 He
lived at 95 Pine Street, 105 and was about 50 years old. 106
Jacobson was born in Sweden “in excellent health.” 107 At the
time, Sweden enforced a compulsory vaccination regime. But
when Jacobson was “vaccinated in infancy . . . he was
troubled with a hot burning rash which continued for
years.” 108 Jacobson “needed constant and efficient care, such
as being wrapped in hot wet sheets, etc.” 109
Jacobson’s eighteen-year-old son had a similar reaction
to the smallpox vaccine. Apparently, the son’s employer
ordered him to be vaccinated. The father urged his son to
quit, rather than get the vaccine. The son chose to stay in his
employment and was vaccinated. As a result of the shot,
“[f]or six months he carried his arm in a sling.” 110 Jacobson
also had a six-year-old daughter. He told Doctor Abbott of the
state board of health about the injuries that he and his son
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See Henning Jacobson Loses His Fight with the Board of Public Health
Over Vaccination, NEW ENG. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.newenglandhistorical
society.com/henning-jacobson-loses-his-freedom-to-the-board-of-public-health/
[https://perma.cc/R2UX-VXMM] (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
105. Anti-Vaccinationists: Rev. Mr. Jacobson and City Clerk Pear of Cambridge
Haled to Court, BOS. POST, Jul. 20, 1902, at 4 [https://perma.cc/NZG3-4JHY].
106. Case Goes to the Supreme Court: Fight Being Made Against the
Compulsory Vaccination Law, BERKSHIRE EAGLE, Nov. 17, 1904, at 8
[https://perma.cc/D2Z7-WLS6].
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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suffered. 111 Jacobson “wanted a signed statement from Dr.
Abbott that he (Abbott) would be responsible for any injury
resulting from the vaccination of his child.” 112
Unsurprisingly, Abbott declined that request, but “granted a
permit of exemption” for the daughter. 113
On March 15, 1902, E. Edwin Spencer, the chairman of
the Cambridge Board of Health “informed [Jacobson] that if
he refused to be vaccinated he would incur the penalty of five
dollars provided by the vaccination law, and would be
prosecuted.” 114 Spencer “offered to vaccinate [Jacobson]
without any expense to him.” 115 However, Jacobson
“absolutely refused to be vaccinated.” 116 Soon, the refusenik
would be hauled into court.
2. Jacobson’s “Good Story” Before the District Court
On July 17, 1902, Spencer filed a criminal complaint
against Jacobson in the Third District Court of Eastern
Middlesex. 117 Spencer charged that “Henning Jacobson,
being over twenty-one years of age and not under
guardianship, did refuse and neglect to comply with
[Cambridge’s] requirement” to be vaccinated. 118 Jacobson
“pleaded not guilty” and the case went to trial. 119 That day
the Boston Globe reported there was “[o]ne new case of
smallpox.” 120 The city also charged four others with violating

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Trial Record at 1–2, *5–6, Commonwealth v. Jacobson, 66 N.E. 719 (Mass.
1903) (No. 2287) [https://perma.cc/Z2Z8-RZ2F].
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 7, *11 (Appendix A).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1, *5.
120. Cambridge, BOS. GLOBE, July 19, 1902, at 4 [https://perma.cc/4NRBJNLA].
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the statute: Ephraim and Maggie Gould (husband and wife),
Paul Morse (a brickmaker), Frank Cone (City Water Office),
and Assistant City Clerk Albert M. Pear. 121 The following
week, six other vaccination prosecutions were to be heard. 122
On July 23, 1902, the five defendants appeared before
Judge McDaniel. 123 Maggie Gould defaulted. Ephraim Gould
requested to continue the case till the following day. Morse
“proved that he had been vaccinated since the charge was
brought against him and he was dismissed from further
custody.” 124 Pear said “he had acted under the advice of his
physician in refusing to submit, but the court said [it] could
not rule on that.” 125 Pear was “one of the most strenuous
antivaccionationists in the city.” 126 A photograph of him
appeared in the Boston Globe with the caption, “Assistant
City Clerk of Cambridge, Who Doesn’t Want to be
Vaccinated.” 127 He told a reporter that he suffered from
“muscular rheumatism” and had “furnished the board with a
certificate from my physician, showing my condition.” 128
Cone, the only defendant with counsel, was represented
by J.W. Pickering. 129 Pickering would later represent
Jacobson on appeal. Pickering “contended that the rights of
man under the constitution were such that the enforcement
of the vaccination law took them away.” 130 Pickering added

121. Fined Them $5 Each: Appeals Taken from Judge McDaniel’s Ruling in the
Vaccination Cases at Cambridge, BOS. GLOBE, July 23, 1903, at 7 [hereinafter
Fined Them $5 Each] [https://perma.cc/G7QP-L88S].
122. Cambridge, supra note 120.
123. Fined Them $5 Each, supra note 121.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Won’t Submit. Albert M. Pear, An Antivaccinationist., BOS. GLOBE, July
18, 1902, at 12 [https://perma.cc/YXA7-358J].
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Fined Them $5 Each, supra note 121.
130. Id.
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that vaccination “was a great menace to individual rights.” 131
Moreover, “certain members of the medical fraternity did not
believe in vaccination.” 132 However, Judge McDaniel ruled
that his court “could not pass on the constitutionality of the
law.” 133
Jacobson represented himself. Apparently, his
arguments were entertaining, but unpersuasive. While
Jacobson was testifying on the stand, Judge McDaniel
interrupted him. “I am fond of a good story, and am sorry to
interrupt one,” the judge said, “but this is a court of law, and
when I am at leisure I shall be pleased to hear it.” 134
Judge McDaniel ordered Pear, Cone, and Jacobson “to
pay a fine of $5 each.” 135 The three of them promptly
appealed their cases to the superior court. “Each furnished
bonds in $200.” 136 Jacobson’s conviction generated some
notoriety. He even made front-page headlines in a Swedish
newspaper from Minneapolis. 137
3. Jacobson Appeals to the Superior Court
The following term, Jacobson appealed his case to the
Superior Court. He asked the judge to admit twenty-five
offers of proof that challenged the effectiveness of vaccines.
For example, he argued that vaccines could cause “serious
and permanent injury,” and even “death.” 138 Moreover,
Jacobson contended that vaccines can render a person
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Allmänna, nyheter, MINN. STATS TIDNING, Aug. 13, 1902, at 1
[https://perma.cc/Q5HG-6YKD]; see Minnesota stats tidning / Skaffaren, MINN.
HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.mnhs.org/newspapers/hub/minnesota-stats-tidning
[https://perma.cc/NDZ3-8DB9] (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
138. Trial Record at 2, *6, Commonwealth v. Jacobson, 66 N.E. 719 (Mass.
1903) (No. 2287) [https://perma.cc/Z2Z8-RZ2F].
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“incapable of performing his usual duties and labors.” 139 The
trial court ruled that these offers of proof “were immaterial,
and excluded each and all of them.” 140 Jacobson was not
opposed to all public health measures. He served on the
advisory board of the Stoughton Sanitorium Trust that
planned to build “a model institution with individual homelike quarters for each patient for the free treatment of
tuberculosis.” 141 The organization sought to “rid the New
England States of this dreaded disease.” 142 But Jacobson
vigorously opposed the smallpox vaccine.
Jacobson asked the trial court to issue eleven jury
charges to find that “section 137 of chapter 75 of the Revised
Laws is unconstitutional and void.” 143 First, the statute was
in “derogation of the rights secured . . . by the preamble to
the Constitution of the United States, and tends to subvert
and defeat the purposes of said Constitution.” 144 The
preamble provides: “We the People of the United States, in
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.” 145
Second, Jacobson asked the court to instruct the jury
that the statute violated the Self Incrimination Clause, the
Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 146 Jacobson’s third proposed jury instruction
139. Id.
140. Id. at 4, *8.
141. Tuberculosis Building Fund Needed, BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 16, 1919, at 1
[https://perma.cc/6WM2-R5NN].
142. Id.
143. Trial Record at 4, *8, Jacobson, 66 N.E. 719 (No. 2287).
144. Id. at 4–5, *8–9.
145. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
146. Trial Record at 5, *9, Jacobson, 66 N.E. 719 (No. 2287).
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was that the statute violated the Privileges or Immunities
Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 147 Fourth, the statute
“is repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution of the United
States.” 148 Fifth, the statute violates Part I, Article I of the
Massachusetts Constitution. 149 Sixth, the statute violates
Article IV, Chapter I, Part II of the Massachusetts
Constitution, which provides that the legislature can enact
“wholesome and reasonable” laws. 150 Seventh, the statute
violates Article X, Part I of the Massachusetts
Constitution. 151 Eighth, the statute violates Article XIV,
Part I of the Massachusetts Constitution. 152 Ninth, the
statute is “wholly repugnant and contrary” to the “spirit” of
the Massachusetts Constitution. 153 Tenth, the Board of
Health’s regulation is “unreasonable, and therefore void.” 154
Eleventh, the regulation is “especially unreasonable”
because it lacks “any exceptions or limitations.” 155 Jacobson
did not request any jury instructions concerning the free
exercise of religion.

147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. I (1780) (“All men are born free and equal,
and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable rights; among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their Lives and Liberties; that of
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and
obtaining their safety and happiness.”).
150. Trial Record at 5–6, *9–10, Jacobson, 66 N.E. 719 (No. 2287).
151. Id. at 6, *10; see MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. X (1780) (“Each individual of the
society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, Liberty and
property, according to standing Laws.”).
152. Trial Record at 6, *10, Jacobson, 66 N.E. 719 (No. 2287); see MASS. CONST.
pt. 1, art. XIV (1780) (“Every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches, and seizures, of his person, his houses, his papers, and
all his possessions.”).
153. Trial Record at 6, *10, Jacobson, 66 N.E. 719 (No. 2287).
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Ultimately, the trial court refused to give any of these
instructions. 156 The judge also declined to issue a directed
verdict, and sent the case to the jury. 157 On February 27,
1903, Jacobson “was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine
of five dollars.” 158 Jacobson would “stand committed until the
fine was paid.” 159 The case was promptly appealed to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
While the case was on appeal, the unvaccinated Jacobson
continued to participate in Cambridge society. In December
1903, Jacobson spoke at a convention of Swedish, Danish,
and Norwegian Lutheran ministers in Cambridge. 160 In May
1904, Jacobson said grace at the first banquet of the
Swedish-American political club of Cambridge. 161 State
Senator William Rounds and Mayor Augustine Daly, who
both attended, were apparently untroubled by Jacobson’s
refusal to be vaccinated. 162 And in July 1904, the Boston
Traveler newspaper selected Jacobson as one of “the ten most
popular ministers” in town. 163 Notwithstanding his criminal
conviction, Jacobson was sent as part of a delegation to the
St. Louis World’s Fair of 1904. 164
Frank Cone, another defendant, “was suspended by
order of Mayor McNamee . . . on the grounds of economy”
shortly after his conviction. 165 He took a job at the National
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1, *5.
159. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 14 (1905).
160. Ministers’ Meeting. Represent Swedish, Danish and Norwegian Lutheran
Churches., BOS. GLOBE, Dec. 14, 1903, at 3 [https://perma.cc/PQU6-55NB].
161. Swedish-American Political Club Has It First Banquet, Has The Mayor As
Its Guest, BOS. GLOBE, May 20, 1904, at 7 [https://perma.cc/NR6V-M9V3].
162. See id.
163. Boston Party Seeing Fair. Will Remain a Week as Guests of an Eastern
Newspaper., ST. LOUIS REPUBLIC, July 19, 1904, at 8 [https://perma.cc/39H4Y68M].
164. Id.
165. Cambridge, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 9, 1904, at 4 [https://perma.cc/5FHT-6ZHR].
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City Bank. 166 Five months later, Cone was reinstated by the
water board. 167
Pear, the Assistant City Clerk, became a cause célèbre
for the Massachusetts Anti-Compulsory Vaccination
Society. 168 The group “voted to sustain him in his contest
with the board of health.” 169 And, “[f]orty-one people in
Somerville have openly refused vaccination, and no
prosecution of them has yet been made, pending decisions in
the Pear case.” 170 After his conviction, Pear was
“unanimously reelected” as Assistant City Clerk. 171 On
appeal, the case was styled Commonwealth v. Pear.
4. The Supreme Judicial Court Affirms
In a brisk eight-page decision, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Jacobson’s conviction. 172
Chief Justice Knowlton wrote the unanimous majority
opinion on April 2, 1903. 173
First, the court placed the Massachusetts law in the
broader context of public health laws. “Sometimes it is
necessary,” the Chief Justice wrote, “that persons be held in
quarantine.” 174 Moreover, “[c]onscription may be authorized

166. Cambridge Bank Changes, BOS. EVENING TRANSCRIPT, Aug. 8, 1903, at 12
[https://perma.cc/3PYP-4ECJ].
167. Cambridge, supra note 165.
168. See Stands by Albert M. Pear, supra note 78.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Quick Rout. Sharples Confirmed in Cambridge. Democratic Alderman Try
to Hold Up Nomination. Mayor’s Estimates Sent in and Referred., BOS. GLOBE,
Feb. 3, 1904, at 11 [https://perma.cc/JVY9-77N4].
172. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 719–22 183 Mass. 242, 242–49
(1903) (The Massachusetts Reporter’s publication of the decision was eight pages
long, while the North Eastern Reporter’s publication is only four pages.), aff’d sub
nom. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 720.
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if the life of the nation is in peril.” 175 Other state courts had
upheld the power to require vaccinations “as a prerequisite
to attendance at school.” 176 From these precedents, the court
reasoned that the state has the power to mandate
vaccinations for the entire populace. Here, the court
favorably cited decisions from “the highest courts of Georgia
and North Carolina” which upheld “[s]tatutes substantially
the same as the one now before us.” 177
Second, the court rejected Jacobson’s claims based on the
Due Process Clause. Chief Justice Knowlton wrote that the
“liberty of the individual may be interfered” with “whenever
the general welfare requires a course of proceedings,” even
when “certain persons object because of their peculiar
opinions or special individual interests.” 178 He stated that
“[t]he rights of individuals must yield, if necessary, when the
welfare of the whole community is at stake.” 179 Chief Justice
Knowlton cited several prominent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, including Powell v. Pennsylvania, Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, and Mugler v. Kansas. 180 These cases recognized
that “if a statute purports to be enacted to promote the
general welfare of the people, and is not at variance with any
provision of the Constitution, the question whether it will be
for the good of the community is a legislative, and not a
judicial, question.” 181 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court made an oblique reference to “matters depending upon
Jacobson’s personal opinion,” and cited Reynolds v. United
States, an early Free Exercise Clause case. 182 But there was
no discussion of the First Amendment. Indeed, Jacobson did
175. Id.
176. Id. at 721.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 720.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 721.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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not raise any First Amendment arguments.
Third, the court identified a limitation on its holding: the
penalty was modest, and the state did not actually force
people to get vaccinated. But the court recognized the
analysis would be different if the law did in fact force people
to get vaccinated. “If a person should deem it important that
vaccination should not be performed in his case, and the
authorities should think otherwise, it is not in their power to
vaccinate him by force, and the worst that could happen to
him under the statute would be the payment of the penalty
of $5.” 183 More than a century later, Justice Gorsuch
described the narrow scope of the Massachusetts law:
“individuals could accept the vaccine, pay the fine, or identify
a basis for exemption.” 184 He added that “[t]he imposition on
Mr. Jacobson’s claimed right to bodily integrity, thus, was
avoidable and relatively modest.” 185 It is unclear how the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court would have treated
a statute that imposed a much higher fine, or jail sentence,
for refusing the vaccine.
In his Supreme Court brief, Jacobson identified a flaw in
this reasoning. “The utmost that the law undertakes to do is
to provide a penalty for its violation,” he wrote. 186 But merely
paying the fine does not eliminate the spread of contagion.
“After I have paid the penalty,” Jacobson wrote, “I am as
much a menace to the community as I was before.” 187 He
added that “if the effect of the law be that with one payment
I may continue to be a menace to the public health, as was
held in England, the law is too absurd to justify its

183. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
184. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 71 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
185. Id.
186. Transcript of Record at 17, *43, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (No. 70-175) [https://perma.cc/EUK9-TX4V].
187. Id.
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existence.” 188 Jacobson argued that the law lacked a
sufficient fit between the means and the ends: the
punishment did not actually eliminate the health problem.
People who paid a five-dollar penalty could continue to
spread smallpox.
Soon, other courts would follow the precedents set by the
high courts in Georgia, North Carolina, and Massachusetts.
At the time, a comment in the Yale Law Journal observed,
“[T]he courts have found a broader ground on which to
uphold the legislation, that if a statute be enacted to promote
the general welfare, whether it be for the good of the
community is a legislative, and not a judicial, question.” 189
Jacobson appealed his conviction to the United States
Supreme Court to set up the definitive test case. Pear and
Cone did not participate in the appeal. The Anti-Compulsory
Vaccination Society “furnished the funds” for Jacobson’s
litigation “through the successive courts.” 190 He had popular
support. In the Berkshires, there was a strong “view of the
opposition . . . to the compulsory vaccination law.” 191 A local
newspaper observed, “[S]hould the case go against
[Jacobson] he has no method to escape other than a permit
or moving to some other state.” 192 Other towns, like
Provincetown, “voted to elect a board of health that would
not enforce the vaccination laws.” 193
The Boston Journal, however, editorialized in favor of
the government. 194 The column, which was published as far
188. Id. (citation omitted).
189. Compulsory Vaccination, supra note 79, at 505.
190. Case Goes to the Supreme Court: Fight Being Made Against the
Compulsory Vaccination Law, supra note 106.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Make It Clear: Changes Sought in Vaccination Law, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 19,
1902, at 4 [https://perma.cc/89SY-KQX4].
194. See A Test of Vaccination., HAWAIIAN STAR, Jan. 27, 1905, at 6
[https://perma.cc/FB38-2YEM].
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away as Hawaii, mocked Henning Jacobson, “who has borne
the personal brunt of the battle cheerfully enough because he
believes that he was right and the authorities wrong.” 195 The
Journal wrote that “the word that shall come from that
august bench,” “the place of final arbitrament,” “will be
momentous for the whole country.” 196 Would the Court “say
whether or not a state has the right to scratch the arm of any
of its citizens for the prevention of pestilence”? 197 Will a
“proved preventive of a loathsome disease . . . be imposed
upon those who do not believe in it”? The Journal hoped the
Court would “declare for the principal of compulsory
vaccination.” 198 By a 7–2 vote, the Court reached that result.
C. Jacobson Before the Supreme Court
In 1905, the Supreme Court heard Henning Jacobson’s
challenge to Massachusetts’s vaccination law. For this test
case, Jacobson argued that the regime violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court upheld his conviction by a 7–2 vote. Justice John
Marshall Harlan wrote the majority opinion. He ruled that
the state can restrict individual liberty to promote the
common welfare. And so long as there is a reasonable fit
between the measure adopted, and the government’s interest
was to promote public health, the law was valid.
Still, Jacobson identified several limitations on its
holding. First, the state law could not conflict with federal
powers. Second, the statute cannot be enforced against a
person for whom the vaccine would be particularly
dangerous. Third, the vaccine mandate could not be enacted
based on pretextual motivations. Fourth, the government
could not arbitrarily violate certain individual rights. Fifth,

195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
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the Court only upheld a modest fine for going unvaccinated.
The Court did not resolve the question of whether the state
could force a person to undergo a medical procedure. The
decision was narrow. Justice Harlan concluded, “We now
decide only that the statute covers the present case . . . .” 199
1. Jacobson’s Arguments on Appeal
On appeal, Jacobson narrowed his arguments to five
grounds. 200 He limited his assignments of error to the federal
Constitution and excluded all claims under the
Massachusetts Constitution. First, Jacobson claimed that
the law was “in derogation of the rights secured . . . by the
preamble to the Constitution . . . and tends to subvert and
defeat the purposes of said Constitution as there
declared.” 201 Second, he asserted that the law violated the
Self Incrimination Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 202 His argument
here was creative. Jacobson wrote that “if the state causes
him to suffer” by taking the vaccine, “and inflict[s] a sickness
which incapacitates him from labor, by what constitutional
right can the state thus deprive him of liberty and property
without compensation.” 203 In other words, if the statemandated vaccine made him ill, and thus unable to work, the
state must pay him just compensation. The incapacitating
vaccine was a taking of his capacity to work! Yet, the law
provided no measure of compensation.
Massachusetts vigorously rejected this argument. The
Commonwealth argued that “[t]he Fifth Amendment does
not apply to action by a State,” citing Barron v. Baltimore

199. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 39 (1905).
200. See Transcript of Record at 21–22, *24–25, Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (No. 70-175) [https://perma.cc/EUK9-TX4V].
201. Id. at 21, *24.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 20, *46.
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and the Slaughter-House Cases. 204 Six years earlier, the
Supreme Court, per Justice Harlan, decided Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago. 205 It held that
when the government takes property without providing just
compensation, there may be a violation of the Due Process
Clause. 206 But Harlan’s Chicago majority opinion did not
turn on the Takings Clause. 207 Indeed, the Takings Clause
was not even cited in that opinion. 208 Rather, the Due
Process Clause, standing by itself, limited the taking of
private property. 209 In the modern era, the Supreme Court
would repeatedly state that Chicago incorporated the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 210 These assertions
amounted to constitutional revisionism. Incorporation was
not accepted constitutional doctrine at this time. 211
Accordingly, in 1903, the Massachusetts Attorney General
did not think that the Takings Clause controlled state
action—notwithstanding Chicago. 212
204. Id. at 5, *62.
205. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
206. Id. at 241 (“In our opinion, a judgment of a state court, even if it be
authorized by statute, whereby private property is taken for the State or under
its direction for public use, without compensation made or secured to the owner,
is, upon principle and authority, wanting in the due process of law required by
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and the
affirmance of such judgment by the highest court of the State is a denial by that
State of a right secured to the owner by that instrument.”).
207. See BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 29, at 327.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122
(1978) (noting that the “Fifth Amendment, which of course is made applicable to
the States through the Fourteenth Amendment” (citing Chi., Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 239)); see also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544
U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (same); Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 232
n.6 (2003) (same); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency,
535 U.S. 302, 306 n.1, (2002) (same); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617
(2001) (same).
211. See supra Section I.B (discussing modern incorporation doctrine).
212. See Brief for the Defendant in Error at 5, *62, Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (No. 70–175) [https://perma.cc/EUK9-TX4V].
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Third, Jacobson argued that the law violated Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 213 Fourth, he claimed the law
“was repugnant to the spirit of the Constitution of the United
States.” 214 Fifth, Jacobson alleged that the trial court erred
by excluding his offers of proof about the vaccine’s
harmfulness, which “tended to prove” that the law was
“unconstitutional and void.” 215
Again, none of Jacobson’s claims concerned the free
exercise of religion.
2. Justice Harlan’s Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court affirmed Jacobson’s conviction.
Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote the majority opinion. 216
Justices Brewer and Peckham dissented without a written
opinion. 217 The Court rejected Jacobson’s first argument
based on the preamble to the United States Constitution. 218
Justice Harlan wrote that the preamble “has never been
regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on
the Government of the United States or on any of its
Departments.” 219 To this day, courts cite Justice Harlan as
the canonical statement for the relevance of the preamble. 220
The Court did not address Jacobson’s second argument based
on the Fifth Amendment. Nor did Justice Harlan address his
majority opinion in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad

213. Transcript of Record at 21, *24, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (No. 70–175) [https://perma.cc/EUK9-TX4V].
214. Id. at 22, *25.
215. Id.
216. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 22 (1905).
217. Id. at 39.
218. Id. at 22.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., Virginia v. Ferriero, 525 F. Supp. 3d 36, 60 (D.D.C. 2021) (“As
the Supreme Court explained, the preamble to the Constitution and the prefatory
clause in the Second Amendment are statements of general purpose.” (citing
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22)).
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Co. v. Chicago. 221
Justice Harlan quickly dispatched “without discussion”
Jacobson’s fourth argument based on the “spirit” of the
Constitution. 222 He found there was “no need in this case to
go beyond the plain, obvious meaning of the words in those
provisions of the Constitution which, it is contended, must
control our decision.” 223 With respect to the fifth claim, the
Court stated that the “mere rejection of defendant’s offers of
proof does not strictly present a Federal question.” 224 Justice
Harlan joked that Jacobson’s twenty-five “rejected offers of
proof . . . are more formidable by their number than by their
inherent value.” 225
The bulk of the opinion focused on the third assignment
of error: Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
rejected Jacobson’s argument that the Massachusetts law
violated the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This claim was foreclosed by the
Slaughter-House Cases. 226 Justice Harlan did not even
consider this claim. 227
The Court also rejected Jacobson’s argument based on
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Massachusetts law exempted children if a “registered

221. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
222. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 22.
223. Id.; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819)
(“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.” (emphasis added)).
224. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24.
225. Id. at 30.
226. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
227. See Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2608 n.3
(2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that Jacobson’s “claim under the Privileges
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was doomed by the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 76–80 (1873), and was not addressed by the
Court” (internal citation cleaned up)).
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physician [certified that they were] . . . unfit subjects for
vaccination.” 228 But, the law made “no exception in the case
of adults in like condition.” 229 Jacobson argued that the
government could not treat adults differently than it treated
children. Justice Harlan disagreed. He found that there was
not “a denial of the equal protection of the laws [as] to
adults.” 230 Why? “[T]he statute,” he found, “is applicable
equally to all in like condition.” 231 In other words, Jacobson
was treated the same as all other adults, and a minor would
be treated the same as all other minors. It is irrelevant that
adults were treated differently than children. Justice Harlan
observed that “there are obviously reasons why regulations
may be appropriate for adults which could not be safely
applied to persons of tender years.” 232 This law did not run
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.
3. Jacobson’s Due Process Clause Analysis
The remainder of Jacobson considered the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court posed the
central question: “Is the statute, so construed, therefore,
inconsistent with the liberty which the Constitution of the
United States secures to every person against deprivation by
the State?” 233 The Court answered no. Justice Harlan’s
analysis of the Due Process Clause had four primary parts.
First, the Court explained the relationship between
individual liberty and the state’s police power. Justice
Harlan wrote that the Constitution “does not import an
absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all

228. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 12.
229. Id. at 30.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. Under modern doctrine, a restriction based on age is “not a suspect
classification under the Equal Protection Clause,” and is reviewed with “rational
basis” scrutiny. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991).
233. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24.
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circumstances, wholly freed from restraint.” 234 All people can
be subjected to “manifold restraints” to promote “the common
good.” 235 The Court observed that “[s]ociety based on the rule
that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted
with disorder and anarchy.” 236 Rather, “a community has the
right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which
threatens the safety of its members.” 237
Second, the Court found there was ample precedent to
support the Massachusetts law. Justice Harlan recognized
that the state can conscript a person “in the ranks of the
army of his country and risk the chance of being shot down
in its defense.” 238 If the government has this greater power,
he reasoned, then a state has the lesser power to “guard itself
against imminent danger” by asserting “control of one’s
body” through a vaccine. 239 Harlan also observed that “many
States” have made “the vaccination of children a condition of
their right to enter or remain in public schools.” 240 Harlan
cited, but did not discuss Morris v. Columbus and State v.
Hay from the Georgia and North Carolina Supreme Courts,
respectively.
Third, Justice Harlan explained that courts should not
second-guess the wisdom of public health measures during
the smallpox outbreak. Harlan stated that it is not in the role
of the courts “to determine which” method “was likely to be
the most effective for the protection of the public against
disease.” 241 The “legislative department” would make that
decision “in the light of all the information it had or could

234. Id. at 26.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 27.
238. Id. at 29.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 32.
241. Id. at 30.
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obtain.” 242 Given this deference, “it cannot be adjudged that
the present regulation of the Board of Health was not
necessary in order to protect the public health and secure the
public safety.” 243
Finally, the Court offered a two-part test to determine
whether the Massachusetts law was valid. First, the Court
asked “if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect
the public health, the public morals or the public safety, has
[a] real or substantial relation to those objects.” 244 Second,
the Court asks if the law, “is, beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law.” 245 In either case, the Court has “the duty . . . to so
adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution.” 246 The
test resembles the sort of means-ends scrutiny that would
become a staple of modern-day constitutional adjudication.
Here, the Commonwealth’s goal, or end, was to reduce the
spread of smallpox. The means chosen—a vaccination
mandate—had a “substantial relation” to reducing the
spread of the outbreak. The Court reasoned that “the means
prescribed by the State to that end has” a “real or substantial
relation to the protection of the public health and the public
safety.” 247 Ultimately, Harlan’s approach sounded in
Thayerian deference. 248 Harlan concluded that the
Massachusetts statute was not “beyond question, in palpable

242. Id.
243. Id. at 28.
244. Id. at 31.
245. Id.
246. Id. (first citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887); then citing
Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, 320 (1890); and then citing Atkin v. Kansas,
191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903)).
247. Id.
248. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (“[T]here is often a range of
choice and judgment [and] in such cases the constitution does not impose upon
the legislature any one specific opinion, but leaves open this range of choice; and
that whatever choice is rational is constitutional.”).
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conflict with the Constitution.” 249 The Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court likewise found that the law
“relate[d] to a subject in regard to which the [legislature] is
authorized to legislate,” and is not “unreasonable and
unconstitutional.” 250
In the end, the Court rejected Jacobson’s arguments
based on the Due Process Clause. Nearly three years after
his trial court conviction, Jacobson’s fine of five dollars was
upheld. And this test case set a nationwide precedent. A
newspaper from Scranton, Pennsylvania observed that
Jacobson “may be accepted confidently for the guidance of
legislators and boards of health in all parts of the country.” 251
Jacobson would continue serving as a minister in Cambridge
for another three decades. 252
4. The Express Limits of Jacobson
Justice Harlan’s opinion was broad. But the Court
identified four limits and implied a fifth constraint. First,
constitutional structure constrains the state’s police powers.
For example, state quarantine laws cannot interfere with
federal power. In Jacobson, Justice Harlan favorably cited
Railroad Co. v. Husen. 253 In this case, Missouri passed a
sanitary law “under the guise of exerting a police power,” but
which “invaded the domain of Federal authority.” 254 This
state law ran afoul of Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce. In Husen, the Court exercised “its duty to hold

249. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
250. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 721 (Mass. 1903), aff’d sub nom.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
251. Compulsory Vaccination,
[https://perma.cc/EHF4-GCXQ].

TIMES-TRIBUNE,

Mar.

11,

1905,

at

6

252. See Rev H.J. Hokenson Installed in Office, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 17, 1929, at
3 [https://perma.cc/BV6B-XEYX]. I was unable to find any press clippings about
Jacobson after 1929.
253. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 28 (citing Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471–
73 (1877)).
254. Id. (citing Husen, 95 U.S. at 471–73).
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such laws invalid.” 255 But this first constraint did not
concern the violation of individual rights. 256
Second, the Court recognized that the statute cannot be
enforced against a person for whom the vaccine would be
particularly dangerous. Harlan wrote, “[e]xtreme cases can
be readily suggested.” 257 For example, the law could not be
enforced against an unvaccinated adult for whom a
“particular condition of his health or body would be cruel and
inhuman in the last degree.” 258 Harlan said an exercise in
constitutional avoidance would be warranted in such a case.
The “statute was [likely not] intended to be applied to such a
case.” 259 Harlan wrote that “‘all laws . . . should receive a
sensible construction.’” 260 And this statute should be read to
avoid “‘injustice, oppression or absurd consequence.’” 261 This
case did not present an “absolute rule that an adult” who is
not a “fit subject of vaccination” must be vaccinated. 262
Moreover, a state could not enforce the law against a person
where “by reason of his then condition, [the law] would
seriously impair his health or probably cause his death.” 263
If the law “was so intended,” then the courts would “be
255. Id.
256. In In re Abbott, Judge Dennis’s dissent conflated Jacobson’s discussion of
the federal government’s “rights” to regulate interstate commerce with individual
rights. 954 F.3d 772, 800 (5th Cir. 2020) (Dennis, J., dissenting), vacated as moot
sub nom. by Planned Parenthood Ctr. For Choice v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1261
(2021). See also Josh Blackman, Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) and Lochner
v. New York (1905) in April 2020, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (April 8, 2020,
1:37 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/04/08/jacobson-v-massachusetts-1905and-lochner-v-new-york-1905-in-april-2020/
[https://perma.cc/T83D-5UV8]
(Judge Dennis “used ellipses in a misleading way to cast a century-old precedent
in a modernistic light.”). I will discuss Abbott infra Section V.D.
257. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 38.
258. Id. at 38–39.
259. Id. at 39.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 39 (quoting United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 486 (1868)).
262. Id.
263. Id.
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competent to interfere and protect the health and life of the
individual concerned.” 264 Jacobson, however, was “in perfect
health and a fit subject of vaccination.” 265
Third, Justice Harlan recognized that a vaccine mandate
could not be enacted based on pretextual motivations: “if a
statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals or the public safety, has no real or
substantial relation to those objects,” then “it is the duty of
the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the
Constitution.” 266 Massachusetts emphatically rejected
Jacobson’s claim that the mandate was pretextual. The
Commonwealth argued that “[i]t cannot be seriously
contended that this statute has some ulterior object which it
seeks to conceal under a pretended desire to promote the
public health.” 267 The Supreme Court agreed, and found that
this law was enacted to “promote the common welfare.” 268
Fourth, the Court acknowledged that the government
could not violate certain individual rights. Justice Harlan
wrote, “There is, of course, a sphere within which the
individual may assert the supremacy of his own will.” 269 And
if that sphere is encroached, people may “rightfully dispute
the authority of . . . any free government existing under a
written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that
will.” 270 But that principle only went so far. Individual
liberty “may at times, under the pressure of great dangers,
be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable
regulations, as the safety of the general public may

264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 31.
267. Brief for Defendant in Error at 6, *63, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11 (1905) (No. 70-175) [https://perma.cc/EUK9-TX4V].
268. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 35.
269. Id. at 29.
270. Id.
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demand.” 271
Justice Harlan drew the line at arbitrariness. The police
power cannot be “exercised in particular circumstances and
in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary,
unreasonable manner.” 272 Such an irrational requirement,
Harlan wrote, “might go so far beyond what was reasonably
required for the safety of the public.” 273 In other words, the
measure would “not [be] justified by the necessities of the
case.” 274 Such rare circumstances would “authorize or compel
the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.” 275
The courts could also intervene if the measure was in no way
“reasonably required” for public safety, or if the mandate was
enforced in an “arbitrary” fashion against “particular
persons.” 276 He added that the police power cannot be
“exerted in such circumstances or by regulations so arbitrary
and oppressive in particular cases” that enforcement would
result in “wrong and oppression.” 277 Alternatively, the courts
would stop a law that was “beyond all question, a plain,
palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law.” 278 Here, Harlan was not discussing the modern concept
of “fundamental” rights that are protected by the Due
Process Clause. 279 Rather, he was referring to some general
constraint on state action—the “fundamental law”—that
accords with traditional notions of the due process of law.

271. Id.
272. Id. at 28.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 38.
278. Id. at 31.
279. See supra Section I.C (discussing the Supreme Court’s fundamental rights
jurisprudence).
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5. Jacobson’s Implied Constraint
Jacobson’s fifth constraint is implied, but is significant:
the Court only upheld a small fine for going unvaccinated.
The law did not actually require people to get vaccinated.
Jacobson argued only that “his liberty is invaded when the
state subjects him to fine or imprisonment for neglecting or
refusing to submit to vaccination. . . .” 280 Having to pay the
fine, Jacobson contended, was itself a violation of liberty,
even if he was not forced to receive the vaccination. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court expressly recognized
this constraint: “If a person should deem it important that
vaccination should not be performed in his case, and the
authorities should think otherwise, it is not in their power to
vaccinate him by force, and the worst that could happen to
him under the statute would be the payment of the penalty
of $5.” 281 The Supreme Court did not, and indeed could not,
resolve the question of whether the state could force a person
to undergo a medical procedure.
Moreover, the fine was modest. Five dollars is roughly
$150 in present-day value. 282 (Justice Gorsuch rounded down
to “about $140.”) 283
Consider the criminal penalties imposed in other
contemporary Supreme Court cases. In 1885, Lee Yick—
better known as Yick Wo—was fined ten dollars for operating
a wooden laundry in San Francisco without a permit. 284
Joseph Lochner was “sentenced to pay a fine of $50” for
280. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
281. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 722 (Mass. 1903) (emphasis added),
aff’d sub nom. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
282. Josh Blackman, Jacobson v. Massachusetts Did Not Uphold the State’s
Power to Mandate Vaccinations, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 24, 2020,
1:45 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/24/jacobson-v-massachusetts-didnot-uphold-the-states-power-to-mandate-vaccinations/ [https://perma.cc/7TQDDLBC].
283. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
284. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 357 (1886).
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violating the New York Bakeshop Act. 285 The Oregon law
limiting the number of hours women could work, which Curt
Muller violated, authorized “a fine of not less than $10 nor
more than $25.” 286 In 1908, Berea College of Kentucky was
fined $1,000 for integrating its classrooms. 287 Frank Meyer
was convicted of violating Nebraska law for teaching his
students German. 288 That 1919 statute permitted “a fine of
not less than twenty-five dollars ($25), nor more than one
hundred dollars ($100).” 289 Oregon parents who sent their
children to private school, in violation of the state’s
compulsory education law, would “be subject to a fine of not
less than $5, nor more than $100, or to imprisonment in the
county jail not less than two nor more than thirty days.” 290
Leo Nebbia sold milk in violation of New York’s price control
laws. 291 This offense was “punishable by not more than a
year’s imprisonment, or not more than $100 fine or both.” 292
Fines in other prominent contemporary cases were even
higher. 293 The Justices would have recognized that five

285. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 47 (1905).
286. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 417 (1908).
287. Berea Coll. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 46 (1908).
288. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 396–97 (1923).
289. Id. at 397.
290. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530 n. (1925).
291. People v. Nebbia, 186 N.E. 694, 695 (N.Y. 1933), aff’d sub nom. Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
292. Id. at 696.
293. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9 (1883) (“upon conviction thereof shall
be fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or shall
be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year”); Lottery Case,
188 U.S. 321, 322 (1903) (“all the parties to such conspiracy shall be liable to a
penalty of not less than one thousand dollars and not more than ten thousand
dollars, and to imprisonment not more than two years”); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 523 (1935) (“a misdemeanor punishable by
a fine of not more than $500 for each offense, and each day the violation continues
is to be deemed a separate offense”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 145 n.1 (1938) (“Section 63 imposes as penalties for violations ‘a fine of
not more than $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than one year, or both.’”);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 110 (1941) (“a fine of not more than $10,000
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dollars was on the far-low end of the spectrum for
contemporary laws.
Indeed, the five-dollar penalty was on the far-low end of
the spectrum for Massachusetts public health laws. The
other restrictions in Chapter 75 of the Revised Statutes
imposed far greater penalties. 294 For example, if a person
knew someone in his house was “sick of smallpox, diphtheria,
scarlet fever or any other infectious or contagious disease,”
and failed to give notice to the board of health, the defendant
was subject to a one-hundred-dollar fine. 295 A doctor who
knew a patient was subject to such diseases and failed to
notify the government was subject to a fine between $50 and
$200 “for each offense.” Failing to “remove any nuisance,
source of filth or cause of sickness” from “any private
premise” was punishable by a twenty-dollar fine “for every
day [the defendant] knowingly violate[d] such order.” 296
There were also stringent rules about polluting public
waters. “[B]ath[ing] in a pond, stream or reservoir, the water
of which is used for the purpose of domestic water supply for
a city or town, shall be punished by a fine of not more than
ten dollars.” 297 And “willfully and maliciously defil[ing] or
corrupt[ing]” public water sources was subject to a $1,000
fine, or “imprisonment for not more than a year.” 298 But
“deposit[ing] excrement or foul or decaying matter” in public
water sources only yielded a fifty-dollar fine. 299
The State imposed strict quarantine rules on vessels
arriving in port. There was a $500 fine for a person who
violated a quarantine order that affects “all persons, goods
and punishes each conviction after the first by imprisonment of not more than
six months or by the specified fine or both”).
294. See MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75 (1901).
295. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 49 (1901).
296. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 67 (1901).
297. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 128 (1901).
298. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 127 (1901).
299. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 128 (1901).
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and effects” arriving by vessel. 300 And the state imposed a
$200 penalty for seamen on vessels that have “come from a
port where an infectious distemper prevails” who refuse to
answer questions from health officials “relating to such
infection or distemper.” 301
Massachusetts also regulated the standards of food
producers. Operating an unsanitary bakery yielded a fine of
“not less than twenty nor more than fifty dollars.” 302 (Across
the border, Joseph Lochner was sentenced at the upper end
of this range.) Operating a slaughterhouse without “written
permission” of local officials yielded a penalty of “not more
than two hundred dollars for every month.” 303 (Running a
private abattoir was altogether banned in the SlaughterHouse Cases.) 304 This last statute was familiar to one
member of the Jacobson Court. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes served on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court from September 1899 through December 1902. In June
1902, Holmes wrote the majority opinion in City of
Cambridge v. Trelegan. 305 That case upheld the city’s power
to “restrain the defendant from carrying on the business of
slaughtering calves” without permission from the board of
health. 306 (The illegal slaughterhouse at 20 Clay Street was
about two miles from Harvard University.) 307 Justice Holmes
wrote that the “board of health’s ordinary business” was
“intended to stop the spread of contagion and the sale of
diseased meats.” 308 It is safe to assume that Holmes was
familiar with other elements of Chapter 75. This Boston
300. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 132 (1901).
301. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 134 (1901).
302. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 33 (1901).
303. MASS. REV. LAWS ch. 75, § 109 (1901).
304. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 38 (1873).
305. 64 N.E. 204, 204 (Mass. 1902).
306. Id.
307. See id.
308. Id.
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Brahmin was also likely aware of Jacobson’s prosecution,
another prominent case from his backyard. 309 Henning
Jacobson was charged in July 1902 and was convicted in
February 1903.
No other offense in Chapter 75 imposed a fine of only five
dollars—all other penalties were higher. These other
statutes suggest that the Massachusetts legislature
considered the violation of the vaccine mandate to be a far
less severe offense that warranted a far less severe
punishment. A five-dollar penalty may have been a
formidable imposition for people of modest means. But the
Massachusetts law seems far less punitive in comparison to
the criminal exactions from other contemporary laws. The
five-dollar penalty operated in a similar fashion as nominal
damages. The amount was large enough to prosecute in
court, but not large enough to actually punish offenders. And
a one-time fee of five dollars was unlikely to deter opponents
of vaccination. Because there was no possibility for jail time,
an offender could simply pay the penalty and move on with
his life.
Again, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
addressed the implied constraint: “[i]f a person should deem
it important that vaccination should not be performed in his
case, and the authorities should think otherwise, it is not in
their power to vaccinate him by force, and the worst that
could happen to him under the statute would be the payment
of the penalty of $5.” 310 The Supreme Court did not pass on
a far more punitive exaction. Nor did the Court pass on an
even more draconian regime in which people must remain
incarcerated until they agree to be vaccinated.
309. A Brief History of the Boston Brahmin, NEW ENGLAND HIST. SOC’Y,
https://www.newenglandhistoricalsociety.com/brief-history-boston-brahmin/
[https://perma.cc/4UT7-PDY2] (last visited Jan. 26, 2022) (“Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Sr., coined the phrase [Boston Brahmin] in 1861 in his novel Elsie
Venner.”).
310. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 722 (Mass. 1903) (emphasis added),
aff’d sub nom. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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The narrow scope of Jacobson is linked to the narrow
regime from Cambridge as applied to Jacobson’s specific
dispute. The holding was expressly limited to this dispute.
Jacobson’s final sentence is worth repeating: “We now decide
only that the statute covers the present case. . . .” 311 Over the
next century, many judges would largely ignore this
statement and extend Jacobson to circumstances even
Justice Harlan could not have fathomed.
D. Lochner after Jacobson
Jacobson v. Massachusetts was argued on December 6,
1904, and was decided on February 20, 1905. 312 Shortly
thereafter, the Supreme Court decided one of the most
infamous cases of the Progressive Era. Lochner v. New York
was argued on February 23 to 24, 1905 and was decided on
April 17, 1905. 313 Lochner upheld most of the New York
Bakeshop Act, but declared unconstitutional the prohibition
on bakers working more than sixty hours a week. 314
The proximity of these two cases is significant. Today,
Lochner is largely viewed as repudiated—part of a bygone
era of constitutional law. And Jacobson has been accepted as
constitutional dogma. But Jacobson and Lochner, which
reach opposing results, are still cut from the same
constitutional cloth. Both of these cases should be viewed as
byproducts of the early twentieth century jurisprudence. To
understand Jacobson, we must understand Lochner. And to
understand Lochner, we must understand Jacobson.
First, in modern constitutional discourse, the Courts
draw a stark divide between economic liberty and personal

311. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39.
312. Id. at 11.
313. 198 U.S. 45, 45 (1905).
314. Id. at 64 (“[T]he freedom of master and employé to contract with each
other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be
prohibited or interfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution.”).
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liberty. 315 However, during the Progressive Era, the Courts
equally protected person and property. 316 Before the
Supreme Court, Jacobson wrote, “As the Fourteenth
Amendment has so often been appealed to for the protection
of property, this plaintiff appeals to it with confidence for the
protection of his freedom.” 317 Neither Jacobson nor Lochner
seemed to suggest that bodily autonomy should be afforded
more or less protection than property rights.
Second, Henning Jacobson and Joseph Lochner framed
their arguments in very similar terms. The former argued
that “a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the
inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and
health in such way as to him seems best.” 318 Lochner raised
a similar triptych. That case asked whether the Bakeshop
Act was “an unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary
interference with the right of the individual to his personal
liberty or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor
which may seem to him appropriate or necessary for the
support of himself and his family?” 319 Other prominent
Progressive Era cases, such as Nebbia v. New York 320 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 321 invoked similar Due Process
triads. Fittingly, in Jacobson, Massachusetts’s brief to the
Court cited People v. Lochner from the New York Court of

315. BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 29, at 155.
316. Id.
317. Transcript of Record at 31, *57, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (No. 70-175) [https://perma.cc/EUK9-TX4V].
318. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
319. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added).
320. 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) (“And the guaranty of due process, as has often
been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation
to the object sought to be attained.” (emphasis added)).
321. 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925) (“Appellees asked protection against arbitrary,
unreasonable, and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent
destruction of their business and property.” (emphasis added)).
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Appeals. 322 That decision had upheld the Bakeshop Act’s
maximum-hour provision. 323
Third, the divide between Jacobson and Lochner sheds
light on the Fuller Court’s jurisprudential divide. While
Jacobson split 7–2, Lochner split 5–4. In Jacobson, Justices
Peckham and Brewer dissented though they did not write a
separate opinion. 324 In Lochner, Justice Peckham wrote the
majority opinion, which Justice Brewer joined. 325 At least
these two members thought that both the Cambridge
vaccination law and the New York Bakeshop Act were
unconstitutional. The other three members of the Lochner
majority had joined the Jacobson majority: Chief Justice
Fuller and Justices Brown and McKenna. This trio thought
the New York law crossed the line, but the Massachusetts
law was reasonable. In many regards, Jacobson was on the
minds of the jurists in Lochner. Justice Peckham’s majority
opinion referred to Jacobson as “[t]he latest case decided by
this court, involving the police power.” 326 He wrote that
Jacobson “differs widely” and is “also far from covering the
one now before the court.” 327
The four Lochner dissenters were all in the Jacobson
majority: Justices Harlan, White, Holmes, and Day. This
quartet favored judicial deference in both cases. But not all
of the Lochner dissenters agreed on the correct approach to
322. Brief for the Defendant in Error at 6, *63, Jacobson, 197 U.S. 11 (No. 70175) [https://perma.cc/EUK9-TX4V] (“Compare, by contrast, the statute
forbidding the manufacture of cigars in tenement-houses (In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y.
98 [(1885)]), the statute forbidding people to give away articles in connection with
a sale of food (People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389 [(1888)]), and the statute forbidding
bakers’ employees to work more than ten hours a day (People v. Lochner, 177
N.Y. 145 [(1904)]. Dissenting opinion).”).
323. People v. Lochner, 69 N.E. 373, 381 (1904), rev’d sub nom. Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
324. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (1905) (“Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice
Peckham dissent.”).
325. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52.
326. Id. at 55.
327. Id. at 56, 58.
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constitutional law. Justice Harlan wrote the principal
Lochner dissent, which was joined by Justices White and
Day. 328 Justice Harlan agreed with the majority that “there
is a liberty of contract which cannot be violated.” 329 But he
contended that “when the validity of a statute is questioned,
the burden of proof, so to speak, is upon those who assert it
to be unconstitutional.” 330 Harlan then cited different
statistical sources, which undercut Lochner’s claim that the
regulation was arbitrary. Harlan thought that Lochner, and
not the government, had the burden of proof to argue that
the law was unconstitutional. Harlan employed the same
framework in Jacobson. He acknowledged that people had a
general right to be free from governmental restraint, but
placed the burden on the individual to assert the
unreasonableness of the law. 331 Harlan cited Jacobson
several times. 332 He wrote that the New York “statute is
[not], beyond question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law.” 333 Harlan used identical
language in Jacobson. 334 The Jacobson majority and
Harlan’s Lochner dissent are completely in accord with each
other.
In Lochner, Justice Holmes wrote a now-famous
dissent. 335 He also opined on the recently decided Cambridge
case. Holmes remarked, “[t]he other day we sustained the
Massachusetts vaccination law” in Jacobson. 336 Holmes
urged the Court to adopt a near-absolute form of deference.
328. Id. at 65 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 68.
330. Id.
331. See supra Section II.C.3.
332. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 67, 68, 70 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 70 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
334. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31 (“beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion
of rights secured by the fundamental law”).
335. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
336. Id. at 75.
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He forcefully rejected any role for the Courts to intervene
based on the Due Process Clause. Holmes would have upheld
the Bakeshop Act if any reasonable person could have
supported the law. 337 This dissent seems inconsistent with
some of the limitations identified in Jacobson. 338 As broad as
Jacobson was, the Court still maintained a role for
meaningful judicial review. The Lochner dissent, by contrast,
would have approved the Bakeshop Act with a rubber stamp.
Perhaps Holmes was uncomfortable with some of Justice
Harlan’s limiting language in Jacobson. But he joined fully.
Still, Holmes would advance his radical understanding
of Jacobson two decades later in Buck v. Bell. 339 And in the
process, he laid the first level of Jacobson’s irrepressible
myth.
III. THE FIRST LEVEL OF JACOBSON’S MYTH:
BUCK V. BELL
Jacobson was a fairly narrow decision. It upheld the
state’s power to impose a nominal fine on an unvaccinated
person. For its time, Jacobson was consistent with the
prevailing modes of judicial review under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Harlan acknowledged several limits on
his decision and stopped far short of sanctioning an absolute
exercise of the police power over a person’s body.
And subsequent decisions accurately followed Jacobson.
In Zucht v. King, the Supreme Court relied on Jacobson to
uphold a compulsory vaccination law for students. 340 In this
case, the City of San Antonio prohibited Rosalyn Zucht, an
unvaccinated student, from attending public or private
schools. This Texas law was far more draconian than the
337. Id. at 76 (“A reasonable man might think it a proper measure on the score
of health. Men whom I certainly could not pronounce unreasonable would uphold
it as a first instalment of a general regulation of the hours of work.”).
338. See supra Section II.C.4 (discussing the limitations of Jacobson).
339. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
340. Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176–77 (1922).
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Cambridge regime. Parents who did not vaccinate their
school-age children would be subject to a “penalty attached
of not less than $5 nor over $100; for failure to pay fine,
imprisonment any number of days, not exceeding 30 . . . .” 341
And schools were subject to a “fine of not less than $10 nor
more than $100 . . . for such offense, and each day, for such
offense, is deemed a separate offense, and upon failure to pay
such person is subject to imprisonment.” 342 Still, the law did
not permit the state to forcibly vaccinate people. Justice
Brandeis’s unanimous majority opinion found this case did
not present a “substantial” “constitutional question.” 343 He
dismissed the issue in a single sentence: “Long before this
suit was instituted, Jacobson v. Massachusetts had settled
that it is within the police power of a State to provide for
compulsory vaccination.” 344 This sentence casts Jacobson at
a broader level of generality, but the reasoning of Zucht is
consistent with Justice Harlan’s decision. Indeed, prior to
Jacobson, state courts had upheld compulsory vaccination
laws for schools. Zucht faithfully followed Jacobson.
However, in Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court would
recast Jacobson. By 1927, only one member of the Jacobson
Court remained: Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. And he
wrote the majority opinion in Buck v. Bell, which included a
fateful citation to Jacobson. And with a single sentence,
Holmes expanded the scope of Jacobson beyond its narrow
confines to support forcible intrusions onto bodily
autonomy. 345
Buck v. Bell upheld the constitutionality of Virginia’s
1924 Sterilization Act. This law empowered the government

341. Zucht v. King, 225 S.W. 267, 269 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920), writ of error
denied, 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
342. Id.
343. Zucht, 260 U.S. at 176.
344. Id. (citation omitted).
345. See 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927).
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to forcibly sterilize so-called “imbeciles,” like Carrie Buck. 346
Prior to Buck, several state courts held that such eugenics
laws were unconstitutional. 347 Two leading cases did not
even cite Jacobson as contrary authority. 348 These courts
apparently did not think that the power to fine an
unvaccinated person supported a power to forcibly sterilize a
person. But in Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court easily upheld
the Virginia law by an 8–1 vote. 349 Justice Butler, the lone
dissenter, did not write a separate opinion. 350 Once again,
like in Jacobson, we do not have the contrary dissenting
views.
Buck v. Bell can be reduced to a simple premise: because
the government has the greater power to imprison an
“imbecile” for life, then the government must have the lesser
power to sterilize the “imbecile,” who can then be
“discharged” from state custody “with safety.” 351 Justice
Holmes found that the alternative of life imprisonment was
far worse. In light of Virginia’s law, the state did not have to
“wait[] to execute degenerate offspring for crime or to let
them starve for their imbecility.” 352 Holmes extended the
analogy still further: if the military draft can “call upon the
best citizens for their lives,” why could the government “not
call upon those who already sap the strength of the State for
these lesser sacrifices”—that is, mandatory sterilization? 353
This argument was quite personal for Holmes. At the Battle
of Antietam, Captain Holmes was shot through the neck and

346. Id. at 207.
347. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING
92 (2018).

OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

348. See Smith v. Bd. Of Exam’rs of Feeble-Minded, 88 A. 963 (N.J. 1913);
Smith v. Command, 204 N.W. 140 (Mich. 1925).
349. Buck, 274 U.S. at 208.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 205–06.
352. Id. at 207.
353. Id.

2022]

IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF JACOBSON

193

reportedly left for dead. 354 In Jacobson, Justice Harlan made
a similar argument: the Fourteenth Amendment permits the
government to “compel [a person], by force if need be, against
his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his
pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his
country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its
defense.” 355 Finally, in one of the most infamous lines in
Supreme Court history, Justice Holmes remarked, “[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough.” 356
Holmes found that Jacobson provided all the support
needed to uphold Virginia’s sterilization law. He analogized
government-compelled
sterilization
to
governmentcompelled vaccination. Citing Jacobson, Holmes concluded
that “[t]he principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is
broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.” 357
Jacobson held that a state can perform one involuntary
medical procedure (vaccination) to stop the spread of a public
health risk (smallpox). So, it follows that the state can
perform
another
involuntary
medical
procedure
(sterilization) to stop the spread of another public health risk
(imbecility). Makes perfect sense, right? Not exactly. Holmes
lost any sense of proportionality—a single dose of a wellestablished vaccine cannot be plausibly compared to the
permanent destruction of reproductive organs. But beyond
the logical fallacy, Holmes had a precedent problem.
Buck

completely

retconned

Jacobson. 358

The

354. Captain Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr, ANTIETAM ON THE WEB,
https://antietam.aotw.org/officers.php?officer_id=910
[https://perma.cc/J9EY4SP2] (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
355. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905).
356. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
357. Id. (generally citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
358. See Colin Clark, Retcon: How A Comic Book Word Can Be Used As A
Handy Rhetorical Weapon, 69 DOJ J. FED. L. & PRAC., no. 5, 2021, at 255, 255–56
(2021) (“As a verb, a retcon occurs when a later author introduces new
information involving an earlier work about the same event or character in a
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Massachusetts Law did not involve forcible vaccination.
Remember, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
observed, “[i]f a person should deem it important that
vaccination should not be performed in his case, and the
authorities should think otherwise, it is not in their power to
vaccinate him by force, and the worst that could happen to
him under the statute would be the payment of the penalty
of $5.” 359 Jacobson could not be involuntarily jabbed in the
arm with a syringe. Rather, the criminal penalty was a
modest five-dollar fine. A 1963 article that critiqued Holmes
recognized that Jacobson did not actually sustain
“compulsory vaccination.” 360 The Massachusetts law “did
not, as in Buck v. Bell, require submission to the order, but
subjected to fine or imprisonment anyone who refused to
comply.” 361 Being forced to pay a nominal fine did not invade
any “fundamental” right. Carrie Buck, by contrast, did not
have the option of paying a fine to avoid sterilization.
Buck v. Bell radically expanded the scope of Justice
Harlan’s modest decision. In time, Holmes’s misreading
would become the paradigmatic understanding of Jacobson.
The first level of Jacobson’s myth was firmly in place.

manner that changes the meaning of the earlier work, usually without
contradicting it. The word is likely here to stay in the legal world as there are the
similarities between the serialized, episodic fiction of comic books and the
serialized, episodic non-fiction written by judges.” (footnote omitted)).
359. Commonwealth v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719, 722 (Mass. 1903) (emphasis added),
aff’d sub nom. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
360. Yosal Rogat, Mr. Justice Holmes: A Dissenting Opinion, 15 STAN. L. REV.
254, 287 & n.360 (1963).
361. Id. at 287 n.360.
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IV. THE SECOND LEVEL OF JACOBSON’S MYTH:
SHERBERT V. VERNER
Jacobson v. Massachusetts did not in any way implicate
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Yet,
during the 1940s several Justices found Jacobson to be a
useful precedent to limit the scope of religious exemptions. If
Rev. Henning Jacobson could be forcibly vaccinated over his
religious scruples, the argument went, then Jehovah’s
Witness students could be required to salute the American
flag. Of course, Jacobson did not raise any Free Exercise
objections, and his case predated the incorporation of the
First Amendment by decades. Still, post-New Deal Justices
laundered this favorable Lochner-Era Due Process precedent
by dressing it up in the garb of the First Amendment. In
Sherbert v. Verner, 362 Justice Brennan expressly
incorporated Jacobson into First Amendment doctrine. 363 In
normal times, certain Free Exercise claims would be
reviewed with strict scrutiny. But during a health crisis of
unknown severity or duration, Brennan crafted an escape
hatch from strict scrutiny that led back to profound judicial
restraint. And the second layer of Jacobson’s myth was
established: the regular Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence
would not apply during health crises. And this myth would
cause confusion for decades to come—especially during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
A. Jacobson and the Free Exercise Clause Before Sherbert
Jacobson v. Massachusetts was decided six decades
before the Supreme Court’s modern Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence emerged. Though Henning Jacobson was a
minister, his challenge had nothing to do with the free
exercise of religion. None of his briefs even referenced
religious freedom. At the time, the Free Exercise Clause was
362. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
363. See id. at 403.
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not incorporated. In Jacobson, Justice Harlan made a single,
indirect reference to religion: “The liberty secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment, this court has said, consists, in
part, in the right of a person ‘to live and work where he will’
and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his
will and without regard to his personal wishes or his
pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his
country and risk the chance of being shot down in its
defense.” 364 This brief reference, however, did not apply the
Free Exercise Clause to Jacobson’s case. Justice Harlan was
merely referring to how a state can limit different types of
liberty—both enumerated and unenumerated rights. He
placed on the same level “religious or political convictions”
with “personal wishes or his pecuniary interests.” Harlan’s
view was consistent with the Progressive-Era approach to
unenumerated rights.
Yet, during the 1940s, several Justices reconceived
Jacobson as a Free Exercise Clause case. Consider three
prominent cases. First, West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette held that public school students could
not be required to salute the American flag. 365 Justice
Frankfurter dissented. He wrote that “the general
requirement of saluting the flag . . . is very far from being the
first instance of exacting obedience to general laws that have
offended deep religious scruples.” 366 His lead example of such
“requirement[s]” was “[c]ompulsory vaccination” in
Jacobson. 367 Justice Harlan’s opinion said absolutely nothing
about “exacting obedience to general laws that have offended
deep religious scruples.” It is unclear why Justice
Frankfurter mustered this citation. But it would catch on the

364. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29 (1905) (quoting Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)).
365. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
366. Id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
367. Id.
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following year.
Second, in Prince v. Massachusetts, a Jehovah’s Witness
woman was charged with violating child labor laws when she
allowed a minor to distribute religious literature. 368 The
Court, per Justice Rutledge, upheld the prosecution. 369
Justice Rutledge stated that “the state has a wide range of
power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things
affecting the child’s welfare,” including “matters of
conscience and religious conviction.” 370 For example, a
parent “cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination
for the child more than for himself on religious grounds.” 371
Here, the Court cited Jacobson. Again, it is unclear why
Justice Rutledge thought Jacobson supported this
proposition, but he adhered to the characterization from
Justice Frankfurter’s Barnette dissent. And, Justice
Rutledge added, “The right to practice religion freely does not
include liberty to expose the community or the child to
communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.” 372
Here, the Court cited several state court cases—but not
Jacobson. (This passage about “communicable diseases”
would be cited during the COVID-19 pandemic.) 373
Third, Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township
upheld state funding for transportation to parochial
schools. 374 Justice Rutledge wrote a dissent, which was
joined by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton. The
dissenters observed that the Free Exercise Clause “secures
all forms of religious expression, creedal, sectarian or
nonsectarian wherever and however taking place, except
conduct which trenches upon the like freedoms of others or
368. 321 U.S. 158, 159–60 (1944).
369. Id. at 160, 171.
370. Id. at 167.
371. Id. at 166.
372. Id. at 166–67.
373. See infra Section VI.A.1.
374. 330 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1947).
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clearly and presently endangers the community’s good order
and security.” 375 A footnote to this statement in dissent 376
cited six cases: (1) Reynolds v. United States, 377 (2) Davis v.
Beason, 378 (3) Mormon Church v. United States, 379 (4)
Cleveland v. United States, 380 (5) Prince v. Massachusetts, 381
and (6) Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 382 The first three cases
involved polygamy in the Utah territory. The fourth case also
related to polygamy. Cleveland rejected a Free Exercise
challenge to a Mann Act prosecution for transporting
polygamous wives across state lines. We already discussed
the fifth case, Prince. And then there was Jacobson, which
was not like the others. It had nothing to do with religion.
Still, these two dissents and one majority opinion from
the 1940s invoked Jacobson as a religious freedom case in
peripheral examples. No case suggested that Jacobson ought
to be reconciled with the Court’s then-nascent Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence. That standard would change two
decades later with Sherbert v. Verner. 383
B. Sherbert Recast Jacobson, a Substantive Due Process
Case, as a Free Exercise Clause Case
Adeil Sherbert’s employer told her to work on
Saturday. 384 Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church, declined that assignment because of her

375. Id. at 32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 32 n.9.
377. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
378. 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
379. 136 U.S. 1 (1890).
380. 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
381. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
382. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
383. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
384. See id. at 399.
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religious beliefs. 385 She celebrated the Sabbath on Saturday
instead of Sunday. 386 As a result, Sherbert was fired. 387
South Carolina then denied Sherbert unemployment
benefits, because she was unwilling to work on Saturday. 388
The Court held that South Carolina’s policy violated the Free
Exercise Clause: the State could not condition Sherbert’s
benefits on her working during her Sabbath. Sherbert would
become a canonical religious freedom case.
Justice Brennan wrote the majority opinion in Sherbert.
The Court applied something like strict scrutiny to review
certain types of neutral laws that burdened the free exercise
of religion. Yet Justice Brennan drew an important
distinction between a “governmental regulation of religious
beliefs” and a “governmental regulation of certain overt acts
prompted by religious beliefs or principles.” 389 Religious
beliefs would be protected more than religious acts.
Regulations of the former were almost always prohibited.
But regulations of the latter may be permissible. Justice
Brennan observed that the Court had upheld regulations of
religious “conduct or actions” that “invariably posed some
substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.” 390 To
support this proposition, Justice Brennan cited four
precedents. Three of them expressly involved the free
exercise of religion: Reynolds v. United States, 391 Prince v.

385. See id.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 399–401.
389. Id. at 402–03.
390. Id. at 403.
391. 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878) (“So here, as a law of the organization of society
under the exclusive dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural
marriages shall not be allowed. Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary
because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit
every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name
under such circumstances.”).
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Massachusetts, 392 and Cleveland v. United States. 393 These
three cases were cited in Justice Rutledge’s Everson
dissent. 394 The fourth case, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, was
not about the free exercise of religion at all. Rather, it
concerned the doctrine that came to be known as substantive
due process.
The second Justice Harlan dissented in Sherbert. Yet, he
seemed to accept Justice Brennan’s recasting of Jacobson as
a First Amendment case. Indeed, he suggested that the first
Justice Harlan’s decision to rule against Rev. Henning
Jacobson demonstrated that the Constitution will rarely
“require special treatment on account of religion.” 395
Jacobson did not get a religious exemption; nor should
Sherbert. Among the precedents to support this proposition
were Reynolds, Prince, Cleveland, and Jacobson. 396 Harlan
took the same four cases Brennan cited, and turned them
around on the majority. In each precedent, the government
prevailed, and the Court denied religious exemptions. But in
the process, the grandson grossly misread his grandfather’s
decision.
Why did the Warren Court retcon a substantive due
process case as a Free Exercise Clause case? My theory: the
post-New Deal Justices laundered a favorable Lochner-Era
Due Process precedent by dressing it up in First Amendment
garb. At the time, it was verboten to even suggest that
Lochner, its progeny, and its antecedents, were valid. But
392. 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“We think that with reference to the public
proclaiming of religion, upon the streets and in other similar public places, the
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of
its authority over adults, as is true in the case of other freedoms, and the rightful
boundary of its power has not been crossed in this case.”).
393. 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946) (“But it has long been held that the fact that
polygamy is supported by a religious creed affords no defense in a prosecution for
bigamy.”).
394. Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 32 n.9 (1947) (Rutledge,
J., dissenting).
395. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 423 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
396. Id.
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Jacobson proved a useful precedent to limit a broad free
exercise right. So the Justices seized upon a happy
compromise. Retconning Jacobson as a First Amendment
case obviated those difficulties. Moreover, treating Jacobson
as a case about an enumerated provision in the Bill of Rights
allowed the Court to use heightened scrutiny, without
upsetting the Carolene Products settlement. Justice Douglas
would make a similar move in Griswold v. Connecticut,
decided two years after Sherbert. In Griswold, “Justice
Douglas recast Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters (1925) as decisions that involved rights
enumerated in the First Amendment. Those cases, however,
concerned economic as well as personal liberties protected by
the Due Process Clause. And the Court did not rely on the
First Amendment in either case.” 397
For whatever reason, with a single citation, Justice
Brennan rewrote Jacobson. What was once an obscure
substantive due process case became a central component of
the Free Exercise Clause balancing test. Justice Brennan
intended the citation to Jacobson to curtail an overexpansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause. But, perhaps
unwittingly, he injected a potentially infinite level of judicial
restraint into the framework. In normal times, certain Free
Exercise claims would be reviewed with strict scrutiny. But
during a public health crisis of unknown severity or duration,
Brennan crafted an escape hatch from strict scrutiny that led
back to profound judicial restraint. And the second layer of
Jacobson’s myth was established.
C. After Sherbert, Courts Incorporated Jacobson into First
Amendment Doctrine in Vaccine Cases
In the years following Sherbert, courts routinely
incorporated Jacobson into First Amendment jurisprudence.
Bowen v. Roy included a string citation of cases in which the
government was alleged to “affirmatively compel” people of
397. BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 29, at 225.
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faith “by threat of sanctions . . . to engage in conduct that
they find objectionable for religious reasons.” 398 Among the
cases cited were Wisconsin v. Yoder, West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette, and Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 399
The former two are landmark First Amendment cases. The
latter did not involve the First Amendment.
The lower courts also attempted to reconcile Jacobson
with the Free Exercise Clause. For example, the Fourth
Circuit recognized that “Jacobson did not explicitly address
the Free Exercise Clause.” 400 Still, citing Sherbert, the
Fourth Circuit stated that Jacobson did “discuss
fundamental ‘liberty’ interests.” 401 And the free exercise of
religion is a “fundamental” right. Thus, a Lochner-era case
was brought into the modern era.
Other lower courts struggled with the interplay between
Jacobson and the Free Exercise Clause. Consider the Second
Circuit’s decision in Phillips v. City of New York. 402 Here,
parents challenged “New York State’s requirement that all
children be vaccinated in order to attend public school.” 403
The parents argued that the mandate violated both
substantive due process and the Free Exercise Clause. First,
the panel held that the substantive due process argument
was “foreclosed” by Jacobson. 404 The panel observed that the
“substantive due process challenge to the mandatory
vaccination regime is therefore no more compelling than
Jacobson’s was more than a century ago.” 405 That analysis
seems to be a correct application of Jacobson. Indeed,
Henning Jacobson conceded that a vaccine mandate could be
398. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 & n.13 (1986).
399. Id. at 703 n.13.
400. Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 656 n.7 (4th Cir. 1995).
401. Id.
402. Phillips v. City of New York, 775 F.3d 538 (2nd Cir. 2015).
403. Id. at 540.
404. Id. at 542.
405. Id.
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imposed on students. He wrote in his Supreme Court brief
that “[t]he school is a part of the state’s domestic economy,
and the state may regulate it in its own discretion.” 406
Next, the Second Circuit turned to the parents’ Free
Exercise Clause arguments. This section of the Court’s
opinion is, admittedly, muddled. At the outset, the Court
recognized that “Jacobson did not address the free exercise
of religion because, at the time it was decided, the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment had not yet been
held to bind the states.” 407 That statement is partially
correct. It would be more accurate to say that Jacobson did
not even raise a Free Exercise Clause claim. Therefore, the
panel recognized, “Jacobson does not specifically control [the
Plaintiffs’] free exercise claim.” 408 I emphasize the word
“specifically,” because Jacobson would still play some role in
the Second Circuit’s First Amendment analysis.
Rather, the Court relied on the “dictum” from Prince v.
Massachusetts—also part of the triad Justice Brennan cited
in Sherbert. 409 Justice Rutledge’s Prince opinion cited
Jacobson to support the proposition that a parent “cannot
claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the child
more than for himself on religious grounds.” 410 This citation
was inapt, because Jacobson did not involve the free exercise
of religion. 411 Yet, the Second Circuit created a bridge from
Jacobson over Prince’s dictum to the Supreme Court’s
modern free exercise jurisprudence: “That dictum [from
406. Transcript of Record at 11, *37, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) (No. 70-175) [https://perma.cc/EUK9-TX4V]; see also Josh Blackman,
Henning Jacobson Agreed That Schools Could Mandate Vaccines, REASON:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 2, 2021, 6:41 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2021
/08/02/henning-jacobson-agreed-that-schools-could-mandate-vaccines/ [https://
perma.cc/LMV5-V5T4].
407. Phillips, 775 F.3d at 543.
408. Id. (emphasis added).
409. Id.
410. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
411. See supra Sections IV.A, IV.B.
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Prince] is consonant with the [Supreme] Court’s and our
precedents holding that ‘a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental
effect of burdening a particular religious practice.’” 412
What was the relevant framework? Jacobson? Prince?
Lukumi? All of the above? Who knows? The Second Circuit’s
analysis was muddled. Phillips concluded, “[a]ccordingly, we
agree with the Fourth Circuit, following the reasoning of
Jacobson and Prince, that mandatory vaccination as a
condition for admission to school does not violate the Free
Exercise Clause.” 413 I think the Second Circuit reached the
correct result under modern doctrine, but the attempt to
reconcile a century of inconsistent precedents created more
confusion than clarity. And this confusion would prove
especially problematic in early 2020.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the courts disagreed
about what precisely Phillips held. The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of New York observed that “the
Second Circuit explicitly stated that it followed the reasoning
of Jacobson when concluding that a mandatory vaccination
policy, as a condition for admission to school, did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause.” 414 I think that reading is a
stretch. There was no explicit statement. The Second
Circuit’s analysis was opaque. And the District Court seems
to have conflated the two parts of the Second Circuit’s
analysis, which separated substantive due process and the
freedom of religion.
Judge Collins, in a Ninth Circuit dissent, offered a
contrary reading of Phillips: “After applying Jacobson to
reject the plaintiffs’ substantive due process challenge to
412. Phillips, 775 F.3d at 543 (quoting Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc.
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993)).
413. Id.
414. Ass’n of Jewish Camp Operators v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 3d 197, 214
(N.D.N.Y. 2020) (citing Phillips, 775 F.3d at 543).
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New York’s vaccination requirement, the [Phillips] court
then addressed (and rejected) the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise
challenge by applying not Jacobson, but the familiar Lukumi
framework that governs all Free Exercise claims.” 415 Both
courts have a plausible reading of Phillips. But on balance, I
prefer Judge Collins’s reading, as he accounts for both parts
of the panel opinion.
In any event, Sherbert did not articulate the relationship
between Jacobson and the Court’s Free Exercise Clause
jurisprudence. Justice Brennan did not adopt Justice
Harlan’s test that a law is unconstitutional only when
“beyond all question, [there is] a plain, palpable invasion of
rights secured by the fundamental law.” 416 Justice Brennan
simply observed that in some cases the Court had upheld
regulations of religious “conduct or actions” that “invariably
posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or
order.” 417 Justice Brennan did not revert back to Justice
Harlan’s Progressive Era jurisprudence. His mere
observation did not incorporate Jacobson’s deep restraint
into the Court’s Free Exercise Clause framework. But his
errant citation embellished the second layer of Jacobson’s
myth: the usual Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence would
not apply during public health crises. And this myth would
cause confusion for decades to come—especially during the
COVID-19 pandemic. 418
Six decades later in South Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, Chief Justice Roberts would amplify

415. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir.)
(Collins, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 775 F.3d at 543), application for
injunctive relief denied, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020), cert. granted and judgment
vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.).
416. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905).
417. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
418. Justice Brennan would also create a mythical account of Marbury v.
Madison in Cooper v. Aaron. See generally Blackman, The Irrepressible Myth of
Cooper v. Aaron, supra note 2.
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Brennan’s myth, and add a new layer of his own. 419 But first,
we will turn to the third level of Jacobson, which was
established in Roe v. Wade.
V. THE THIRD LEVEL OF JACOBSON’S MYTH:
ROE V. WADE
Jacobson v. Massachusetts involved a claim to an
unenumerated right to liberty under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Jacobson argued
that “his liberty [was] invaded when the State subject[ed]
him to fine or imprisonment for neglecting or refusing to
submit to vaccination.” 420 Having to pay the fine, Jacobson
contended, was itself a violation of his liberty, even if he was
not forced to receive the vaccination. Jacobson did not
involve any intrusion on bodily autonomy. However, two
decades later, Justice Holmes expanded the scope of
Jacobson beyond its narrow confines to support forcible
intrusions onto bodily autonomy. Buck v. Bell analogized
involuntary vaccination to involuntary sterilization. Here,
Justice Holmes laid the first level of Jacobson’s myth.
Five decades later, Roe v. Wade reaffirmed this first level
of Jacobson’s myth. The landmark abortion case explained
that the right to terminate a pregnancy can be restricted in
light of precedents upholding compulsory vaccination
(Jacobson) and compulsory sterilization (Buck). But Justice
Blackmun’s majority opinion did not simply repeat Holmes’s
error. Rather, the landmark abortion case created even more
confusion. Roe incorporated Jacobson, as well as Buck, into
the Supreme Court’s modern substantive due process
jurisprudence—thus laying the third level of Jacobson’s
myth. And in the process, Roe extended Jacobson yet further:
during a health crisis, the state had a specific power to
restrict abortions. This expanded authority would become
apparent during the pandemic. Federal courts held that
419. See infra Section VI.B.
420. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26.
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abortion restrictions designed to stop the spread of COVID19 would be reviewed with Jacobson deference, and not Roe
or Casey. Part V will trace the evolution of the third level of
Jacobson’s myth from Buck v. Bell to Eisenstadt v. Baird to
Roe v. Wade to Planned Parenthood v. Casey to the pandemic.
A. Eisenstadt Begat Roe
In Sherbert v. Verner, Justice Brennan incorporated
Jacobson into the Supreme Court’s modern Free Exercise
Clause jurisprudence. 421 Nine years later, he would subtly
incorporate Jacobson into the Supreme Court’s modern
substantive due process jurisprudence. 422 Eisenstadt v.
Baird held that unmarried people had the same
constitutional right to contraceptives that married people
had. 423 Denying an unmarried person access to contraception
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 424 Perhaps the most
important sentence in Eisenstadt set the stage for Roe v.
Wade. Justice Brennan’s majority opinion stated, “[i]f the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.” 425 One year later, Roe would cite this sentence. 426
Indeed, Justice Stewart’s concurrence would quote the part
about “the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 427
421. See supra Section IV.B.
422. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453–54 (1972).
423. Id. at 447.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 453 (emphasis altered). I’ve criticized the circular reasoning of an
argument that follows the form, “If P means anything, it must mean Q.” See Josh
Blackman, “If It Means Anything, It Must Mean . . .,” JOSH BLACKMAN: BLOG
(Sept. 9, 2015), https://joshblackman.com/blog/2015/09/09/if-it-means-anythingit-must-mean/ [https://perma.cc/W8KH-NRHD].
426. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
427. Id. at 169–70 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at
453) (emphasis added).
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In Eisenstadt, Justice Brennan cited three cases to
support this apparent constitutional truism about a right to
privacy: Stanley v. Georgia, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, and Jacobson v. Massachusetts. 428 First, Stanley
held that the Due Process Clause protects the right to
possess obscene material in the home. 429 Second, Skinner
held that Oklahoma could not forcibly sterilize a prisoner
who was convicted of grand larceny. 430 Skinner distinguished
but did not overrule Buck v. Bell. Justice Jackson’s
concurrence, however, cast that ignominious precedent in
doubt. 431
Justice Brennan’s first two citations in Eisenstadt make
sense. Stanley was an apt citation, as it protected the
defendant’s right to “privacy of his own home.” 432 Skinner,
which protected the “right to have offspring,” was also on
point. 433 But the third case, Jacobson, was not on point. This
case did not discuss any sort of privacy right, like in Stanley.
It involved the simple right to be free from unwanted medical
treatment. Nor did Jacobson in any way discuss child
rearing. But, once again, with a simple citation, Justice
Brennan suggested that Jacobson should govern a much
broader substantive due process right—the right of privacy—
as understood in modern jurisprudence.
Eisenstadt begat Roe. But could Jacobson bear Roe? One
year later, Roe v. Wade would firmly establish this third

428. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453–54.
429. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969).
430. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
431. Cf. id. at 546–47 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“There are limits to the extent
to which a legislatively represented majority may conduct biological experiments
at the expense of the dignity and personality and natural powers of a minorityeven those who have been guilty of what the majority define as crimes. But this
Act falls down before reaching this problem, which I mention only to avoid the
implication that such a question may not exist because not discussed. On it I
would also reserve judgment.”).
432. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568.
433. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
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layer of Jacobson’s myth.
B. Vaccination, Sterilization, and Termination
Roe v. Wade needs no introduction. 434 In that landmark
abortion decision, Justice Blackmun’s majority opinion
recognized a constitutional right to terminate a
pregnancy. 435 Jane Roe had asserted that “the woman’s right
is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her
pregnancy at whatever time, in whatever way, and for
whatever reason she alone chooses.” 436 The Supreme Court
rejected that argument, finding that “this right is not
unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation.” 437
In an important paragraph, Justice Blackmun identified
limits on “the privacy right,” which is not “absolute.” 438
Justice Blackmun contended that states can force a woman
to maintain a pregnancy to “protect[] potential life,” among
other reasons. 439 He observed that “[t]he Court’s decisions
recognizing a right of privacy also acknowledge that some
state regulation in areas protected by that right is
appropriate.” 440 Specifically, “[t]he Court has refused to
recognize an unlimited right” “to do with one’s body as one
pleases.” 441 To support this proposition, Justice Blackmun
cited two cases with one-word parentheticals: “Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination); Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927) (sterilization).” 442

434. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
435. Id. at 164–65.
436. Id. at 153.
437. Id. at 154.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. (internal citations cleaned up).
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Without question, Buck v. Bell supports this
proposition. 443 Buck upheld the state’s power to forcibly
sterilize a woman who was deemed an “imbecile.” 444 Carrie
Buck could not do with her body as she pleased. Instead, the
state sterilized her to prevent the reproduction of more
“imbeciles.” If the state could permanently remove a
woman’s reproductive organs, Roe reasoned, it follows that
the state could also force a woman to use those organs to
deliver a child to term. Justice Blackmun, who referenced the
linkage between abortion and overpopulation, 445 may have
seen Buck and Roe in similar lights.
Still, the decision to reaffirm Buck in Roe was
unfortunate. Scholars consider Buck as part of the so-called
“anticanon.” 446 Yet, to this day, Buck remains good law. For
example, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled “that
involuntary sterilization is not always unconstitutional if it
is a narrowly tailored means to achieve a compelling
government interest.” 447 The court favorably cited Buck. It
ruled that a “mildly retarded” woman could not seek
damages from the government for compelling her to submit
to tubal ligation sterilization. 448 Justice Blackmun’s
favorable citation of Buck, regrettably, endorsed the
precedent.
Roe’s citation of Jacobson, however, was far more
problematic. Here, Justice Blackmun endorsed the first level
of Jacobson’s myth. Massachusetts never asserted the power
to forcibly vaccinate people. Rather, Henning Jacobson, who
refused to be vaccinated, simply had to pay a modest fine.

443. See supra Part III.
444. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
445. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116 (1973) (“In addition, population growth, pollution,
poverty, and racial overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem.”
(emphasis added)).
446. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 389 (2011).
447. Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1129 (8th Cir. 2001).
448. Id. at 1127.
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This 1905 case did not concern an “unlimited right to do with
one’s body as one pleases.” 449 Yet, Justice Blackmun adopted
Justice Holmes’s all-too-common misreading of Jacobson.
Roe analogized compulsory sterilization to compulsory
vaccination. Other post-Roe Supreme Court decisions would
likewise equate Jacobson with compulsory sterilization. 450
Justice Blackmun’s citation of Jacobson is even more
perplexing, as Justice Harlan’s judicial restraint was 180degrees out of phase with Justice Blackmun’s strict scrutiny.
It is difficult to reconcile Roe and Jacobson.
C. Reconciling Roe and Jacobson
Roe established an intricate trimester framework that
balanced the state’s interests to protect fetal life against the
woman’s interest to terminate the pregnancy. 451 Jacobson
was cited to demonstrate that this right was not absolute.
Yet, Jacobson’s deferential framework was inconsistent with
Roe’s rigorous trimester framework. Indeed, it is difficult to
reconcile the modes of jurisprudence employed in these two
cases, seven decades apart. The former would uphold a law
unless there was “beyond all question, a plain, palpable
invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law.” 452 The
latter protected an unenumerated “right of privacy” of
unclear provenance, “whether it be founded in the
Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action” or “in the Ninth Amendment’s
reservation of rights to the people.” 453 This 1905 exercise of
449. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
450. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673–74 (1977) (“While the
contours of this historic liberty interest in the context of our federal system of
government have not been defined precisely, they always have been thought to
encompass freedom from bodily restraint and punishment.” (first citing Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (sterilization); and then citing Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination))).
451. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
452. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 31.
453. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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restraint in no way resembles what Justice White derided as
an “exercise of raw judicial power.” 454 In dissent, Justice
Rehnquist aptly charged that Roe was “more closely attuned
to” another case decided from 1905: Lochner. 455 But that
comparison is unfair to Justice Peckham. The Lochner Court
required far more evidence to declare unconstitutional New
York’s maximum-hours law 456 than the Roe Court needed to
establish a new nationwide standard for abortion laws.
Jacobson also seems in palpable conflict with other
aspects of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence. For example,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists
found
that
Pennsylvania’s
abortion
restrictions were unconstitutional, because they might pose
a medical risk to pregnant women. 457 In dissent, Justice
White turned Jacobson around on the majority. 458 He
discussed the “actual holding of Jacobson” that upheld a
mandate
to
“be
vaccinated
against
smallpox,
notwithstanding that exposure to vaccination carried with it
a statistical possibility of serious illness and even death.” 459
Jacobson thus recognized that “a compelling state interest
may justify the imposition of some physical danger upon an

454. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting); see also
Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 10 F.4th 430, 464 (5th Cir. 2021) (“‘[W]hat
distinguishes abortion from other matters of health care policy in America—and
uniquely removes abortion policy from the democratic process established by our
Founders—is Supreme Court precedent.’ Compare, e.g., Jacobson v.
Massachusetts (rejecting substantive due process claim that ‘a compulsory
vaccination law is . . . hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for
his own body’ and ‘nothing short of an assault upon his person’).” (citation altered)
(first quoting Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265, 277 & n.1
(5th Cir. 2019) (Ho, J., concurring in the judgment), cert. granted, 141 S. Ct. 2619
(2021) (mem.); and then citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26
(1905))).
455. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
456. See supra Section II.D.
457. 476 U.S. 747, 771 (1986).
458. Id. at 808–09 (1986) (White, J., dissenting).
459. Id. at 809.
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individual.” 460 Given this precedent, Justice White found
“baffling” the Court’s “unwillingness to tolerate the
imposition of any nonnegligible risk of injury to a pregnant
woman in order to protect the life of her viable fetus in the
course of an abortion.” 461 Faithfully applied, Jacobson would
support the constitutionality of these abortion restrictions.
Roe should have rejected Jacobson-level minimalism—not
purported to follow it.
Jacobson also undermines another aspect of the
Supreme Court’s modern abortion jurisprudence: deference
to the state on contested medical questions. In Stenberg v.
Carhart, the Court declared unconstitutional a ban on
“partial birth abortion.” 462 At the time, there was some
disagreement about whether a specific abortion method was
ever necessary to save a woman’s life. 463 What should courts
do in the face of such a debate? The majority did not defer to
the government. However, in dissent, Justice Kennedy found
that deference was warranted. He favorably cited Jacobson,
which “establish[ed] beyond doubt the right of the legislature
to resolve matters upon which physicians disagreed.” 464 A
century earlier, Justice Harlan was uninterested in what
Jacobson’s doctors thought about the risks from vaccines. 465
Jacobson, which Roe embraced, cuts against Stenberg’s lack
of deference for state health officials.
Seven years later in Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court
upheld the federal ban on partial birth abortion. 466 Now,
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. 467 And he
repeated his apt reading of Jacobson: “The Court has given
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000).
463. Id. at 965–66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
464. Id. at 971.
465. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24 (1905).
466. 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
467. Id. at 132.
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state and federal legislatures wide discretion to pass
legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific
uncertainty.” 468 Again, this sort of deference is entirely
inconsistent with Roe’s second-guessing of legislative
judgments.
Yet, the Supreme Court has maintained Roe’s reliance
on Jacobson. Indeed, Planned Parenthood v. Casey would
further compound Justice Blackmun’s myth. 469 The Casey
plurality observed that “a State’s interest in the protection of
life falls short of justifying any plenary override of individual
liberty claims.” 470 Here the Court cited Jacobson, but not
Buck v. Bell. Like in Roe, the Casey plurality did not seem to
be relying on Justice Harlan’s conception of when a state
could restrict liberty to prevent the spread of disease. Rather,
Casey invoked Jacobson to explain that there are some limits
on the unenumerated right. But this citation does far more
work. Justice Harlan considered a very different conception
of liberty than did the Casey Court. In 1905, the presumption
was that a state could intrude on a person’s liberty. Casey
inverted that presumption of constitutionality to a
presumption of liberty. The Casey plurality’s reference to
Jacobson gets the precedent entirely backwards. 471
Jacobson provides no footing for Roe or Casey. But the
myth goes deeper. Jacobson did not involve the restriction of
liberty during normal times. Rather, the 1905 case
implicated freedom during a public health crisis. It was not
difficult to predict how courts would reconcile Roe and

468. Id. at 163 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 30–31).
469. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
470. Id. at 857 (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–30).
471. Other modern cases grounded Jacobson in modern substantive due
process jurisprudence. For example, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health “inferred” from Jacobson “[t]he principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment.” 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990). The Court wrote that Jacobson “balanced
an individual’s liberty interest in declining an unwanted smallpox vaccine
against the State’s interest in preventing disease.” Id.
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Jacobson during the COVID-19 pandemic: Jacobson, and not
Roe, applies. Indeed, courts would go further in 2020: when
the government acts to prevent the spread of disease during
a pandemic, Jacobson controls all substantive due process
cases.
D. Abortion in the Time of Pandemic
During the pandemic, governments took unprecedented
steps to stop the spread of COVID-19. Many states postponed
elective surgeries in order to ration personal protective
equipment (PPE). And several states, including Texas,
deemed certain types of abortions as elective procedures.
What was the correct framework to assess these restrictions?
Should courts have followed traditional abortion
jurisprudence from Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v.
Casey? Or did those cases include an escape hatch during
public health crises? The Fifth Circuit held that during the
pandemic, Jacobson, and not Roe, was the governing
precedent. And this holding followed from the third level of
Jacobson’s myth, which Justice Blackmun established in
Roe.
1. Abortion, COVID, and PPE
Think back to March 2020. Products once taken for
granted were in short supply. People hoarded toilet paper,
alcohol wipes, and hand sanitizer. Moreover, governments
rationed personal protective equipment (PPE) like face
masks, surgical gowns, and rubber gloves. Soon, governors
imposed strict limits on the use of PPE. Indeed, for some
time, governments urged people not to wear masks to ensure
health professionals had adequate supplies. 472 To that end,
472. See Alexandra Kelley, Fauci: Why the Public Wasn’t Told to Wear Masks
When the Coronavirus Pandemic Began, THE HILL (June 16, 2020), https://
thehill.com/changing-america/well-being/prevention-cures/502890-fauci-whythe-public-wasnt-told-to-wear-masks [https://perma.cc/6D8F-CPXW] (“When the
coronavirus pandemic hit stateside, face masks were strictly recommended as
personal protective equipment (PPE) for health care professionals. According to
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more than thirty states prohibited elective surgeries as a
means to preserve PPE. 473 Doctors could only perform
emergency, urgent, or non-elective procedures. States
defined elective surgery in four primary fashions.
Four states largely deferred to the federal government’s
definition of elective procedures: Oklahoma, Utah,
Louisiana, and New York. 474 In seven states, only life-saving
procedures were permitted: Arkansas, Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Texas. 475 Eleven
Anthony Fauci, the nation’s leading infectious disease expert and a key member
of the White House coronavirus task force, masks weren’t advised to the public
from the start because of the anticipated PPE shortages.”).
473. State Guidance on Elective Surgeries, AMBULATORY SURGERY CTR. ASS’N
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.ascassociation.org/asca/resourcecenter/latestnewsre
sourcecenter/covid-19/covid-19-state [https://perma.cc/77NA-GFYR].
474. See Non-Emergent, Elective Medical Services, and Treatment
Recommendations, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://www.cms.gov/files/document/31820-cms-adult-elective-surgery-and-proce
dures-recommendations.pdf [https://go.cms.gov/35Uo1Co]; Okla. Exec. Ord. No.
2020-13 para. 22 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.sos.ok.gov/documents/executive
/1931.pdf [https://bit.ly/36BLZlW]; Utah State Pub. Health Ord. para. 6 (Mar. 23,
2020,
6:30
PM),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/12gNfyF1fHbhI_kv3L6jqKeU4dkGtK2d/view [https://bit.ly/2GzAuRA] (order from Executive Director
Utah Dept. of Health (Office of the Governor of UT)); La. Healthcare Facility
Notice #2020-COVID19-ALL-007 (Mar. 21, 2020), http://ldh.la.gov/assets/oph
/Coronavirus/resources/providers/LDH-UPDATED-Notice-Med-Surg-Procedures
32120.pdf [https://bit.ly/3lesG6o] (order from State Health Officer Louisiana
Dept. of Public Health (Office of the Governor of LA)); N.Y. Dep’t of Health,
COVID-19 Directive to Increase Availability of Beds by a Minimum of 50% and
Provide
Necessary
Staffing
and
Equipment
(Mar.
23,
2020),
https://on.ny.gov/3bxCC7u [https://bit.ly/34s5fQr] (Office of the Governor of NY).
475. State Guidance on Elective Surgeries, Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. Ass’n
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.ascassociation.org/asca/resourcecenter/latestnews
resourcecenter/covid-19/covid-19-state [https://bit.ly/3jyHlsE]; Ala. Ord. of the
State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public Gatherings Due to Risk of
Infection by COVID-19 para. 7a (Mar. 27, 2020), https://governor
.alabama.gov/assets/2020/03/Amended-Statewide-Social-Distancing-SHO-Order
-3.27.2020-FINAL.pdf [https://bit.ly/2Ss8x0i] (Office of the Governor of Alabama);
Fla. Exec. Ord. No. 20-72 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.flgov.com/wpcontent/uploads/orders/2020/EO_20-72.pdf [https://bit.ly/3jASJ7l] (Office of the
Governor of the State of Florida); Miss. Exec. Ord. No. 1470 (Apr. 10, 2020),
https://mcusercontent.com/08cb3e52aa1308600f84d49ea/files/b4fe55a2-0d864fed-a3d8-6e8ea8ceac86/Executive_Order_1470_Hospitals.pdf [https://bit.ly/2F3
mlez] (Office of the Governor of the State of Mississippi); Pa. Dep’t of Health
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states allowed procedures to be performed if they could not
be delayed: Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Minnesota, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Washington,
and West Virginia. 476 Eleven other states expressly
delegated to medical professionals the authority to
determine what procedures were essential: Alaska, Hawaii,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Jersey,

Guidance on Ambulatory Surgical Facilities’ Responses to COVID-19 (Mar. 20,
2020), [https://bit.ly/30zSlhS] (Office of the Governor of Pennsylvania); Md.
Directive and Ord. Regarding Various Healthcare Matters para. 6 (Mar. 23,
2020), https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/ASCACONNECT/b42cd9
22-f859-443e-852e-27f187129ed1/UploadedImages/COVID-19/03_23_2020_Sec_
Neall_Healthcare_Matters_Order_MARYLAND_ORDER_23Mar2020.pdf [https
://bit.ly/2SuAPHt]; Tex. Exec. Ord. GA-09 (Mar. 22, 2020), https://gov.texas
.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA_09_COVID-19_hospital_capacity_IMAGE_03-22
-2020.pdf [https://bit.ly/3liBYhS] (Governor of the State of Texas).
476. See Ariz. Exec. Ord. No. 2020-10 (Mar. 19, 2020) https://azgovernor.gov
/sites/default/files/eo_2020-10.pdf [https://bit.ly/30JTjZ1]; Colo. Exec. Ord.
D 2020 009 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/default/files
/inline-files/D%202020%20009%20Ordering%20Cessation%20of%20All%20Elect
ive%20Surgeries_0.pdf [https://bit.ly/2SuMRRh]; Ind. Exec. Ord. No. 20-13
para. 4 (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.in.gov/gov/files/Executive-Order-20-13Medical-Surge.pdf [https://bit.ly/36Hfezd]; Iowa Proclamation of Disaster
Emergency § 1 (Mar. 26, 2020), https://governor.iowa.gov/sites/default/files/docu
ments/Public%20Health%20Proclamation%20-%202020.03.26.pdf [https://bit.ly
/2SdegAq]; Ky. Cabinet for Health and Fam. Servs., Dep’t of Pub. Health
Directive paras. 1, 3 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://governor.ky.gov/attachments
/20200323_Directive_Elective-Procedures.pdf
[https://bit.ly/3nl2icO];
Minn.
Emergency Exec. Ord. No. 20-09 para. 2 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://mn.gov
/governor/assets/Emergency%20Executive%20Order%2020-09_FINAL_As_Filed
_tcm1055-424357.pdf [https://bit.ly/3jFFL8D]; N.M. Dep’t Health Pub. Health
Ord., para. 3 (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.governor.state.nm.us/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/3_24_PHO_1.pdf [https://bit.ly/30B4LpX]; N.C. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., Guidance for Hosp. & Ambulatory Surgery Ctr. Leaders
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://ncasca.memberclicks.net/assets/COVID19/NC%20DHHS
%20COVID-19%20Elective%20Surgeries.pdf [https://bit.ly/36zlHRl]; Ohio Dep’t
of Health, Dir.’s Ord. for the Mgmt. of Non-Essential Surgeries and Procedures
throughout Ohio, paras. 1–2 (Mar. 17, 2020), https://content.govdelivery.com
/attachments/OHOOD/2020/03/17/file_attachments/1403950/Director%27s%20O
rder%20non-essential%20surgery%203-17-2020.pdf
[https://bit.ly/3nuX6Dx];
Wash. Proclamation by the Governor No. 20-24 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www
.governor.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proclamations/20-24%20COVID-19%20nonurgent%20medical%20procedures%20(tmp).pdf [https://bit.ly/3iGzqIM]; W. Va.
Exec. Ord. No. 16-20 (Mar. 31, 2020), https://governor.wv.gov/Documents
/EO%2016-20electiveprocedures.pdf [https://bit.ly/34CeFIT].
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South Dakota, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia. 477
The states can also be divided up based on how they
treated abortions. Massachusetts, New Mexico, and
Washington designated certain abortion services as essential
procedures in their regulations. 478 These three states, plus
fifteen others, submitted an amicus brief indicating that they
477. See Alaska COVID-19 Health Mandate, Mandate 5.1–Elective Procedures
(Mar. 19, 2020), https://gov.alaska.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/COVID-19Health-Mandate-005.pdf [https://bit.ly/30EXUvC]; Haw. Exec. Ord. No. 20-05
para. 2 (Apr. 16, 2020), https://governor.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads
/2020/04/2004090-ATG_Executive-Order-No.-20-05-distribution-signed-1.pdf
[https://bit.ly/3jHNmTR]; Ill. Dep’t of Pub. Health, COVID-19 Elective Surgeries
and Procedures, para. D (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.dph.illinois.gov/sites
/default/files/Elective_Surgery_04.24.20.pdf
[https://bit.ly/2GhgvjA];
Mass.
Bureau of Health Care Safety & Quality Memorandum (Mar. 15, 2020),
https://www.mhalink.org/MHADocs/Communications/COVID19/20-03-15C19%
20Elective%20Procedure%20OrderUPDATE.pdf [https://bit.ly/325oLlx]; Mich.
Exec. Ord. No. 2020-17 para. 1 (Mar. 20, 2020, 12:28 PM), https://www
.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2019-2020/executiveorder/pdf/2020-EO-17.pdf
[https://bit.ly/2R5B4bg]; Neb. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Directed Health
Measure Ord. 2020-009 (Apr. 3, 2020), http://www.northbendeagle.com
/2020/Sept2020/DHM-September14.pdf [https://bit.ly/2Grphm9]; N.J. Exec. Ord.
No. 109 para. 1 (Mar. 23, 2020), https://nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy
/pdf/EO-109.pdf [https://bit.ly/34yy11H]; S.D. Exec. Ord. No. 2020-07 (Mar. 23,
2020), https://sdsos.gov/general-information/executive-actions/executive-orders
/assets/2020-08.PDF [https://web.archive.org/web/20211005225719/https://sdsos
.gov/general-information/executive-actions/executive-orders/assets/202008.PDF]; Tenn. Exec. Ord. No. 18 para. (Mar. 23, 2020), https://publications
.tnsosfiles.com/pub/execorders/exec-orders-lee18.pdf
[https://bit.ly/30LxU1H];
Vt. Exec. Order No. 01-20 Addendum 3 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://governor.vermont
.gov/sites/scott/files/documents/ADDENDUM%203%20TO%20EXECUTIVE%20
ORDER%2001-20.pdf [https://bit.ly/2I8Ryoj]; Ord. of the Governor & State
Health Comm’r, Ord. of Pub. Health Emergency Two (Mar. 25, 2020),
https://www.governor.virginia.gov/media/governorvirginiagov/executive-actions
/Order-of-Public-Health-Emergency-Two-Order-of-The-Governor-and-StateHealth-Commissioner.pdf [https://bit.ly/3jB2vq6].
478. Mass. Bureau of Health Care Safety & Quality Memorandum (Mar. 15,
2020),
https://www.mhalink.org/MHADocs/Communications/COVID19/20-0315C19%20Elective%20Procedure%20OrderUPDATE.pdf [https://bit.ly/325oLlx]
(“[T]erminating a pregnancy is not considered a nonessential, elective invasive
procedure for the purpose of this guidance.”); N.M. Dep’t Health Pub. Health
Ord., para. 3 (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.governor.state.nm.us/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/3_24_PHO_1.pdf
[https://bit.ly/30B4LpX];
Wash.
Proclamation by the Governor No. 20-24 (Mar. 19, 2020), https://www.governor
.wa.gov/sites/default/files/proclamations/20-24%20COVID-19%20non-urgent%
20medical%20procedures%20(tmp).pdf [https://bit.ly/3iGzqIM].

2022]

IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF JACOBSON

219

also designated abortions as essential procedures: New York,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia. 479
Four states attempted to designate certain abortion
services as non-essential procedures as a means to preserve
PPE: Ohio, Alabama, Oklahoma, and Texas. 480 The policies
in the first three states were enjoined in their entirety. 481
The Texas policy was saved, in part, by Jacobson.
479. Brief for the States of New York, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawai’i, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
and the District of Columbia as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, In
re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020) (No. 20-50264), [https://perma.cc/3Z6UUTXM].
480. See Letter from Jonathan Fulkerson, Ohio Deputy Att’y Gen., to Planned
Parenthood of Southwest Ohio (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/6816634-Ltr-Southwest.html [https://perma.cc/2Q6J-CG7J] (Ohio
Attorney General’s office ordering Planned Parenthood facility to “immediately
stop performing non-essential and elective surgical abortions” pursuant to March
17, 2020, Ohio Department of Health Order); Press Release, Off. of the Att’y Gen.
of Texas, Health Care Professionals and Facilities, Including Abortion Providers,
Must Immediately Stop All Medically Unnecessary Surgeries and Procedures to
Preserve Resources to Fight COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/health-care-professionalsand-facilities-including-abortion-providers-must-immediately-stop-all [https://
perma.cc/L2FC-3DMP] (warning abortion providers, among others, to “postpone
all surgeries and procedures that are not immediately medically necessary”);
Press Release, Governor of Oklahoma, Governor Stitt Clarifies Elective Surgeries
and Procedures Suspended Under Executive Order (Mar. 27, 2020),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200329132759/https://www.governor.ok.gov/artic
les/press_releases/governor-stitt-clarifies-elective-surgeries] (clarifying certain
abortion services are not medical emergencies, but instead are elective surgeries
and minor medical procedures, and thus must be postponed); Order of the State
Health Officer Suspending Certain Public Gatherings Due to Risk of Infection by
COVID-19 (Mar. 27, 2020), https://www.alabamapublichealth.gov/legal/assets
/order-socialdistancing-signed-032720.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9UH-4A54] (order
from Alabama State Health Officer also suspending abortion procedures).
481. Pre-Term Cleveland v. Att’y Gen. of Ohio, No. 20-3365, 2020 WL 1673310,
at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 6, 2020); Robinson v. Marshall, 450 F. Supp. 3d 1293, 1296
(M.D. Ala. 2020); S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. CIV-20-277-G, 2020 WL
1677094, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2020); see also Little Rock Fam. Plan. Servs.
V. Rutledge, 454 F. Supp. 3d 821, 834–35 (E.D. Ark. 2020), vacated, No. 4:19-CV00449-KGB, 2020 WL 6129627 (E.D. Ark. May 1, 2020).
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2. Roe and Jacobson in Texas
During normal times, abortion disputes are resolved
through the frameworks from Roe v. Wade, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, and other related cases. But what about
abortion restrictions enacted during abnormal times? Would
a different framework apply for abortion restrictions
imposed to prevent the spread of a pandemic? Prior to 2020,
no court was ever confronted with this question because no
government ever tailored its abortion restrictions to a public
health crisis. But everything changed in March 2020. And,
like in Roe five decades earlier, Texas was ground zero for
this new abortion jurisprudence.
Texas Governor Greg Abbott imposed restrictions on
certain types of abortions in order to preserve PPE. 482 The
District Court ruled that this policy conflicted with Roe and
Casey. 483 In In re Abbott, the Fifth Circuit reversed. 484 A
divided panel held that Roe and Casey are not the governing
standards when the state is “faced with a society-threatening
epidemic.” 485 A “public health crisis” opens up an escape
hatch from Roe. 486 These dire conditions trigger Jacobson’s
rule. It becomes irrelevant whether the restriction imposes
482. Tex. Exec. Ord. GA-09, at 1–2 (Mar. 22, 2020), https://gov.texas
.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA_09_COVID-19_hospital_capacity_IMAGE_0322-2020.pdf [https://bit.ly/3liBYhS]; see also Press Release, Texas Att’y Gen.,
Health Care Professionals and Facilities, Including Abortion Providers, Must
Immediately Stop All Medically Unnecessary Surgeries and Procedures to
Preserve Resources to Fight COVID-19 Pandemic (Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/health-care-professionalsand-facilities-including-abortion-providers-must-immediately-stop-all
[https://perma.cc/S2DT-77LW].
483. Planned Parenthood Ctr. For Choice v. Abbott, 450 F. Supp. 3d 753, 757
(W.D. Tex. 2020), vacated, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 WL 1808897 (W.D. Tex.
Apr. 8, 2020).
484. In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772, 776 (5th Cir. 2020), vacated as moot sub nom.
by Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1261 (2021).
485. Id. at 784.
486. Id. at 786 (“By all accounts, then, the effect on abortion arising from a
state’s emergency response to a public health crisis must be analyzed under the
standards in Jacobson.”).
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an “undue burden” on access to abortion. Rather the
Jacobson framework applies: the government “may
implement emergency measures that curtail constitutional
rights so long as the measures have at least some ‘real or
substantial relation’ to the public health crisis and are not
‘beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights
secured by the fundamental law.’” 487
In the time of COVID, the Roe and Casey frameworks no
longer govern. Instead, the court returned to the state of
constitutional law circa 1905. This test left many questions
unanswered. It is unclear how threatening the epidemic
must be to trigger the escape hatch. What exactly is a “public
health crisis”? Would something short of a pandemic qualify?
The panel did not articulate what the threshold rates of
transmission, hospitalization, and death are. Beyond these
epidemiological queries, the decision had legal shortcomings.
What exactly was the precedential basis for this escape
hatch? The Supreme Court “has consistently cited Jacobson
in its abortion decisions.” 488 Admittedly, none of these cases
“involved a state’s postponement of some abortion
procedures in response to a public health crisis.” 489 No
government ever had the need for such a restriction. But Roe,
Casey, and Carhart “cite[d] Jacobson with approval and
without suggesting that abortion rights are somehow exempt
from its framework.” 490 The Fifth Circuit referenced the
same citations to Jacobson discussed supra Section V.B.2. 491
The court added that “[t]he right to abortion is no exception”

487. Id. at 784 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
488. Id. at 785.
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (first citing Jacobson, 197 U.S.
at 25); then citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (citing
Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 24–30); and then citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124,
163 (2007) (citing Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 30–31).
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to Jacobson’s rule. 492 In light of these citations, “the effect on
abortion arising from a state’s emergency response to a
public health crisis must be analyzed under the standards in
Jacobson.” 493
In In re Abbott, the district court below had briskly
dismissed any argument that Roe has an escape hatch. 494
The judge would “not speculate on whether the Supreme
Court included a silent ‘except-in-a-national-emergency
clause’ in its previous writings” on abortion. 495 The Fifth
Circuit responded that the district court’s “analysis is
backwards: Jacobson instructs that all constitutional rights
may be reasonably restricted to combat a public health
emergency.” 496 The panel could “avoid applying Jacobson
here only if the Supreme Court had specifically exempted
abortion rights from its general rule.” 497 But the Court “has
never” sealed shut the Jacobson escape hatch. 498 The panel
concluded that the Texas “emergency measure that
postpones certain non-essential abortions during an
epidemic—does not ‘beyond question’ violate the
constitutional right to abortion.” 499
Here, the Fifth Circuit followed the logical consequences
of Jacobson’s third myth. Roe established a general rule, but
explained that Jacobson limits that general rule. Casey and
Gonzales likewise cited Jacobson to recognize limits on the
general rule. None of those cases suggested that Jacobson
492. In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 778.
493. Id. at 786.
494. Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, 450 F. Supp. 3d 753, 758
(W.D. Tex. 2020), vacated, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020 WL 1808897 (W.D. Tex.
Apr. 8, 2020).
495. Id.
496. In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 786; see also In re Rutledge, 956 F.3d 1018, 1028
(8th Cir. 2020) (“[T]he district court’s failure to apply the Jacobson framework
produced a patently erroneous result.”).
497. In re Abbott, 954 F.3d at 786.
498. Id.
499. Id. at 791 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 31 (1905)).
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was inapplicable. So it fell to the lower courts to decide how
Jacobson limits the right to abortion. And it was not difficult
to predict how courts would reconcile these two cases during
a public health crisis: Jacobson and not Roe applies. What
may have seemed like a harmless citation to Jacobson in Roe
took on a whole new meaning during the pandemic. In the
Fifth Circuit, Roe and Casey would have to be read in
conjunction with Jacobson.
On remand, the District Court found Texas’s order
“violates the standards set forth in both” Casey and
Jacobson. 500 Other courts followed a similar path. For
example, an Oklahoma federal court analyzed the abortion
restrictions “under both Jacobson’s standard for permissible
state action during a public health emergency and Casey’s
undue-burden analysis.” 501 And an Alabama federal court
likewise “applied together” Jacobson with Roe and Casey. 502
It ruled that “[t]he Jacobson Court—writing long before the
development
of
modern
substantive-due-process
jurisprudence—found no clear invasion of any fundamental
right.” 503 The district court then explained that “[a]bortion,
at least before viability, is a fundamental right.” 504 The court
concluded, “[t]o fully prevent this choice (by, for example,
mandating that a woman’s abortion be delayed until it is
illegal) violates Casey’s central holding, and thus violates
Jacobson, too.” 505 The district court committed the sin of
500. Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, No. A-20-CV-323-LY, 2020
WL 1815587, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020), mandamus granted, vacated in part
sub nom. In re Abbott, 956 F.3d 696 (5th Cir 2020), vacated as moot sub nom. by
Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1261 (2021).
501. S. Wind Women’s Ctr. LLC v. Stitt, No. CIV-20-277-G, 2020 WL 1677094,
at *4 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 6, 2020), appeal dismissed, 808 F. App’x 677 (10th Cir.
2020).
502. Robinson v. Marshall, 454 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1198 (M.D. Ala. 2020), appeal
dismissed sub nom. Robinson v. Att’y Gen., 20-11401-W, 2020 WL 3989457 (11th
Cir. May 5, 2020).
503. Id. at 1198 n.10.
504. Id. at 1198.
505. Id. at 1199.
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modernity: it read the phrase “fundamental right” in a 1905
decision to equate to the Court’s modern fundamental rights
jurisprudence. 506
I doubt that Justice Blackmun intended Jacobson to
impose any meaningful restrictions on the right to abortion.
Indeed, it would have been difficult for the Roe Court to
envision how a restriction on abortions could prevent the
spread of disease. Historically, abortion restrictions were
designed to protect another life, that is, the states’ interest
to “protect[] potential life” in the womb. 507 Jacobson was
always a strange fit for Roe. But Roe’s citation to Jacobson
had unintended and profound constitutional consequences
“in diverse contexts, including those . . . unimagined” in
1973. 508 The unimaginable became a reality during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
*

*

*

In Sherbert v. Verner, Justice Brennan incorporated
Jacobson into the Supreme Court’s enumerated rights
jurisprudence. Level 2 was established. And in Roe v. Wade,
Justice Blackmun accepted Justice Holmes’s misreading
from Buck v. Bell and incorporated Jacobson into the Court’s
unenumerated rights jurisprudence: level 1 was reaffirmed
and level 3 was entrenched. Next, we will turn to the fourth
level of Jacobson’s myth.

506. See supra Section I.A.
507. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
508. See NLRB. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 615 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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VI. THE FOURTH LEVEL OF JACOBSON’S MYTH:
SOUTH BAY UNITED PENTECOSTAL CHURCH V. NEWSOM
In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, many
states restricted attendance in houses of worship. These
gatherings were deemed “non-essential.” First Amendment
challenges were filed across the country. Initially, the lower
courts split about the constitutionality of these measures. 509
And from March through May of 2020, the Supreme Court
stayed out of the fray. During this period, many judges used
Jacobson’s deferential framework to scrutinize religious
freedom claims. But on May 29, 2020, the Supreme Court
would leave an indelible mark on the COVID-19 pandemic.
In South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, the
Court declined to enjoin California’s restrictions on houses of
worship. The justices sharply split 5–4. 510 The unsigned
majority opinion contained no reasoning. But Chief Justice
Roberts wrote a brief concurring opinion that counseled
deference during this public health crisis. 511 The Chief
Justice included one citation to Jacobson, though it was
unclear exactly how he was using that 1905 decision. 512 Soon,
the
South
Bay
concurrence
would
become
a
“superprecedent.” Over the following six months, 140 cases
cited the solo opinion, more than 90 of which also cited
Jacobson. Whether deliberate or not, Chief Justice Roberts
established what would become the fourth layer of
Jacobson’s myth: Jacobson-level deference was warranted
for all pandemic-related constitutional challenges. The lower
509. See Josh Blackman, The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause, 44 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 637, 647 (2021).
510. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (South Bay I), 140 S. Ct.
1613, 1613 (2020), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021)
(mem.).
511. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief).
512. Id. (“Our Constitution principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of
the people’ to the politically accountable officials of the States ‘to guard and
protect.’” (alteration in original) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
38 (1905))).
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courts followed the Chief’s signal from the shadow docket.
However, on November 25, 2020, the superprecedent
would come to an end. In Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
v. Cuomo, the new Roberts Court—with Justice Barrett
replacing Justice Ginsburg—held that New York’s
restrictions on houses of worship were unconstitutional. The
per curiam decision followed traditional First Amendment
doctrine and did not rely on Jacobson-level deference. 513 In a
concurrence, Justice Gorsuch forcefully buried three of
Jacobson’s four myths. 514 Chief Justice Roberts failed to
defend his own superprecedent. Indeed, Roberts mounted a
partial retreat from South Bay and Jacobson.
A. Jacobson During the Pandemic, Before South Bay
During the pandemic, governors enacted emergency
measures to halt the spread of COVID-19. Some states
restricted public gatherings, including prayer at houses of
worship. 515 Other states restricted the sale of firearms to
promote social distancing. 516 And several states restricted
abortions to conserve personal protective equipment. 517
These orders were challenged as violating the First, Second,
and Fourteenth Amendments. Courts largely rejected these
challenges. And judges across the country seized upon
Jacobson v. Massachusetts to uphold all types of lockdown
measures.
For more than a century, Jacobson proved to be a fairly
obscure precedent. Between February 1905 and March 2020,
513. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66–68
(2020).
514. Id. at 69–75 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
515. See, e.g., Blackman, The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause, supra note 509,
at 741.
516. See Josh Blackman, The “Essential” Second Amendment, 26 TEX. REV. OF
LAW & POL. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 1), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3827441.
517. See supra Section V.D.
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Jacobson was cited in about 700 federal and state cases—
about five times per year over the course of 115 years. 518 It
was only mentioned in passing in a few constitutional law
casebooks. 519 But in the first nine months of the pandemic—
from March through December 2020—Jacobson was cited
more than 200 times. The citation rate increased by more
than 5,000%! The pandemic awakened Jacobson from its
judicial slumber. Almost overnight, it became the most
important constitutional precedent.
Lower courts found that Jacobson provided an escape
hatch from the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence for both
unenumerated and enumerated rights. Judges expressly
adopted the third level of Jacobson’s myth from Roe v. Wade,
and implicitly adopted the second level of Jacobson’s myth
from Sherbert v. Verner. There was no occasion to revisit the
first level of Jacobson’s myth from Buck v. Bell, as—to date—
no government has attempted to forcibly vaccinate people.
Indeed, state governments have sought to avoid that sort of
coercion by imposing mandates through employers and
schools. 520 Several courts cast doubt on this reading of
518. I performed this search, and others, using the Westlaw Keycite feature.
519. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1015 (6th ed. 2019)
(“[I]n Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Supreme Court upheld
a Massachusetts law that required vaccinations. The Court allowed the law
because of the government’s compelling interest in stopping the spread of
communicable diseases.”); RANDY E. BARNETT & JOSH BLACKMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT 950 (3rd ed. 2018) (“The Court had
previously upheld a law requiring compulsory vaccination in Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). Why is Buck v. Bell any different?”).
520. See, e.g., Vaccination Requirement: Workplaces, NYC: HEALTH,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/covid/covid-19-vaccine-workplace-requirement
.page [https://perma.cc/P3XZ-8VZG] (last visited Jan. 30, 2022) (“As of December
27, [2021] workers in New York City who perform in-person work or interact with
the public in the course of business must show proof they have received at least
one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine.”). Melody Gutierrez & Howard Blume, All
California School Children Must Be Vaccinated Against COVID-19 Under New
Bill, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2022, 5:43 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california
/story/2022-01-24/new-vaccine-legislation-california-schoolchildren-mandate
[https://perma.cc/AB8E-7A8K]. The federal government attempted to impose a
workplace vaccine-or-test mandate, but the Supreme Court declared it unlawful.
COVID–19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 Fed.
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Jacobson, but they were in the minority.
1. Jacobson and Enumerated Rights
Part V.D discussed the Fifth Circuit’s decision in In re
Abbott. This case upheld, in part, Texas’s abortion
regulations during the pandemic. 521 The divided panel held
that Jacobson was the appropriate framework to assess
restrictions on the unenumerated right to abortion. 522 But
the Fifth Circuit did not merely rule on the relationship
between Jacobson and substantive due process. The court
went further. It found that during a pandemic, the Supreme
Court’s enumerated rights jurisprudence also has the same
escape hatch—including First Amendment caselaw. The
Fifth Circuit stated that “Jacobson instructs that all
constitutional rights may be reasonably restricted to combat
a public health emergency.” 523 All rights: unenumerated
rights as well as enumerated rights. The Fifth Circuit stated
its absolute rule: “Jacobson governs a state’s emergency
restriction of any individual right, not only the right to
abortion.” 524
And this rule would even apply to restrictions on the free
exercise of religion. Jacobson, the panel said, would govern
“an emergency restriction on gathering in large groups for
public worship during an epidemic.” 525 Jacobson established
a “settled rule” that “allows the state to restrict, for example,
one’s right to peaceably assemble, to publicly worship, to
Reg. 61,402, 61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021) (“The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) is issuing an emergency temporary standard (ETS) to
protect unvaccinated employees of large employers (100 or more employees) from
the risk of contracting COVID–19 by strongly encouraging vaccination.”); see
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Admin.,
142 S. Ct. 661 (2022).
521. In re Abbott, 954 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 2020), vacated as moot sub nom. by
Planned Parenthood Ctr. for Choice v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1261 (2021).
522. Id. at 786.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 778 n.1.
525. Id. (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–67 (1944)).

2022]

IRREPRESSIBLE MYTH OF JACOBSON

229

travel, and even to leave one’s home.” 526 This century-old
“framework govern[s] emergency exercises of state authority
during a public health crisis.” 527 The panel recognized that
“individual rights secured by the Constitution do not
disappear during a public health crisis.” 528 However,
Jacobson “plainly stated that rights could be reasonably
restricted during those times.” 529
How did the panel justify this application of Jacobson to
enumerated rights like the First Amendment? The Fifth
Circuit cited Prince v. Massachusetts, which stated that
“[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty
to expose the community . . . to communicable disease.” 530 In
a footnote, Prince cited Jacobson. Of course, Jacobson said
nothing about the free exercise of religion. And Prince did not
concern communicable diseases. 531 Rather, the government
prosecuted a Jehovah’s Witness woman for violating child
labor laws—the child was distributing religious literature.
(The prosecution was likely a pretextual means to punish
this minority faith.) In Prince, Justice Rutledge used the
hypothetical about communicable diseases to identify
general limits on the Free Exercise Clause. A single dictum
from a 1944 decision that predates modern jurisprudence is
a very slender reed to support such a sweeping restriction of
all enumerated constitutional rights. 532
The Fifth Circuit panel missed what would have been the
strongest citation for its position, which originated the
second level of Jacobson’s myth: Sherbert v. Verner. 533
Justice Brennan expressly incorporated Jacobson into the
526. Id. at 778.
527. Id.
528. Id. at 783.
529. Id. at 784.
530. Id. (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166–67).
531. See also discussion supra Section IV.A (discussing Prince and Jacobson).
532. See id.
533. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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landmark Free Exercise Clause caselaw. 534 Citing Jacobson,
Justice Brennan observed that the Court had upheld
regulations of religious “conduct or actions” that “invariably
posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or
order.” 535 This sentence would have provided much deeper
support for In re Abbott. If the government can burden
religious conduct to protect public safety, presumably the
state can also burden other enumerated rights to protect
public safety. It arguably follows from Sherbert that the
government can, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause,
restrict worship during the pandemic that “posed some
substantial threat to public safety.” 536
Justice Brennan likely could not have fathomed that his
analysis could be used to shut down worship services during
a pandemic. (None of us could before 2020.) But, Sherbert’s
invocation of Jacobson leads to that conclusion. Like with
Roe, there are unintended consequences for citing Jacobson,
even in dicta. In re Abbott missed the connection, but intuited
the same analysis.
The Fifth Circuit was not alone. Other courts found that
Jacobson limits the First Amendment, which “is not
absolute.” 537 One court stated that in times of crisis,
Jacobson trumps all constitutional law. Specifically,
“[d]uring an epidemic, the Jacobson court explained, the
traditional tiers of constitutional scrutiny do not apply.” 538
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California
observed, “[e]ven with a hundred years of hindsight, courts
continue to adopt Jacobson’s benchmark when reviewing
emergency public health measures enacted pursuant to

534. See id. at 402–03; supra Section IV.A (discussing Sherbert and Jacobson).
535. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905)).
536. See id.
537. Lighthouse Fellowship Church v. Northam, 458 F. Supp. 3d 418, 428 (E.D.
Va. 2020).
538. Cassell v. Snyders, 458 F. Supp. 3d 981, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
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emergency police powers.” 539
In Sherbert, Justice Brennan suggested that the First
Amendment is constrained by Jacobson. In this regard, the
Fifth Circuit’s analysis was consistent with Sherbert. But the
Supreme Court, and the Fifth Circuit, were simply wrong
about Jacobson as applied to enumerated rights, such as the
First Amendment. Jacobson said nothing at all about
enumerated provisions of the Constitution. The decision
predated modern incorporation doctrine by decades. During
the pandemic, several courts recognized this tension and cast
doubt on Jacobson with respect to enumerated rights.
2. Casting Doubt on Jacobson
Not all judges were eager to graft Jacobson onto the
edifice of modern constitutional law. Judge Collins of the
Ninth Circuit was a leading critic of Jacobson’s vitality. He
expressly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s In re Abbott analysis. In
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, California
argued that Jacobson would “extend to the First Amendment
and other [enumerated] constitutional provisions.” 540 In
dissent, Judge Collins disagreed. “Nothing in Jacobson,” he
wrote, “supports the view that an emergency displaces
normal constitutional standards.” 541 The First Amendment
lacks an escape hatch. Rather, Jacobson provides that “an
emergency may justify temporary constraints within those
standards.” 542 That is, within the “standards” of substantive
due process. “Jacobson’s deferential standard of review is
appropriate in that limited context” of “what we would now
call a ‘substantive due process’” case. 543 But Jacobson is not
539. Cross Culture Christian Ctr. v. Newsom, 445 F. Supp. 3d 758, 766 n.3
(E.D. Cal. 2020).
540. S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 942 (9th Cir.
2020) (Collins, J., dissenting), application for injunctive relief denied, 140 S. Ct.
1613 (2020), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.).
541. Id.
542. Id. (emphasis omitted).
543. Id.
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the appropriate standard for cases involving enumerated
rights.
Here, Judge Collins seems to follow the third level of
Jacobson’s myth from Roe: the substantive due process right
to abortion is constrained by the 1905 precedent. However,
Judge Collins rejected Justice Brennan’s second level of
Jacobson’s myth. He wrote, “Jacobson had no occasion to
address a Free Exercise claim, because none was presented
there.” 544 Rather, “Jacobson says nothing about what
standards would apply to a claim that an emergency
measure violates some other, enumerated constitutional
right.” 545 He was right. And apparently persuasive. Indeed,
Judge Duncan—who wrote the Fifth Circuit’s panel opinion
in In re Abbott—may have later reconsidered his prior
position. In Planned Parenthood v. Kauffman, Judge Duncan
joined Judge Ho’s concurrence. 546 In Footnote 1, Judge Ho
wrote:
It’s even been suggested that our court went too far in In re Abbott,
954 F.3d 772, 778 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020), by effectively equating the
unenumerated right to abortion with express rights like the free
exercise of religion. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 943 n.2 (9th Cir. 2020) (Collins, J.,
dissenting). I agree that Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11,
(1905), involved substantive due process—not the Free Exercise
Clause—and thus does not set the controlling standard in religious
exercise cases. See also Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak,
140 S. Ct. 2603, 2608 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of
application for injunctive relief) (same). That said, Judge Collins’s
criticisms helpfully illustrate that our court hardly needs reminding
that courts are duty-bound to follow the law, and not to distort it to
disfavor abortion. 547

As I read this footnote, Judge Duncan came to doubt that
Jacobson provides the relevant standard to review
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Fam. Plan. & Preventative Health
Servs., Inc. v. Kauffman, 981 F.3d 347, 384 (5th Cir. 2020) (Ho, J., concurring).
547. Id. at 385 n.1 (internal citations cleaned up).
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restrictions on the enumerated right to free exercise of
religion. The other member of the In re Abbott majority,
Judge Elrod, did not join Judge Ho’s concurrence.
Other judges also cast doubt on Jacobson in the context
of the enumerated right to religious freedom. The U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky observed
that “even under Jacobson, constitutional rights still
exist.” 548 Likewise, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania observed that “when Jacobson was
decided,” the “century of development [that] has seen the
creation of tiered levels of scrutiny for constitutional claims
. . . did not exist.” 549 Rather, that court applied “ordinary
constitutional scrutiny . . . to maintain the independent
judiciary’s role as a guarantor of constitutional liberties—
even in an emergency.” 550 And a dissenting judge on the
Second Circuit wrote that “Jacobson does not call for
indefinite deference to the political branches exercising
extraordinary emergency powers, nor does it counsel courts
to abdicate their responsibility to review claims of
constitutional violations.” 551
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maine rejected
the argument that Jacobson was “a de jure immunity
talisman,” or “the Rosetta Stone for evaluating the merits of
a challenge to any COVID-19-related government

548. On Fire Christian Ctr., Inc. v. Fischer, 453 F. Supp. 3d 901, 912 (W.D. Ky.
2020). I criticized this decision on other grounds. See Josh Blackman, Courts
Should Not Decide Issues That Are Not There, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr.
12, 2020, 2:35 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/04/12/courts-should-notdecide-issues-that-are-not-there/ [https://perma.cc/FZE7-CYUA].
549. Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 883, 897 (W.D. Pa. 2020),
injunction stayed by No. 20-2936, 2020 WL 5868393, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2020),
dismissing appeal and vacating as moot sub nom. Cnty. of Butler v. Governor of
Pa., 8 F.4th 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Butler Cnty. v. Wolf,
No. 21-698, 2022 WL 89363 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022).
550. Id. at 901.
551. Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 979 F.3d 177, 184 (2d Cir. 2020) (Park, J.,
dissenting).
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regulation.” 552 Rather, Justice Harlan’s opinion concerned “a
different public health crisis in a different time, threatening
different types of injuries.” 553 But if Jacobson was followed,
courts would “routinely dismiss cases at the pleading stage
based on the immediate evaluation of the merits of
governmental action in derogation of constitutional
rights.” 554
In another case, that same Maine federal court described
Jacobson as “a case rejecting a ‘substantive due process’
challenge to a compulsory vaccination requirement.” 555
Jacobson did not supplant traditional doctrine. The court
observed that “the Supreme Court established the
traditional tiers of scrutiny in the course of the 100 years
since Jacobson was decided.” 556 The federal judge aptly
described the dynamic: “[T]he permissive Jacobson rule
floats about in the air as a rubber stamp for all but the most
absurd and egregious restrictions on constitutional liberties,
free from the inconvenience of meaningful judicial review.” 557
In May 2020, the Chief Justice of the United States
would give this rubber stamp a fresh coat of ink.
B. Jacobson from the Bay State to South Bay
The Supreme Court made its first mark on the COVID19 pandemic in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v.
Newsom. The District Court and the Ninth Circuit had
upheld California’s restrictions on in-person worship. (I
discussed Judge Collins’ South Bay dissent supra in Section
VI.A.2.) The church asked the Supreme Court to grant an
552. Savage v. Mills, 478 F. Supp. 3d 16, 26 (D. Me. 2020).
553. Id.
554. Id.
555. Bayley’s Campground Inc. v. Mills, 463 F. Supp. 3d 22, 31 (D. Me. 2020),
reconsideration denied, 2:20-CV-00176-LEW, 2020 WL 3037252 (D. Me. June 5,
2020), and aff’d, 20-1559, 2021 WL 164973 (1st Cir. Jan. 19, 2021).
556. Id. at 32.
557. Id.
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emergency injunction to block California’s restrictions. The
Court split 5–4 and denied the injunction. This unsigned
shadow docket decision offered no reasoning. But Chief
Justice Roberts wrote a brief concurrence that counseled
deference during this public health crisis. The Chief Justice
included one citation to Jacobson, though it was unclear
exactly how he was using that 1905 decision.
Soon, the South Bay concurrence would become a
“superprecedent.” Over the following six months, 140 cases
cited the solo opinion, more than 90 of which also cited
Jacobson. Whether deliberate or not, Chief Justice Roberts
established what would become the fourth layer of
Jacobson’s myth: Jacobson-level deference was warranted
for all pandemic-related constitutional challenges. The lower
courts followed the Chief’s signal, and applied this
framework in cases involving the Second Amendment, voting
rights, the right to travel, procedural due process, the right
of assembly, and many others.
1. Chief Justice Roberts, Meet Justice Harlan
After the outbreak of COVID-19, California Governor
Gavin Newsom “place[d] temporary numerical restrictions
on public gatherings to address” the pandemic. 558 The state
“limit[ed] attendance at places of worship to 25% of building
capacity or a maximum of 100 attendees.” 559 The South Bay
United Pentecostal Church challenged the constitutionality
of these measures. The lower courts upheld the governor’s
orders. 560 The church sought an emergency injunction from
the Supreme Court. On May 29, 2020, late on Friday

558. South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in
denial of application for injunctive relief), cert. granted and judgment vacated,141
S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.).
559. Id.
560. See S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 959 F.3d 938, 941 (9th
Cir. 2020) (Collins, J., dissenting), application for injunctive relief denied, 140 S.
Ct. 1613 (2020), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021)
(mem.).
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evening, the Court split 5–4. 561 South Bay United Pentecostal
Church v. Newsom, an unsigned per curiam opinion, denied
the injunction. This shadow docket ruling offered no
reasoning. Chief Justice Roberts voted to deny the
injunction. He was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh dissented. They would have granted the
application.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a brief concurrence that
explained why he denied the emergency injunction. The fiveparagraph opinion did not cite any Free Exercise Clause
cases. At most, Roberts suggested that California’s
“restrictions appear consistent with the Free Exercise
Clause” because “[s]imilar or more severe restrictions apply
to comparable secular gatherings” and “the Order exempts
or treats more leniently only dissimilar activities.” 562 This
comparator approach, as I called it, was a novel creation. 563
I’ve critiqued Roberts’s approach to the First
Amendment at some length. 564 Still, South Bay was decided
in a narrow context. The church asked the Supreme Court to
grant an emergency injunction. The sole question presented
was whether the Supreme Court should issue an injunction
pursuant to the All Writs Act. 565 Chief Justice Roberts wrote
that an injunction should only issue if the church’s claim for
relief was “indisputably clear.” 566 At the Supreme Court,
such extraordinary relief requires a “more demanding
standard than that which applies to the motion for an
injunction pending appeal” in the court of appeals, or for a

561. South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. at 1613.
562. Id.
563. Blackman, The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause, supra note 509, at 664.
564. See generally id.
565. 28 U.S.C. § 1651.
566. South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. at 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial
of application for injunctive relief) (quoting STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET. AL., SUPREME
COURT PRACTICE § 17.4, at 17-19 (11th ed. 2019)).
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motion for a preliminary injunction in the district court. 567
In other words, the Supreme Court should rarely intervene
in an interlocutory fashion. The lower courts, however, do not
face such restraints in the first instance.
For our purposes, however, the most significant aspect of
the concurrence was a single citation to Jacobson. Here is the
penultimate paragraph of Roberts’s concurrence:
The precise question of when restrictions on particular social
activities should be lifted during the pandemic is a dynamic and
fact-intensive matter subject to reasonable disagreement. Our
Constitution principally entrusts “[t]he safety and the health of the
people” to the politically accountable officials of the States “to guard
and protect.” Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905). . . .
Where those broad limits are not exceeded, they should not be
subject to second-guessing by an “unelected federal judiciary,”
which lacks the background, competence, and expertise to assess
public health and is not accountable to the people. See Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 545
(1985). 568

Chief Justice Roberts said little about constitutional law.
He did not say that Jacobson has any bearing on the Free
Exercise Clause. He did not say that Jacobson provides an
alternate test to assess pandemic measures. He did not say
that Jacobson supplants modern constitutional doctrine. All
Roberts said was that “politically accountable officials,” and
not the courts, are primarily responsible for protecting public
safety and health. Yet he maintained that “[o]ur
Constitution principally entrusts” the elected branches with
this responsibility. Principally, not entirely. Rather, courts
should not “second-guess[]” those decisions if “broad limits
are not exceeded.”
Roberts’s citation of Jacobson was, on its face,
unremarkable. 569 But the Chief Justice sent an
567. Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, 977 F.3d 728, 732 (9th Cir. 2020)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting), vacated on denial of reh’g en banc, 981 F.3d 764 (9th
Cir. 2020).
568. South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. at 1613–14 (internal citations cleaned up).
569. Chief Justice Roberts’s citation of Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
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unmistakable signal to the lower courts. And in the process,
he added a new level to Jacobson’s mythical status:
Jacobson-level deference was warranted for all pandemicrelated constitutional challenges.
2. The South Bay “Superprecedent” Established the
Fourth Level of Jacobson’s Myth
In Roe v. Wade, Justice Blackmun’s single citation to
Jacobson led to In re Abbott five decades later. 570 But in
South Bay, Chief Justice Roberts’s single citation to
Jacobson led to a jurisprudential revolution almost
overnight. Between June and December of 2020, Chief
Justice Roberts’s South Bay concurrence became a
“superprecedent.” 571 Approximately 140 cases cited the solo
opinion, 572 more than 90 of which also cited Jacobson. For a
time, those five paragraphs became constitutional gospel.
As a threshold matter, many courts failed to
acknowledge that Roberts’s opinion was merely a solo
concurrence. One court stated that “[t]he Supreme Court
recently invoked the Jacobson standard when denying an
Transit Authority, however, may have been quite remarkable. See Josh
Blackman, Did Chief Justice Roberts Signal His Harry Blackmun Moment?,
REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 30, 2020, 2:42 AM), https://reason.com
/volokh/2020/05/30/did-chief-justice-roberts-signal-his-harry-blackmun-moment/
[https://perma.cc/C8SJ-7NQX] (“Roberts may be laying down a marker. Is this
decision Chief Roberts’s Harry Blackmun moment? Is he signaling that he will
now go full-bore judicial restraint? Is he breaking up with the conservatives on
the Court? I hope I am not reading too much into a few citations. But Roberts can
say a lot with few words. This concurrence is an inauspicious sign for
conservatives, as this term draws to a close.”). In hindsight, my prediction may
have been right. See Josh Blackman, October Term 2019 in Review: Blue June,
U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Aug. 27, 2020), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu
/2020/08/27/seila-blackman/.
570. See supra Section V.D.2.
571. See Josh Blackman, Roman Catholic Diocese Part I: The End of the South
Bay “Superprecedent,” REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 26, 2020, 2:14 AM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/26/roman-catholic-diocese-part-i-the-end-ofthe-south-baysuperprecedent/ [https://perma.cc/F96D-UKKN]; Blackman, The
“Essential” Free Exercise Clause, supra note 509, at 645.
572. Blackman, The “Essential” Free Exercise Clause, supra note 509, at 676.
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application for injunctive relief. . . .” 573 No, the Supreme
Court did not invoke Jacobson; it was one Justice. Another
court referred to Chief Justice’s Roberts’s solo concurrence as
a “plurality” that “invoked the Jacobson standard.” 574 A
writing joined by one Justice on the shadow docket is not a
“plurality.” South Bay did not set any enduring precedent.
The unsigned order was “precedential only as to ‘the precise
issues presented and necessarily decided.’” 575
The lower courts also read far more into the South Bay
concurrence than Roberts actually wrote in a single sentence.
Many judges asserted that Chief Justice Roberts endorsed,
or even applied Jacobson’s deferential standard to review
violations of enumerated rights. Consider a sampling:
• “[W]hile it does not come in the form of binding
precedent, no less an authority than the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court [sic] has thrown his support
behind the continued vitality of Jacobson’s deferential
framework in the midst of this unfolding public health
crisis.” 576
• Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence “highlight[s] the
continued vitality of Jacobson’s core holding.” 577
• “Under Jacobson, courts are to be circumspect secondguessing the policy decisions of public officials

573. Calvary Chapel San Jose v. Cody, No. 20-CV-03794-BLF, 2020 WL
6508565, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020) (emphasis added). See Josh Blackman,
Roman Cath. Diocese Part I: The End of the South Bay “Superprecedent,” REASON:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 26, 2020, 2:14 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11
/26/roman-catholic-diocese-part-i-the-end-of-the-south-baysuperprecedent/
[https://perma.cc/F96D-UKKN].
574. Antietam Battlefield KOA v. Hogan, 501 F. Supp. 3d 339, 343 (D. Md.
2020).
575. Harvest Rock Church, Inc. v. Newsom, 977 F.3d 728, 732 (9th Cir.)
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting), vacated on denial of reh’g en banc, 981 F.3d 764 (9th
Cir. 2020) (quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam)).
576. Page v. Cuomo, 478 F. Supp. 3d 355, 366 (N.D.N.Y. 2020).
577. Young v. James, No. 20 CIV. 8252 (PAE), 2020 WL 6572798, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-3790 (2d Cir. Feb. 4, 2021).
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responding to a public health emergency. Justice
Roberts echoed that sentiment . . . .” 578
• “Albeit not a binding precedent, no less an authority
than the Chief Justice of the United States has thrown
his support behind the continued vitality of Jacobson’s
deferential framework in the midst of this unfolding
public health crisis.” 579
• “[R]ecently, concurring in a denial of injunctive relief
in a free-exercise challenge to California’s COVID-19
stay-at-home order, Chief Justice Roberts indicated
that Jacobson’s reasoning may be applicable to federal
court review of states’ COVID-19 measures.” 580
• “Chief Justice Roberts recently echoed this Court, its
sister courts, and Jacobson in explaining the need for
judicial deference to public health officials during a
pandemic.” 581
• Chief Justice Roberts’s South Bay concurrence,
“following the guidance of Jacobson, instructs courts
to refrain from Monday-morning quarterbacking the
other co-equal, elected branches of government when
those branches are responding to difficulties beyond
those that are incidental to ordinary governance.” 582
• “Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion in
which he noted that state officials must be given broad
578. Ramsek v. Beshear, 468 F. Supp. 3d 904, 920 (E.D. Ky. 2020), appeal
dismissed and remanded, 989 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 2021).
579. AJE Enter. LLC v. Just., No. 1:20-CV-229, 2020 WL 6940381, at *4 (N.D.
W. Va. Oct. 27, 2020), appeal dismissed, No. 20-2256, 2021 WL 2102318 (4th Cir.
Jan. 27, 2021).
580. Russell v. Harris Cnty., 500 F. Supp. 3d 577, 616 & n.32 (S.D. Tex. 2020)
(citing South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of
application for injunctive relief), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct.
2563 (2021) (mem.)).
581. PCG-SP Venture I LLC v. Newsom, No. EDCV201138JGBKKX, 2020 WL
4344631, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2020).
582. Soos v. Cuomo, 470 F. Supp. 3d 268, 278–79 (N.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal
withdrawn (May 27, 2021).
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latitude to protect public health during an emergency
based on Jacobson.” 583
Many courts relied on South Bay to find that Jacobson
complements, or even supplants, traditional constitutional
law during an emergency. A Louisiana federal court cited the
Chief Justice’s concurrence, and stated, “[t]raditional
doctrine does not control during a pandemic; Jacobson
does.” 584 A Michigan federal court found that under
Jacobson, during the “great dangers” of a pandemic, “[t]he
state may temporarily infringe on the liberties guaranteed
by the constitution to individuals in favor of the common
good.” 585 These courts viewed Jacobson as opening an escape
hatch from traditional First Amendment analysis.
Other courts treated Jacobson as a threshold inquiry
before turning to traditional doctrine. An Illinois federal
court found that “even if Jacobson did not govern, Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits
of any of their federal claims based on traditional
constitutional analyses.” 586 Another Illinois federal court
concluded that “[e]ven if this case falls outside Jacobson’s
emergency crisis standard, Plaintiffs have failed to show a
likelihood of success under traditional First Amendment
analysis.” 587
In light of South Bay, courts also extended Jacobson’s
deferential framework to other constitutional rights.

583. Robinson v. Murphy, No. CV 20-5420, 2020 WL 5884801, at *6 (D.N.J.
Oct. 2), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2020).
584. 4 Aces Enters., LLC v. Edwards, 479 F. Supp. 3d 311, 323 (E.D. La. 2020).
585. League of Indep. Fitness Facilities & Trainers, Inc. v. Whitmer, 468 F.
Supp. 3d 940, 948 (W.D. Mich. 2020) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197
U.S. 11, 29 (1905)), appeal dismissed, 843 F. App’x 707 (6th Cir. 2021).
586. Vill. of Orland Park v. Pritzker, 475 F. Supp. 3d 866, 882 (N.D. Ill. 2020).
587. Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker, 470 F. Supp. 3d 813, 821 (N.D. Ill.), aff’d,
973 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2020).
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3. The South Bay “Superprecedent” Extended
Jacobson’s Myth to the Second Amendment
The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence
is of recent vintage. In 2008, District of Columbia v. Heller
held that the Second Amendment protects an individual
right to keep and bear arms. 588 Two years later, McDonald
v. City of Chicago held that the Second Amendment also
restricted state gun control laws. 589 Neither case cited
Jacobson, nor suggested that gun rights could be subject to
greater restrictions during a public health crisis.
In the twelve years between Heller and the COVID-19
pandemic, only one case considered a state’s powers to
restrict Second Amendment rights during a crisis. And the
government lost. North Carolina law prohibited the carrying
of a gun during a state of emergency. In Bateman v. Perdue,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North
Carolina held that these statutes violated the Heller
framework. 590 The Court found that the laws “excessively
intrude[d] upon plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights by
effectively banning them (and the public at large) from
engaging in conduct that is at the very core of the Second
Amendment at a time when the need for self-defense may be
at its very greatest.” 591 The Court did not even cite
Jacobson. 592 The Attorney General did not appeal the
adverse ruling in Bateman, so there is no appellate decision.
Fast-forward to 2020. During the early days of the
pandemic, some governments ordered the closure of firearm
stores. 593 Ostensibly, these measures were designed to keep
588. 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
589. 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).
590. 881 F. Supp. 2d 709, 716 (E.D.N.C. 2012).
591. Id.
592. Cf. Altman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 464 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1121 (N.D. Cal.
2020) (“[T]he Court has found no authority applying Jacobson in the Second
Amendment context.”).
593. See Blackman, The “Essential” Second Amendment, supra note 509, at 1.
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people spread apart and promote social distancing. But as a
practical matter, these orders made it impossible to purchase
firearms. Governor Murphy of New Jersey was quite candid
about why he excluded firearm dealers from the list of
“essential” businesses. He stated that “[a] safer society for
my taste has fewer guns and not more guns.” 594 Murphy
added, “The guns that do exist are at the hands of the right
people, particularly trained members of law enforcement.” 595
The Governor explained that “[c]rime has been down and
let’s hope it stays down, but we’re very comfortable where we
landed on that.” 596
Soon, these measures were challenged as violations of
the Second Amendment. Here too, courts grafted Jacobson
onto the Supreme Court’s modern Second Amendment
jurisprudence. And each case followed the South Bay
superprecedent. Consider three cases.
First, Altman v. County of Santa Clara upheld the
closure of all firearm stores. 597 In that case, the “Plaintiffs
attempt[ed] to dismiss Jacobson as ‘arcane constitutional
jurisprudence.’” 598 The court disagreed. Jacobson “remains
alive and well—including during the present pandemic.” 599
Here, the court cited Chief Justice Roberts’s then-three-dayold South Bay concurrence. Indeed, to this judge, that lone
citation indicated that Jacobson was “alive and well” and
would govern the Second Amendment challenge. 600
594. Alex Napoliello, Gun Advocates Say Shops Should Reopen Now. Murphy
Says No., NJ.COM (Mar. 25, 2020, 11:22 PM), https://www.nj.com/coronavirus
/2020/03/gun-advocates-say-shops-should-reopen-now-murphy-says-no.html
[https://perma.cc/L3RC-38TS].
595. Id.
596. Id.
597. 464 F. Supp. 3d at 1124–25.
598. Id. at 1118.
599. Id. (first citing South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.); and then citing Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
600. Id.
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Altman also rejected the relevance of Bateman from
North Carolina. The California district court found that the
“the defendants did not raise” Jacobson, and therefore, “the
Bateman court had no occasion to determine whether the
Jacobson framework applied” in the context of the Second
Amendment. 601 It is far more likely that the North Carolina
Attorney General never thought to invoke Jacobson to
restrict Second Amendment rights. Altman also favorably
cited the Fifth Circuit’s In re Abbott decision, which held that
Jacobson should be used “to evaluate pandemic-related
restrictions on [enumerated] constitutional rights.” 602
Altman ultimately did not “decide whether Jacobson or the
Ninth Circuit’s Second Amendment framework applies
here,” because the government’s closure of all firearm stores
survived review under either test. 603 But the court did
proceed to apply Justice Harlan’s test: a closure of all firearm
stores was not “‘beyond question, in palpable conflict with’
the Second Amendment.” 604
The second Second Amendment case was Dark Storm
Industries LLC v. Cuomo. 605 The Northern District of New
York also found that Jacobson should govern Second
Amendment claims during the pandemic. And once again, it
relied on Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence: “If Jacobson is
still good law—and it is, see S. Bay United Pentecostal
Church—the Court is hard pressed to find that orders
mandating the closure of businesses in a facially-neutral
manner do not pass constitutional muster.” 606 The New York
601. Id. at 1127 (citing Bateman v. Perdue, 881 F. Supp. 2d 709 (E.D.N.C.
2012), ECF Nos. 54 (Dec. 15, 2010), 61 (Dec. 16, 2010), 64 (Dec. 16, 2010), 73 (Jan.
10, 2011)).
602. Id. at 1119.
603. Id. at 1120.
604. Id. at 1124 (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29–31
(1905)).
605. See Dark Storm Indus. LLC v. Cuomo, 471 F. Supp. 3d 482 (N.D.N.Y.
2020).
606. Id. at 504 (citing South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020), cert. granted and
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district court then upheld the restrictions on firearm sales
under Jacobson, and not with Heller.
Third, McDougall v. County of Ventura considered a
challenge to the county’s “Stay at Home Order,” which
restricted gun stores. 607 The plaintiffs argued “that Jacobson
‘must be read with its historical limitations in mind,’ as it
was decided ‘long before the evolution of modern
constitutional scrutiny.’” 608 The court found this “argument
[was] unavailing because the weight of authority from both
the United States Supreme Court and Circuits indicates the
Jacobson framework is valid authority.” 609 This court block
quoted the penultimate paragraph from the South Bay
concurrence. Apparently, the judge viewed Chief Justice
Roberts’s separate writing from the shadow docket as
Supreme Court “authority.” The district court concluded,
“Because this case involves a constitutional challenge to a
health order promulgated by the County in response to a
nationwide public health crisis, the Court applies Jacobson
to determine whether the stay well at home orders violated
the Second Amendment.” 610 And unsurprisingly, the court
held that the orders comported with Jacobson.
These three district court judges read the Chief Justice
as endorsing Jacobson for all types of COVID-related cases,
including a Second Amendment challenge. Roberts directly
said nothing of the sort, but reasonable jurists drew the same
implication.
In January 2022, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District
Court’s decision in McDougal. 611 Judge VanDyke wrote the
judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.)).
607. 495 F. Supp. 3d 881, 885 (C.D. Cal. 2020), rev’d, No. 20-56220, 2022 WL
176419 (9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2022).
608. Id. at 890.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. McDougall v. Cnty. of Ventura, No. 20-56220, 2022 WL 176419, at *17
(9th Cir. Jan. 20, 2022).
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majority opinion for the panel. He found that “Jacobson does
not concern the specific, constitutionally enumerated right at
issue here, and essentially applied rational basis review.” 612
Therefore, “Jacobson does not apply” to this Second
Amendment case. 613 Rather, “the severity of the Orders’
burden warrants strict scrutiny—which the Orders fail to
satisfy because they are not the least restrictive means to
further Appellees’ interest, especially when compared to
businesses that have no bearing on fundamental rights, yet
nevertheless were allowed to remain open.” 614
Judge VanDyke observed that “[m]ultiple jurists and
legal commentators have likened this analysis by the
Jacobson Court to what we now call rational basis review.” 615
Among other sources, VanDyke cited Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence in Roman Catholic Diocese. 616 (In my view, the
modern-day rational basis test differs from the sort of review
used by Justice Harlan in Jacobson.) 617 Moreover, VanDyke
recounted that “[i]n the intervening century since Jacobson,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly determined that some
level of heightened scrutiny applies when evaluating laws
implicating specific, enumerated constitutional rights.” 618
Heller was explicit “that rational basis review does not apply”

612. Id. at *7.
613. Id. at *9.
614. Id. at *7.
615. Id. at *10.
616. See id. at *10 n.17; see, e.g., Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo,
141 S. Ct. 63, 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Although Jacobson pre-dated the
modern tiers of scrutiny, this Court essentially applied rational basis review to
. . . Jacobson’s challenge . . . .”); Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Civil
Liberties in a Pandemic: The Lessons of History, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 815, 829
(2021) (“From the perspective of today, it is striking how much Jacobson used the
language of rational basis review, although that as a formal test was not
formulated until much later by the Supreme Court.”).
617. See supra Section I.A (“courts in the early twentieth century employed the
concept of a rational basis test in a very different fashion than courts do in the
modern era”).
618. McDougall, 2022 WL 176419, at *10.
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to Second Amendment claims. 619 Jacobson concerned a
“substantive due process challenge emanating from the
Fourteenth Amendment; no specific enumerated right was at
issue.” 620 The standard is different for unenumerated,
substantive due process rights.
Moreover, the panel observed that “[t]he Supreme Court
has also repeatedly affirmed that heightened-scrutiny
requirements still apply during times of crises.” 621 Indeed,
the Supreme Court has “applied strict scrutiny and ignored
Jacobson entirely” in Tandon v. Newsom and Roman
Catholic Diocese. 622 And “since Roman Catholic Diocese,
several courts have followed the Supreme Court’s lead and
ignored Jacobson in analyzing the constitutionality of public
health orders.” 623 Of course, there was one, and “only [one]
writing from the Court pertaining to COVID-related
government orders that relied on Jacobson”: Chief Justice
Roberts’s South Bay concurrence. 624 Still, Judge VanDyke
observed, Roberts “has distanced himself from Jacobson in
more recent writings.” 625
As this article goes to press, the en banc Ninth Circuit
has not yet vacated McDougal, but if past is prologue, the
panel opinion will not stand for long. 626
619. Id.
620. Id. at *9.
621. Id. at *10.
622. Id. (first citing Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per
curiam); then citing S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (South Bay II),
141 S. Ct. 716, 717–18 (2021) (statement of Gorsuch, J.); and then citing Roman
Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (per curiam)).
623. Id. at *11 n.18.
624. Id. at *10 (citing South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.)).
625. Id. (citing Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 75–76 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting)).
626. See Duncan v. Bonta, 19 F.4th 1087, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2021) (VanDyke,
J., dissenting) (“By my count, we have had at least 50 Second Amendment
challenges since Heller—significantly more than any other circuit—all of which
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4. The South Bay “Superprecedent” Extended
Jacobson’s Myth to the Other Rights
Other judges invoked South Bay and Jacobson in the
same fashion for a hodgepodge of constitutional rights.
The Fifth Circuit relied on Jacobson to uphold
restrictions on voting rights. 627 The panel cited—you guessed
it—Chief Justice Roberts’s invocation of Jacobson. 628 Indeed,
the majority faulted the district court for “overlooking or
disagreeing with” Jacobson. 629
The Central District of California rejected a procedural
due process challenge to the state’s “Stay at Home Order.” 630
Here, the court favorably cited Jacobson, as well as Chief
Justice Roberts’s admonition from South Bay. 631
In Carmichael v. Ige, plaintiffs argued that Hawaii’s
lockdown measures violated the right to travel. 632 The
District Court acknowledged that “South Bay did not concern
Equal Protection or Due Process claims.” But so what? “Chief
Justice Roberts focused on the deference paid to local
we have ultimately denied. In those few instances where a panel of our court has
granted Second Amendment relief, we have without fail taken the case en banc
to reverse that ruling. This is true regardless of the diverse regulations that have
come before us—from storage restrictions to waiting periods to ammunition
restrictions to conceal carry bans to open carry bans to magazine capacity
prohibitions—the common thread is our court's ready willingness to bless any
restriction related to guns.”); see also Josh Blackman, Will the En Banc 9th
Circuit Extend the Second Amendment’s Losing Streak to 51 Cases?, REASON:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2022, 6:21 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2022/01
/21/will-the-en-banc-9th-circuit-extend-the-second-amendments-losing-streakto-51-cases/ [https://perma.cc/7F76-TTNU].
627. See Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, 961 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2020)
(holding that district court could not “require[] state officials . . . to distribute
mail-in ballots to any eligible voter who wants one”).
628. Id. at 394 (quoting South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.)).
629. Id.
630. Pro. Beauty Fed’n of Cal. v. Newsom, No. 2:20-CV-04275-RGK-AS, 2020
WL 3056126, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 8, 2020).
631. Id. at *7, *9.
632. Carmichael v. Ige, 470 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1139 (D. Haw. 2020).
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governments concerning matters of health and safety, and
not the standards typically applied to constitutional claims,
i.e., strict scrutiny to assess a free exercise claim under the
First Amendment.” 633 And what was the source of that
deferential standard? The district court cited Roberts, who
quoted Jacobson. Indeed, the judge faulted the plaintiffs for
relying on cases that “did not address South Bay,” and in
turn Jacobson. 634
The District of New Mexico observed that “[d]espite the
importance of the right to assemble, it, like other
constitutional rights, is still subject to restrictions.” 635 Here,
the court cited Jacobson. And the Court followed “the
Supreme Court’s intervening caselaw”—namely, the South
Bay concurrence. 636
There were dozens of other cases that read Jacobson in
a similar fashion. 637
633. Id. at 1142 n.5.
634. Id. at 1142 n.6.
635. Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 472 F. Supp. 3d 926, 1019 (D.N.M. 2020),
aff’d sub nom. Legacy Church, Inc. v. Collins, 853 F. App’x 316 (10th Cir. 2021)
(citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
636. Id. at 1047.
637. See, e.g., Miura Corp. v. Davis, No. 220CV05497SVWADS, 2020 WL
5224348, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2020) (citing South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. 1613)
(observing that in COVID-19 cases “district courts, appellate courts, and the
Supreme Court have found the holding of Jacobson v. Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) relevant”); Ill. Republican Party v. Pritzker,
470 F. Supp. 3d 813, 821 (N.D. Ill.) (“[T]he Court concludes that Plaintiffs have a
less than negligible chance of prevailing on their constitutional claims because
the current crisis implicates Jacobson and the Order advances the Governor’s
interest in protecting the health and safety of Illinois residents.”), aff’d, 973 F.3d
760 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The district court appropriately looked to Jacobson for
guidance, and so do we.”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1754 (2021); Brach v. Newsom,
No. 220CV06472SVWAFM, 2020 WL 6036764, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2020) (in
COVID-19 cases, “district courts, appellate courts, and the Supreme Court have
looked to Jacobson”); Bill & Ted’s Riviera, Inc. v. Cuomo, 494 F. Supp. 3d 238,
245 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (“Defendants were acting within their police power to protect
the public health and safety and that, concomitantly, the measures they took are
subject to Jacobson review.”); H’s Bar, LLC v. Berg, No. 20-CV-1134-SMY, 2020
WL 6827964, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 2020) (“[R]elying on Jacobson, courts across
the country have consistently declined to enjoin state and local restrictions aimed
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Pre-South Bay, several courts placed Jacobson in its
proper place. 638 But post-South Bay, the tide followed Chief
Justice Roberts. Few courts went the other way, and those
decisions were often reversed. For example, the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania found that
Jacobson does not control substantive due process challenges
to COVID-19 lockdown measures based on the right to travel
and the right to earn a living. 639 It held that the
“extraordinarily deferential standard based on Jacobson is
not appropriate.” 640 Rather, “[t]he Court will apply ‘regular’
constitutional scrutiny to the issues in this case.” 641 But this
decision was an outlier. It didn’t even cite Roberts’s
concurrence. The Third Circuit promptly stayed the
injunction, 642 and nine months later vacated the district
court decision as moot. 643
The overwhelming significance of Chief Justice Roberts’s
concurrence with respect to Jacobson was undeniable. And
the South Bay superprecedent would remain the law of the
land for six more months.
at protecting the public against the spread of COVID-19.”).
638. See, e.g., Bayley’s Campground Inc. v. Mills, 463 F. Supp. 3d 22, 31 (D.
Me.), reconsideration denied, No. 2:20-CV-00176-LEW, 2020 WL 3037252 (D. Me.
June 5, 2020), and aff’d, No. 20-1559, 2021 WL 164973 (1st Cir. Jan. 19, 2021)
(“In the eleven decades since Jacobson, the Supreme Court refined its approach
for the review of state action that burdens constitutional rights.”). This case was
decided mere hours before South Bay was rendered. See also supra Section
VI.A.2.
639. Cnty. of Butler v. Wolf, 486 F. Supp. 3d 883, 926 (W.D. Pa. 2020),
injunction stayed by No. 20-2936, 2020 WL 5868393, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2020),
dismissing appeal and vacating as moot sub nom. Cnty. of Butler v. Governor of
Pa., 8 F.4th 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2021), cert. denied sub nom. Butler Cnty. v. Wolf,
No. 21-698, 2022 WL 89363 (U.S. Jan. 10, 2022).
640. Id. at 899.
641. Id.
642. Cnty. of Butler v. Governor of Pa., No. 20-2936, 2020 WL 5868393, at *1
(3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2020).
643. Cnty. of Butler v. Governor of Pa., 8 F.4th 226, 231 (3d Cir. 2021), cert.
denied sub nom. Butler Cnty., Pa. v. Wolf, No. 21-698, 2022 WL 89363 (U.S. Jan.
10, 2022). The controversy arguably became moot during the court’s lengthy
briefing schedule.
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C. Here Comes the Calvary Chapel
During the pandemic, the Nevada government imposed
restrictions on public gatherings. The state permitted
restaurants, bars, casinos, and gyms to operate at fifty
percent of their capacity. However, houses of worship were
capped at fifty people, regardless of their capacity. On May
22, 2020, the Calvary Chapel Church challenged the Nevada
Governor’s emergency directives. The district court denied a
temporary restraining order on June 11. 644 The court
favorably cited Jacobson and quoted from the penultimate
paragraph of Roberts’s South Bay concurrence. 645 And, the
court concluded, “the holding in South Bay [was] applicable
to this case and . . . the Emergency Directive [was] neutral
and generally applicable and does not burden Plaintiff’s First
Amendment right to free exercise.” (There was no holding in
South Bay; the court was referring to the concurrence.). The
church appealed that judgment to the Ninth Circuit. That
appeal was denied on July 2. 646 The panel’s order was two
sentences long. 647 It contained no reasoning, but favorably
cited South Bay. 648 The superprecedent was treated as
binding authority in the Ninth Circuit.
On July 8, the church filed an application for injunctive
relief with the Supreme Court. 649 The briefing on that case
concluded on July 16. Eight days later, the Supreme Court

644. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 3:20-CV-00303-RFB-VCF,
2020 WL 4260438, at *4 (D. Nev. June 11), rev’d, 982 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 2020).
645. Id. at *2.
646. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, No. 20-16169, 2020 WL
4274901, at *1 (9th Cir. July 2), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020) (mem.).
647. Id.
648. Id.
649. Emergency Application for an Injunction Pending Appellate Review,
Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603 (2020) (No. 19A1070),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/p
ublic/19a1070.html [https://bit.ly/3itNWTQ].
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denied the application in an unsigned per curiam opinion. 650
Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh dissented.
They would have granted the injunction. Through the
process of elimination, 651 we can conclude that Chief Justice
Roberts, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor,
and Kagan voted to deny the injunction.
Chief Justice Roberts did not write separately. He did
not reconcile his South Bay analysis with the facts in
Nevada. Nor did Chief Justice Roberts address the lower
courts who had treated his South Bay concurrence—and its
discussion of Jacobson—as binding precedent. The Chief
Justice remained silent.
Justice Alito wrote the principal dissent. He suggested
that the lower court erred by relying on Jacobson. Justice
Alito explained that “it is a mistake to take language in
Jacobson as the last word on what the Constitution allows
public officials to do during the COVID-19 pandemic.” 652
Justice Alito added that the “[l]anguage in Jacobson must be
read in context.” 653 Specifically, Jacobson was not a Free
Exercise Clause case. Justice Alito wrote that “it is important
to keep in mind that Jacobson primarily involved a
substantive due process challenge to a local ordinance
requiring residents to be vaccinated for small pox.” 654 He
concluded that “[i]t is a considerable stretch to read the
decision [in Jacobson] as establishing the test to be applied
when statewide measures of indefinite duration are
challenged under the First Amendment or other provisions

650. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603 (2020)
(mem.).
651. Josh Blackman, Invisible Majorities: Counting to Nine Votes in Per
Curiam Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (July 23, 2020, 3:23 PM), https://www.scotusblog
.com/2020/07/invisible-majorities-counting-to-nine-votes-in-per-curiam-cases/
[https://perma.cc/U6BR-ZR6S].
652. Calvary Chapel, 140 S. Ct. at 2608 (Alito, J., dissenting).
653. Id.
654. Id.
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not at issue in that case.” 655
Justice Kavanaugh wrote a separate dissent. He made a
similar point about the 1905 precedent. Jacobson, he wrote,
stands for the proposition that “courts should be extremely
deferential to the States when considering a substantive due
process claim by a secular business that it is being treated
worse than another business.” 656
The Calvary Chapel dissenters were correct. Alas, the
Chief Justice’s “superprecedent” would remain the law of the
land—for exactly four more months.
D. Reverend Jacobson of Cambridge Leaves the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn
Between June and November 2020, Chief Justice
Roberts’s South Bay concurrence became a superprecedent.
These decisions largely adhered to the fourth level of
Jacobson’s myth: in times of public health crises, Jacobson
deference is the governing framework for all judicial review.
But soon the superprecedent would come to an end. On
November 25, 2020, the Supreme Court decided Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo. The new Roberts
Court—with Justice Barrett replacing Justice Ginsburg—
held that New York’s restrictions on houses of worship were
unconstitutional. The per curiam decision followed
traditional First Amendment doctrine and did not rely on
Jacobson-level deference.
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, because he concluded
New York’s then-expired regulations no longer injured the
plaintiffs. Here, Roberts made no mention of Jacobson. In a
concurrence, Justice Gorsuch forcefully buried three of
Jacobson’s four myths. Chief Justice Roberts responded to
Justice Gorsuch. But he failed to defend his own

655. Id.
656. Id. at 2614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 25–28 (1905)).
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superprecedent. Indeed, Roberts mounted a partial retreat
from South Bay and Jacobson.
1. Jacobson Meets the New Roberts Court
On October 6, 2020, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo
imposed new restrictions on public gatherings in houses of
worship. 657 These policies were challenged by the Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, Agudath Israel of America, and
other parties. 658 The district court declined to enjoin Cuomo’s
policy. 659 It expressly recognized that Chief Justice Roberts
“rel[ied] on Jacobson.” 660 The court wrote, “in light of
Jacobson and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in South
Bay, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff has established a
likelihood of success on the merits.” 661 On November 9, the
Second Circuit affirmed based on the South Bay
concurrence. 662 In dissent, Judge Park assailed Jacobson. 663
He wrote, “Jacobson does not call for indefinite deference to
the political branches exercising extraordinary emergency
powers, nor does it counsel courts to abdicate their
responsibility to review claims of constitutional

657. Press Release, N.Y. Governor’s Press Off., Governor Cuomo Announces
New Cluster Action Initiative (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news
/governor-cuomo-announces-new-cluster-action-initiative
[https://perma.cc/2VWA-5FYX].
658. I represent parents and a Jewish school that also challenged Governor
Cuomo’s orders. I also filed an amicus brief in support of Agudath Israel before
the Second Circuit. See Josh Blackman, Briefs Filed in Lebovits v. Cuomo and
Agudath Israel of America v. Cuomo, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 27, 2020,
9:00 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/10/27/briefs-filed-in-lebovits-v-cuomoand-agudath-israel-of-america-v-cuomo/ [https://perma.cc/CDA9-J9FU].
659. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 493 F. Supp. 3d 168, 171
(E.D.N.Y. 2020), aff’d sub nom. Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 980 F.3d 222, 227–
28 (2d Cir. 2020), rev’d, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam).
660. Id.
661. Id. at 171.
662. Agudath Isr. of Am. v. Cuomo, 980 F.3d 222, 227–28 (2d Cir. 2020), rev’d
sub nom. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per
curiam).
663. Id. at 230 (Park, J., dissenting).
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violations.” 664 That circuit court decision would be the last
hurrah for the South Bay concurrence, and the fourth level
of Jacobson’s myth.
The composition of the Supreme Court had changed
since South Bay. Justice Ginsburg passed away, and was
replaced by Justice Amy Coney Barrett. 665 She took the
judicial oath on October 27, 2020. And on November 12, the
Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn sought an injunction
from the new Roberts Court. 666 Later that evening, Justice
Alito delivered the keynote address at the Federalist Society
National Lawyers Convention. 667 He spoke at some length
about COVID-19, religious liberty, and Jacobson.
So what are the courts doing in this crisis, when the
constitutionality of COVID restrictions has been challenged in
court[?] [T]he leading authority cited in their defense is a 1905
Supreme Court decision called Jacobson v. Massachusetts. The case
concerned an outbreak of smallpox in Cambridge, and the Court
upheld the constitutionality of an ordinance that required
vaccinations to prevent the disease from spreading. Now I’m all in
favor of preventing dangerous things from issuing out of Cambridge
and infecting the rest of the country and the world. It would be
good if what originates in Cambridge stayed in Cambridge.
But to return to the serious point, it’s important to keep Jacobson
in perspective. Its primary holding rejected a substantive due
process challenge to a local measure that targeted a problem of
limited scope. It did not involve sweeping restrictions imposed
across the country for an extended period. And it does not mean
that whenever there is an emergency, executive officials

664. Id.
665. See Peter Baker & Nicholas Fandos, Trump Announces Barrett as
Supreme Court Nominee, Describing Her as Heir to Scalia, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/26/us/politics/amy-coney-barrett-supre
me-court.html [https://perma.cc/Z6XC-ATW9].
666. Emergency Application for Writ of Injunction, Roman Cath. Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (No. 20A87), https://www.supremecourt
.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20a87.html
[https://perma.cc/4R3A-JDD9].
667. Adam Liptak, In Unusually Political Speech, Alito Says Liberals Pose
Threat to Liberties, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/11/13/us/samuel-alito-religious-liberty-free-speech.html
[https://perma.cc/58JA-88V8].
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have unlimited unreviewable discretion. 668

Two weeks later, Justice Alito’s assessment of Jacobson
would appear in the U.S. Reports.
On November 25, shortly before midnight, the Supreme
Court decided Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v.
Cuomo. 669 The majority halted New York’s regulations. The
per curiam opinion was unsigned. But, by the process of
elimination, we can infer that Justices Thomas, Alito,
Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett were in the majority.
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan were in dissent. 670 Justice Ginsburg could no longer
maintain the South Bay majority. Now, Justice Barrett
helped the new conservative Court form a new 5–4 majority.
The unsigned per curiam opinion was very short at less
than 2,000 words. It did not cite Jacobson, or the Chief
Justice’s South Bay concurrence. The mythical precedent of
1905 and the superprecedent of 2020 played no part in the
Court’s decision. In Roman Catholic Diocese, the Court
effectively repudiated the South Bay concurrence, and, in the
process, cast some doubt about the continued vitality of
Jacobson—at least with respect to Free Exercise Clause
cases. For our purposes, the most important aspects of the
case were Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence and Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissent. The two separating writings sparred over
Jacobson.

668. Josh Blackman, Video and Transcript of Justice Alito’s Keynote Address
to the Federalist Society, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 12, 2020, 11:18 PM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/12/video-and-transcript-of-justice-alitoskeynote-address-to-the-federalist-society/ [https://perma.cc/ZP8P-8X8P].
669. 141 S. Ct. 63 (2020) (per curiam).
670. Id. at 75–81.
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2. Justice Gorsuch Buries Three of Jacobson’s Four
Myths
Justice Gorsuch wrote a four-page concurrence in Roman
Catholic Diocese. He offered a stinging criticism of the South
Bay concurrence. Gorsuch wrote that “a majority of the Court
[now] makes . . . plain” that “courts must resume applying
the Free Exercise Clause” to review COVID-19 measures
“[r]ather than apply[ing] a nonbinding and expired
concurrence from South Bay.” 671 Indeed, Gorsuch wrote that
the South Bay concurrence “was mistaken from the start,”
because “[t]o justify its result,” the Chief Justice “reached
back 100 years in the U.S. Reports to grab hold of our
decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts.” 672 But, Gorsuch
stressed, “Jacobson hardly supports cutting the Constitution
loose during a pandemic.” 673 Justice Gorsuch then wrote four
paragraphs that addressed each of the four levels of
Jacobson’s myths. Gorsuch forcefully rejected the first,
second, and fourth levels, but he seemed to accept the third
level.
First, Gorsuch recited the actual facts of Jacobson. He
did not accept the first level of Jacobson’s myth from Buck v.
Bell. Gorsuch wrote that the Massachusetts law “required
individuals to take a vaccine, pay a $5 fine, or establish that
they qualified for an exemption.” 674 There was no forcible
mandate to be vaccinated. People could instead choose to pay
a modest fine. Indeed, Gorsuch converted the $5 fine to
present-day value as $140. 675 Justice Gorsuch’s reading of
Jacobson closely tracked my own, which I articulated prior
to Roman Catholic Diocese. 676 And I offered the same
671. Id. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
672. Id.
673. Id.
674. Id.
675. Id.
676. Josh Blackman, Jacobson v. Massachusetts Did Not Uphold the State’s
Power To Mandate Vaccinations, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 24, 2020,
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calculation, but rounded up to $150. 677
Second, Gorsuch rebuked the second layer of Jacobson’s
myth from Sherbert v. Verner: the 1905 precedent has no
bearing on laws that burden enumerated rights, like the free
exercise of religion. Gorsuch explained that “Jacobson predated the modern tiers of scrutiny.” 678 He added, “[t]hat
decision involved an entirely different mode of analysis, an
entirely different right, and an entirely different kind of
restriction.” 679 Specifically, Jacobson asserted what we
would now call an “implied ‘substantive due process’ right to
‘bodily integrity’ that emanated from the Fourteenth
Amendment.” 680 Gorsuch’s choice of the verb “emanated”
seemed to mock Griswold v. Connecticut. 681 Justice Douglas’s
infamous decision intoned that “specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from
those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” 682
Justice Gorsuch completed the barb in the next sentence:
“Even if judges may impose emergency restrictions on rights
that some of them have found hiding in the Constitution’s
penumbras, it does not follow that the same fate should befall
the textually explicit right to religious exercise.” 683 Beneath
1:45 AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/24/jacobson-v-massachusetts-didnot-uphold-the-states-power-to-mandate-vaccinations/ [https://perma.cc/HFH3DKQ4]; Josh Blackman, What Exactly Is a Vaccine Mandate?, REASON: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Nov. 24, 2020, 9:00 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/24
/what-exactly-is-a-vaccine-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/AN2D-9PFR].
677. Josh Blackman, Roman Catholic Diocese Part II: Told You So About
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 26, 2020, 3:07
AM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/26/roman-catholic-diocese-part-ii-toldyou-so-about-jacobson-v-massachusetts/ [https://perma.cc/N847-ZPN7].
678. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 70 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
679. Id.
680. Id.
681. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
682. Id. at 484.
683. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 70–71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Of
course, the crux of Griswold was that the right to privacy was an emanation from
a penumbra from “textually explicit rights” in the Bill of Rights. Justice Douglas
tried mightily to keep his opinion within the Footnote Four framework. See
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the snark, Justice Gorsuch made an essential point: To the
extent Jacobson has any vitality, the precedent only affects
cases that involve unenumerated substantive due process
rights. Jacobson should have no bearing, whatsoever, on
laws that restrict “textually explicit rights” in the Bill of
Rights, such as the “right to religious exercise.” 684 Gorsuch
added that “[n]othing in Jacobson purported to address, let
alone approve, such serious and long-lasting intrusions into
settled constitutional rights” like New York’s restrictions on
“traditional forms of worship.” 685
Third, Justice Gorsuch seemed to accept, at least by
implication, the third layer of Jacobson’s myth from Roe v.
Wade. He did not disagree that Jacobson was the appropriate
framework to review substantive due process cases during
the pandemic. Gorsuch wrote that “Jacobson applied what
would become the traditional legal test associated with the
right at issue.” Specifically, he contended that Jacobson
“essentially applied [modern] rational basis review.” 686 I
disagree.
The standard of review from Jacobson does not resemble
modern day constitutional law. 687 And Jacobson’s test did
not serve as a progenitor of the modern rational basis test. 688
It is a mistake to conflate the two doctrines. 689 If anything,
BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 29, at 224 (Justice Douglas “tried to base the
unenumerated ‘right of privacy’ on several enumerated rights in the Bill of
Rights. This move, at least superficially, allowed Griswold to remain within
Footnote Four’s framework.”).
684. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
685. Id.
686. Id. at 70.
687. See supra Section II.A.
688. Id.
689. Lindsay F. Wiley & Stephen I. Vladeck, Coronavirus, Civil Liberties, and
the Courts: The Case Against “Suspending” Judicial Review, 133 HARV. L. REV. F.
179, 191 (2020) (“In other words, in a decision that predated even Lochner (by
just under two months), the Supreme Court’s reference to what was ‘reasonable’
was far more robust than what we tend to think of today as ‘minimum rationality’
rational basis review.” (footnote omitted)).
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Jacobson was more rigorous than modern rational basis
review. In Jacobson, Justice Harlan suggested that laws
enacted for pretextual reasons would be unconstitutional. 690
But under precedents like Williamson v. Lee Optical, 691
courts uphold pretextual laws so long as there is some
“conceivable” basis to justify them. 692
Justice Gorsuch tried to reconcile Jacobson with modern
precedent. He wrote, “Jacobson explained that the
challenged law survived only because it did not ‘contravene
the Constitution of the United States’ or ‘infringe any right
granted or secured by that instrument’”—such as the First
Amendment. 693 Here, I think Justice Gorsuch overreached.
It was sufficient to simply find that the 115-year-old opinion
predated modern constitutional law, and leave it there.
Jacobson should be interred, not revived. Still, I agree with
Gorsuch that Massachusetts’s law would have “easily
survived rational basis review.” 694 I am less certain that the
law “might even have survived strict scrutiny,”
notwithstanding “the opt-outs available to certain
objectors.” 695
Fourth, Gorsuch rejected the fourth mythical gloss that
Chief Justice Roberts placed on Jacobson: the deferential

690. See supra Section II.C.4.
691. 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“But the law need not be in every respect
logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is
an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
692. See BARNETT & BLACKMAN, supra note 29, at 175. In Lee Optical, the
District Court, however, found the Oklahoma regulation was pretextual. Lee
Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 142 (W.D. Okla. 1954)
(“The dispensing optician, a merchant in this particular, cannot arbitrarily be
divested of a substantial portion of his business upon the pretext that such a
deprivation is rationally related to the public health.” (emphasis added)), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
693. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 71 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
694. See id.
695. See id.
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precedent is not a rubber stamp for all government actions
during a pandemic. He stated, unequivocally, that “Jacobson
didn’t seek to depart from normal legal rules during a
pandemic, and it supplies no precedent for doing so.” 696 This
argument is anachronistic. When Jacobson was decided, the
“normal legal rules,” as we understand them today, did not
exist. The better explanation is that Jacobson does not
provide an escape hatch from modern constitutional
doctrine.
Justice Gorsuch buried three of Jacobson’s fourth myths.
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts forcefully responded to
Justice Gorsuch. But he failed to defend his own
superprecedent. Indeed, Roberts mounted a partial retreat
from South Bay and Jacobson.
3. Chief Justice Roberts’s Partial Retreat from
Jacobson
Chief Justice Roberts dissented in Roman Catholic
Diocese. By late November, New York had removed the
restrictions on houses of worship. The government argued
that the case became moot. And the Chief Justice agreed. He
found that there was “simply no need” to “grant injunctive
relief under the present circumstances.” 697 At the time, none
of the applicants were subject to “any fixed numerical
restrictions.” 698 Roberts recognized that “it is a significant
matter to override determinations made by public health
officials concerning what is necessary for public safety in the
midst of a deadly pandemic.” 699 Still, Roberts observed that
New York’s “challenged restrictions raise serious concerns
under the Constitution,” and were distinguishable from the
challenged regulations he declined to enjoin in South Bay

696. Id. at 70.
697. Id. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
698. Id.
699. Id.
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and Calvary Chapel. 700 Had New York not changed its
restrictions, Roberts may have ruled for the Plaintiffs.
The Chief Justice, however, was not done. He took
umbrage with Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence. Specifically,
Roberts blanched at any suggestion that he propagated a
misreading of Jacobson. Roberts charged, “One solo
concurrence today takes aim at my concurring opinion in
South Bay.” 701
In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch wrote that “today
the author of the South Bay concurrence even downplays the
relevance of Jacobson for cases like the one before us.” 702
According to Gorsuch, Roberts now claims that “the South
Bay concurrence never really relied in significant measure
on Jacobson.” 703 This account, Gorsuch claimed, “would
require a serious rewriting of history.” 704 What evidence does
Gorsuch adduce to show that the Chief Justice relied on the
Jacobson? Gorsuch said that Jacobson “was the first case
South Bay cited on the substantive legal question before the
Court, it was the only case cited involving a pandemic.” 705
Roberts returned fire. He observed that Jacobson
“warranted exactly one sentence in South Bay.” 706 By
contrast, “Jacobson occupies three pages of today’s
concurrence.” 707 And “[w]hat did that one sentence say?” 708
Roberts repeated himself: “Only that ‘[o]ur Constitution
principally entrusts ‘[t]he safety and the health of the people’
to the politically accountable officials of the States ‘to guard

700. Id.
701. Id.
702. Id. at 71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
703. Id.
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. Id. at 75 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
707. Id.
708. Id.
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and protect.’” 709 Roberts wrote, “It is not clear which part of
this lone quotation today’s concurrence finds so
discomfiting.” 710 Roberts charged that “[t]he concurrence
speculates that there is so much more to the sentence than
meets the eye.” 711 But Roberts was content to mock Justice
Gorsuch’s “interpretive tools,” including the “new ‘first case
cited’ rule.” 712 The Chief Justice retorted that “the actual
proposition asserted should be uncontroversial, and the
concurrence must reach beyond the words themselves to find
the target it is looking for.” 713
Roberts aptly lampooned Gorsuch’s “first case cited”
rule. But the Chief Justice of the United States had no
response to the hundred-plus federal judges who read
Roberts’s “superprecedent” as embracing Jacobson. 714
Justice Gorsuch asked rhetorically, “Why have some
mistaken this Court’s modest decision in Jacobson for a
towering authority that overshadows the Constitution
during a pandemic?” 715 South Bay is to blame, at least in
part. Gorsuch observed that “many lower courts quite
understandably read [South Bay’s] invocation [of Jacobson]
as inviting them to slacken their enforcement of
constitutional liberties while COVID lingers.” 716 He cited two
cases. First, the Seventh Circuit, per Judge Easterbrook,
“line[d] up with Chief Justice Roberts.” 717 Second, the
709. Id. at 75–76 (quoting South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020) (Roberts,
C. J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief) (alteration in
original) (quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905)), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 141 S. Ct. 2563 (2021) (mem.)).
710. Id. at 76.
711. Id.
712. Id.
713. Id.
714. See supra Sections VI.B.2, VI.B.3.
715. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 71 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
716. Id.
717. Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker, 962 F.3d 341, 347 (7th
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District of New Mexico cited the Chief Justice quoting
Jacobson. 718
In Section VI.B, I cited dozens of other cases that
demonstrated the influence of Roberts’s concurrence to
embrace Jacobson. Jurists across the country managed to
glean the same understanding of Jacobson. I find it highly
unlikely that all of these judges misread a Supreme Court
decision. The far more plausible conclusion is that Roberts
sent an unmistakable signal to the lower courts. The
inescapable implication of the Chief Justice’s concurrence is
that Jacobson played a role in Robert’s constitutional
calculus. Judges of all stripes saw what Gorsuch saw. There
was not more than meets the eye. The rule was staring
everyone in the face.
I acknowledge that Chief Justice Roberts never made his
point explicitly. But the Chief, a master wordsmith, can say
much with few words. I doubt he ever intended his
concurrence to have such an impact. To Roberts, his
Jacobson citation was a simple, unremarkable sentence. No
more, no less. There is only what meets the eye. But Roberts
turned a blind eye as the judiciary consistently—and
apparently erroneously—misread his opinion.
In November 2020, I wrote that “the South Bay
concurrence has taken on a life of its own, far beyond the
Chief’s intentions.” 719 Whether intentional or not, Roberts
Cir. 2020) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Perhaps a state could differentiate between the
maximum gathering permitted in a small church and a cathedral with seats for
3,000, but we do not evaluate orders issued in response to public-health
emergencies by the standard that might be appropriate for years-long notice-andcomment rulemaking.”); see Josh Blackman, Judge Easterbrook Admits What
Was Implicit in Chief Justice Robert’s South Bay Decision, REASON: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (June 17, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2020/06/17
/judge-easterbrook-admits-what-was-implicit-in-chief-justice-roberts-south-baydecision/ [https://perma.cc/V95W-BU3W].
718. Legacy Church, Inc. v. Kunkel, 472 F. Supp. 3d 926, 1046 (D.N.M. 2020).
719. Josh Blackman, The Chief Justice’s Unexpected Super Precedent from the
Shadow Docket, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 17, 2020, 2:04 AM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2020/11/17/the-chief-justices-unexpected-superprecedent-from-the-shadow-docket/ [https://perma.cc/TP4L-EGNP].
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provided critical and timely guidance for the lower courts.
And in Calvary Chapel and Roman Catholic Diocese, the
Chief Justice made no effort to disabuse those judges of their
apparent errors. From my vantage point, Roberts was
content that his understated concurrence nudged judges to
adopt a constitutional framework from 1905.
In his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch recognized that “no
Justice now disputes any of [his] points” regarding
Jacobson. 720 Gorsuch added, “Nor does any Justice seek to
explain why anything other than our usual constitutional
standards should apply during the current pandemic.” 721
When push came to shove in Roman Catholic Diocese,
Roberts declined to defend his superprecedent. In truth, he
partially retreated from South Bay and Jacobson.
4. Jacobson Falls After Roman Catholic Diocese
Roman Catholic Diocese “arguably represented a seismic
shift in Free Exercise law.” 722 And Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence went a long way to exile Jacobson from the
jurisprudential zeitgeist. The Supreme Court decided two
more COVID-19 Free Exercise cases on the shadow docket:
South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom II and
Tandon v. Newsom. Neither majority opinion cited
Jacobson. 723 Chief Justice Roberts wrote separately in South
Bay II, but did not even mention Jacobson. In August 2021,
the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional, in part, New
York’s COVID-19 eviction moratorium. 724 That decision
likewise did not cite Jacobson. Justice Breyer’s dissent
invoked Jacobson twice and cited the South Bay

720. Roman Cath. Diocese, 141 S. Ct. at 71 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
721. Id.
722. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 982 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir.
2020).
723. South Bay II, 141 S. Ct. 716 (2021); Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294
(2021) (per curiam).
724. Chrysafis v. Marks, 141 S. Ct. 2482, 2482 (2021).
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concurrence. 725 There was no response from the majority, nor
did Chief Justice Roberts write a separate opinion. By all
accounts from the shadow docket, the Supreme Court has
moved on from the fourth level of Jacobson’s myth.
Other lower courts also recognized that Roman Catholic
Diocese changed Jacobson’s legal landscape. A California
federal court summed up the shift:
Based on the recent U.S. Supreme Court precedent of Roman
Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, the concurrence of Justice Gorsuch,
and even the concurring opinion (in South Bay [II]) and dissenting
opinion (in Roman Catholic Diocese) of Chief Justice Roberts, this
Court concludes that the normal constitutional standards of review
should apply, not a separate “Jacobson standard.” 726

A New York federal court likewise explained that
“Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Roman Catholic Diocese of
Brooklyn v. Cuomo, informs the Court’s analysis and
instructs the Court to apply its usual tiers of scrutiny”
instead of Jacobson. 727 And a concurring judge on the Fifth
Circuit stated that Jacobson does not “suppl[y] the standard
by which courts in 2021 must assess emergency public health
measures.” 728 These statements would have been
constitutional apostasies between June and November 2020.
Lower courts were reversed for not following Jacobson. But
Roman Catholic Diocese, and in particular Justice Gorsuch’s
concurrence, laid bare the fourth level of Jacobson’s myth. A
public health emergency does not give rise to an alternative
standard of review.
725. Id. at 2484 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The legislature does not enjoy
unlimited discretion in formulating that response, but in this case I would not
second-guess politically accountable officials’ determination of how best to ‘guard
and protect’ the people of New York.” (first quoting Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11, 38 (1905); and then citing South Bay I, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613 (2020)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief))).
726. Culinary Studios, Inc. v. Newsom, 517 F. Supp. 3d. 1042, 1063 (2021).
727. Plaza Motors of Brooklyn, Inc. v. Cuomo, No. 20-CV-4851 (WFK) (SJB),
2021 WL 222121, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2021).
728. Big Tyme Invs., L.L.C. v. Edwards, 985 F.3d 456, 470–71 (5th Cir. 2021)
(Willett, J., concurring).
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Still, some courts continue to follow Jacobson. 729 Indeed,
district court judges, bound by circuit precedent, may have
their hands tied. 730 However, from my read of the
emanations and penumbras from the shadow docket, Roman
Catholic Diocese has largely eclipsed Jacobson.
CONCLUSION
For a century, Jacobson v. Massachusetts was largely an
obscure precedent. It was cited in scattered school
vaccination cases, and during the occasional quarantine
dispute. But for the most part, this 1905 decision became
irrelevant as constitutional law evolved. Yet, in a quartet of
landmark cases—Buck v. Bell, Sherbert v. Verner, Roe v.
Wade, and Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo—
Justices invoked Jacobson. These simple citations elevated a
narrow Lochner-era precedent into a complex, four-leveled
myth. First, under Jacobson, the government could forcibly
sterilize people to promote the common good. Second and
third, Jacobson provides an escape hatch from the tiers of
scrutiny; to fight outbreaks of disease, the government has
emergency
powers
to
abridge
enumerated
and
unenumerated rights. Fourth, during public health crises,
courts must provide across-the-board deference to the
government. Jacobson said nothing at all about these four
principles. But Jacobson had been retconned to support each
myth.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, courts reflexively relied
on the mythicized account of Jacobson to rubberstamp
729. See, e.g., Stewart v. Justice, 518 F. Supp. 3d 911, 917 (S.D. W. Va. 2021)
(“Though it is clear that Jacobson’s ultimate fate is unsettled, the Court declines
to read the tea leaves of Roman Catholic Diocese and will follow the [Jacobson]
rule adopted by a majority of courts.”); Heights Apartments, LLC v. Walz, 510 F.
Supp. 3d 789, 808 (D. Minn. 2020) (stating that “the Court will apply Jacobson,
but it does so bearing in mind the many arguments against doing so”).
730. See, e.g., M. Rae, Inc. v. Wolf, 509 F. Supp. 3d 235, 246 (M.D. Pa. 2020)
(“The bottom line for our purposes is that Jacobson is controlling precedent until
the Supreme Court or Third Circuit Court of Appeals tell us otherwise.”).
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unprecedented restrictions on individual freedom. Yet, I
suspect these cases would have come out in the exact same
fashion even if Jacobson had never been decided. Judges of
all stripes have a natural tendency to exercise restraint in
times of crisis.
In Roman Catholic Diocese, Justice Gorsuch launched a
fusillade at those judges who relied on Jacobson to defer to
COVID measures. He asked, “Why have some mistaken this
Court’s modest decision in Jacobson for a towering authority
that overshadows the Constitution during a pandemic?” 731
Putting aside the Chief Justice’s South Bay concurrence,
Gorsuch could “only surmise that much of the answer lies in
a particular judicial impulse to stay out of the way in times
of crisis.” 732 Justice Gorsuch concluded that “[t]hings never
go well” when judges “shelter in place when the Constitution
is under attack.” 733 He added, “Jacobson hardly supports
cutting the Constitution loose during a pandemic.” 734 Indeed,
the Supreme Court had never formally stated that Jacobson
formed bypasses from the edifice of modern constitutional
law.
Jacobson or no Jacobson, courts still would have
deferred to unprecedented lockdown measures. Yet,
Jacobson proved to be a useful prop for judges who otherwise
sought to exercise judicial minimalism. Jacobson was old,
but never overruled. The case was written by a revered
Justice, without any published dissents. The Supreme Court
had cited it over the years in cases involving bodily
autonomy, religious freedom, abortion, and unenumerated
rights. There was language about deference, the common
good, and fundamental rights. And the case arose during a
virus outbreak. It was the ideal case through which judges
731. Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 71 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
732. Id.
733. Id.
734. Id.
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could refract their own passive virtue. For these reasons,
courts expressed no caution with elevating Jacobson to the
apotheosis of constitutional law. The myth of Jacobson was
far more important than the precise contours of Justice
Harlan’s decision. And Chief Justice Roberts effortlessly
propped up that myth in South Bay.
Those judges who eschewed Jacobson, or at least cast
doubt on the case, were also the judges least likely to favor
restraint. The COVID-19 cases were something of a
jurisprudential Rorschach Test. Some jurists looked at the
never-ending and ever-changing torrent of restrictions as
arbitrary and capricious executive lawmaking. Other jurists
welcomed all efforts from the state to do something—
anything—to fight COVID-19. The actual facts and holding
of Jacobson had little impact on how judges viewed the
venerable inkblot. But for those jurists who favored
restraint, Jacobson provided weighty authority to
rubberstamp state action. During a century of incubation,
Jacobson laid dormant, “like a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need.” 735 COVID-19 pulled the trigger.
The Supreme Court should now disarm all four
chambers of that lethal weapon. First, the Court should
explain that its modern substantive due process precedents
govern disputes about bodily autonomy, not Jacobson. It
would be salutary to finally overrule Buck v. Bell. Second,
the Court should formally adopt Justice Gorsuch’s analysis
from Roman Catholic Diocese: during a pandemic, modern
First Amendment jurisprudence and not Jacobson should
govern Free Exercise Clause disputes. Third, the Court
should reject the framework from In re Abbott, and hold that
Jacobson plays no role when reviewing laws that burden
735. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting); see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 443 (1944) (“Even the
personal liberty of the citizen may be temporarily restrained as a measure of
public safety.” (first citing Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); and
then citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905))).
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unenumerated rights. 736 Fourth, the Court may have already
buried Chief Justice Roberts’s not-so-superprecedent. But, to
dispel any doubts, the Court should limit Jacobson to its
facts: the government can impose a modest fine on the
unvaccinated, with exemptions based on specific health
concerns. And, in light of modern doctrine, exemptions must
also be granted to protect the freedom of religion. Finally, to
avoid propagating future myths, the Court should stop citing
Jacobson altogether. These seemingly harmless citations
often take on a life of their own.
With these four steps, Jacobson can be restored to its
original meaning, and the Court can permanently seal the
constitutional escape hatch. Future disputes should be
resolved based on settled law, and not on an irrepressible
myth.

736. The Supreme Court ultimately vacated In re Abbott because the case
became moot. See Planned Parenthood Ctr. For Choice v. Abbott, 141 S. Ct. 1261
(2021). In re Abbott is no longer a binding circuit precedent.

